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Summary
This thesis is a text-based analysis o f conceptions o f the intellectual in relation 
to the political sphere. The specific instances studied relate, positively and 
negatively, to the socialist tradition in politics and culture. They are drawn from  
a variety o f academic disciplinary contexts and also from  the contexts o f 
political organisations and social movements. One o f the principal dilemmas 
faced by the intellectual in this century, as this thesis sets out to make clear, has 
been that o f trying to bridge the divide between these two spheres.
This investigation is centred upon statements made by intellectuals reflecting 
upon the typical role or function o f the intellectual within society and politics. 
My contention is that such self-reflection is a necessary condition o f the 
intellectual's coming into being. Intellectuals are realised in specific identities, 
in a process o f self-identification. The force o f intellectual practice is dependent 
upon elements o f personal commitment, moral or political, and the enactment o f 
an experiential dimension. But, at the same time, as a practice that has a 
transcendent orientation, the intellectual seeks to go beyond the subjective in 
pursuit o f the objective, the extra-personal, the unsituated.
My thesis offers itself as an identification o f a tradition, as the relation o f a 
narrative o f the intellectual, which also recognises its own particularity. As such, 
it is not a work o f synthesis, but a reflexive narrative. Narrative is an appropriate 
concept with regards to the intellectual; it m ay thus be seen as a creative process 
drawing upon particular events and characters. Such a view, involving both 
commitment to and distance from  the intellectual, is not common within 
prevailing accounts, which have tended to be either sociological-objective or 
normative-subjective. I have tried to see the intellectual as reflexively situated 
between these positions, as between an interested identity and disinterested 
practice, and not ju st in a purely “objective "fashion but acknowledging my own 
involvement within such a view.
‘And now the tempter whispers ‘But you also 
Have the slave-owner’s mind,
Would like to sleep on a mattress of easy profits,
To snap your fingers or a whip and find 
Servants or houris ready to wince and flatter 
And build with their degradation your self-esteem;
What you want is not a world of the free in function 
But a niche at the top, the skimmings of the cream.’
And I answer that this is largely so for habit makes me 
Think victory for one implies another’s defeat,
That freedom means the power to order, and that in order 
To preserve the values dear to the élite 
The élite must remain a few It is so hard to imagine 
A world where the many would have their chance without 
A fall in the standard of intellectual living 
And nothing that the highbrow cared about 
Which fears must be suppressed There is no reason for 
thinking
That, if you give a chance to people to think or live,
The arts of thought or life will suffer and become rougher 
And not return more than you could ever give. ’
Louis Macneice, Autumn Journal III
Prologue: The Dialectics of Intellectual Practice
‘[IIn approaching the question o f the intellectuals one is confronted not just with 
alternative definitions or theories, or even bodies o f empirical evidence, but with 
alternative historical narratives with profound political resonances. ’ (Nicholas 
Garnham, 1995: 365)
Problems of a Definition
Conventionally studies of the intellectual begin with a definition. In 
accordance with sound academic practice, the object of analysis is, first, 
identified, and then, proposals offered and conclusions drawn as to the exact 
nature of that object both in relation to specific empirical phenomena and to a set 
of statements which already define it.
To the extent that the coherence of a piece of research is dependent upon the 
identification of a discrete object upon which a methodological and conceptual 
apparatus may be brought to bear, it may be said that I, too, follow conventional 
practice. However, at the same time, I would argue that it is necessary to assert 
the special character of the intellectual with regard to the question of a definition. 
For the intellectual necessarily exhibits a high degree of self-reflexivity, and 
central to intellectual practice is the act of self-definition One may say, indeed, 
that talking about what it means to be an intellectual is not the same as being one, 
but, this being acknowledged, an essential part of being an intellectual is to talk 
about what it means to be one.
To embark upon a study of the intellectual is to enter into a discourse that 
demands participation, in the sense of requiring the researcher to participate in a 
contradictory relationship between his or her scholarly practice and the identity 
within which that practice is realised. To reflect in a any serious and extended 
way upon the nature of the intellectual requires one, at least, to register the 
dialectic of universality and particularity which has been key to its successive
conceptions. As such, it is to recognise that the practice of knowledge has both 
an inward and an outward orientation, is constitutive of both subject and object, 
which stand in a contradictory relation with one another The intellectual is the 
name given to that reflexive moment within knowledge where it realises itself in 
a particular identity and simultaneously attempts to overcome the specificity of 
that manifestation. The intellectual, as Sartre stated, is that which uncovers the 
tension between the limitless promise of rational knowledge and its cramped and 
limited realisation in specific individual and collective forms.
My own discussion of the intellectual, then, is marked by a contradiction: it is 
driven by the imperative to define its object, to find a universal, disinterested and 
permanent definition of the intellectual, while being aware that no such object 
exists, only its manifestation in particular intellectuals existing in specific 
situations. However, those intellectuals through acts of self-definition themselves 
have attempted to identify just such an “objective” entity as part of their function 
as intellectuals, while at the same time acknowledging the limits and 
contradictory character of that endeavour. The contradiction that characterises 
this thesis thus constitutes an extension of that contradiction between subject and 
object, universality and particularity, commitment and distance that has, by turns, 
been repressed, regretted and celebrated in succeeding conceptions of the 
intellectual but which may be said to be at its heart
Narratives
As such, therefore, this thesis does not purport to give an impartial overview 
of the intellectual, nor does it seek to offer an encompassing synthesis that
u
enables the observer to go away with a comprehensive taxonomy of “types”. It 
constitutes, rather, something more indeterminate in character: an attempt to 
elaborate a narrative of the intellectual which makes no claims to objective truth 
but instead is an active making of a tradition that is also a recognition of that 
tradition’s heterogeneous and self-contradictory nature. This attempt has 
therefore its own narrative “truth”, that is, it is true in that it articulates the 
character of the tradition of the active, self-making intellectual 
This thesis forms a single linear narrative insofar as it represents an effort to 
tell one story, starting, roughly, in 1910 and ending in the present day, against a 
unified background of events and characters, that of European revolution and 
counter-revolution, Cold War, the Communist Party, academic institutions and 
counter-hegemonic cultural and political formations. But this general narrative is 
realised through a number of micro-narratives, which may be said to exist in 
other than chronological relationship This mode of narration is appropriate 
insofar as the intellectual does not exist, as stated above, in a “pure” form as a 
discrete autonomous entity but in particular conceptions elaborated out of 
specific political, cultural and social contexts that are the products of the attempt 
to relate to a wider, non-specific, traditional context
In this respect, one can see the relevance here of Bourdieu’s description of the 
intellectual as characterised by an ‘intention o f autonomy' (1996: 343); the pure, 
autonomous intellectual is that which is aspired to, rather than being what has 
been already achieved 1 In present circumstances, intellectuals are divided by 
‘conjunctural and epiphenomenal oppositions’ (1996: 343) arising out of specific 
situations (Bourdieu uses the example of Habermas and Foucault to illustrate his 1
1 For Bourdieu, sec chapter six below.
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point; each aspires to autonomy, but due to prevailing specific circumstances of 
tradition, each saw the other as an opponent )
In this way, the narrative of the intellectual is aspiralional, is concerned with 
escaping the limits o f identity and condition into the pure realm of autonomy 
Articulated in such a narrative, therefore, are both dependence and independence. 
Hence, in his argument for a “corporatism of the universal”, Bourdieu identifies 
the intellectual’s specific aspirational function as requiring a dialectical 
interaction with the limits which seek always to impose themselves upon the 
specific intellectual, with institutional limits in particular. Without these limits, 
the intellectual would achieve a pure autonomy, would achieve a disembodied, 
asocial existence, which outcome Bourdieu, with his materialist social analysis, 
can not accept Without the constant need for the re-telling of the narrative of the 
intellectual, according to changing conditions and conventions, there would no 
longer be a need for a storyteller The dialectic would thus come to an end
In the last chapter of this thesis I have identified the contemporary 
political/cultural conjuncture as one where the limits upon the aspiration of the 
intellectual have been accepted, leading to the cancellation o f the autonomous 
intention. The contemporary crises of the intelligentsia so often commented upon 
may be said to be a crisis o f its own making. Those in the position which 
formerly would have been that from which the narrative of the intellectual would 
be re-told, who would have reclaimed an continued the tradition of the 
intellectual by identifying themselves with it, no longer do so We have been 
witness in recent years to the so-called “end of meta-narratives”, to the bonfire of 
universalist traditions that aspire to transcend local traditions and micro­
narratives. This conflagration has accounted for the intellectual, as just such a
transcendent narrative. We can no longer lift ourselves above the level of 
particularity, it is not only that all the moves have already been made in the 
“games” of politics, philosophy and culture, but the fact that they are revealed as 
games that discredits their claims to seriousness, to an aspiration really to 
uncover the way of things and to change them. All that is left for us, a la Lyotard 
and Baudrillard, is the ‘refusal to mourn’ (Callinicos, 1989: 17) their passing, 
and to engage at the level of everyday life in “symbolic exchanges” -  that is, in 
the circulation of various particular representations of fragments of reality in 
order to accrue to ourselves symbolic “surplus value”.
But, the intellectual can not simply be placed at the level of meta-narrative; my 
argument is that, realised in specific identities, it has been engaged in a dialectic 
between general, and generalising, narratives -  grand theories, foundational 
accounts, moral and political schemata -  and those that are particular and local in 
character. The production of the former has involved the production of the latter, 
the creation o f ideals, objective and extra-personal conceptual or institutional 
structures has also necessitated the creation of a personal identity, of a certain 
subjectivity in a particular time and place. Moreover, this dual movement is 
contradictory, insofar as it constitutes the localising o f the universal, making it 
the “property” of a particular individual or group, and simultaneously, the 
universalising o f the particular, whereby the values and conceptions of specific 
individuals become generalised characteristics
Intellectuals and Socialism
The specific instances of the intellectual chosen for study in this thesis are 
drawn largely, though not exclusively, from the Left It is within the universe of 
Left politics and culture that the key problems and issues with regard to the
constitution of the intellectual have been brought most sharply into focus. With 
its orientation upon universal transformation and upon the realisation of theory in 
practice, socialism has provided a conceptual context that has had a deep appeal 
for intellectuals. However, in its practical realisation in the party and its 
subsidiary organisations, it has also provided an institutional context that has 
placed limits upon intellectual practice. The “classic” dilemmas of the 
intellectual in the twentieth-century have been those between commitment and 
distance, affiliation and non-affiliation, centrality and marginality, and it is 
within -  or, without -  the mass organisations of the Left that those dilemmas 
have been lived through and reflected upon
Indeed, one may say that the conceptions of the intellectual featured in the 
following chapters are to a large extent the products of the effort to resolve these 
dilemmas Thus, in his idea of the freischwebende Intelligenz Mannheim 
proposed a paradoxical figure whose social “commitment” rested upon his or her 
comprehensive synthesis of, or, distance from, all particular ideological 
positions And for Critical Theorists such as Horkheimer and Adorno, the very 
marginality o f the critical intellectual, his or her complete detachment from 
concrete political practice, constituted his or her centrality, insofar as the 
intellectual was thereby enabled to “identify” him- or herself with the negative 
totality that in their very partial and fragmentary character the phenomena of the 
present did not represent
For his part, Gramsci’s “organic intellectual” can be seen as, amongst other 
things, the result of his effort to overcome the opposition between individual and 
collective intellectual and cultural development. The elaboration of such 
intellectuals out of the ranks of the working-class, rather than representing the
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debasement of “High culture” at the hands of “mass culture”, would in fact be 
both the proof and the guarantee of that class’s cultural and moral maturity.
In the cases of Mills’ and Thompson’s re-assertion of the value of the moral- 
experiential dimension, there may be seen an attempt to re-moralise, to 
“personalise” the public political sphere in the teeth of a complete loss of 
legitimacy on the part of the official Left. The imaginative “craftsmanship” of 
Mills and the emphasis of Thompson upon the value of an “organic” educational 
practice represented the blurring of divisions between political and academic 
practice, where each would become (must become) both the subject of 
commitment and the object of distanced analysis.
Sartre, endeavouring to combine Marxism with existentialism and thereby 
reclaim the former as a vital, creative force in everyday life, argued for the 
intellectual to be seen as committed in his or her very existence. It was thus 
possible for him or her to play a central role in the class struggle without 
necessarily submitting to the discipline o f the party, without necessarily 
demonstrating commitment to the cause, As we will see, in the aftermath of the 
May Events in France Sartre sought to adapt this position, to bring into line with 
a new conviction of the necessity and efficacy of direct political action 
However, I would argue that his perception o f the intellectual’s contradictory 
position -  which awareness he made a constitutive element of the intellectual 
itself -  was not only valid but also not easily overcome, indeed, Sartre may be 
said ultimately to have adopted a position where the dialectic of commitment and 
distance, constraint and aspiration became a strict division between the two sides
Havel’s conception of an existential dissidence, unlike the other instances of 
the intellectual featured in this thesis, originated in the context of state socialism 
For Havel, in this context there was a necessity to distinguish between the
morally compromised “utopian” political intellectuals whom he held responsible 
for perpetuating the “fantasy” of human perfectibility through social engineering 
and those responsible “moral” intellectuals who preserved the idea of a sphere of 
transcendent truth above the merely political. According to Havel, Communism 
had transformed unthinking dependence into independent thought, commitment 
and membership into the ritualised acts of the unffee. It was the dissident’s task -  
his or her moral obligation -  to reclaim these and to reaffirm autonomy as that 
which had yet to be achieved.
However, and this leads us into the final chapter of our narrative, the 
expterience o f state socialism, and its collapse, has led Havel and many others to 
view not only socialism itself but politics as a whole (a politics o f the whole) as 
no longer the main sphere in or the appropriate means by which such an end can 
be achieved It is my contention, however, that with the disappearance of a belief 
in the possibility or desirability of a universalising politics one may also lose the 
aspiration that has been both its product and that by which such a politics may be 
held to account.
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From the Realm o f the Spirit to ‘the 
laboratory o f actual life9: Karl 
Mannheim’s Changing Intellectual
Introduction
The significance of the intellectual for Karl Mannheim was as that which served 
to bridge the gap between experience (the experiential totality) and theory, 
between systemic thought and the living phenomena of which it purported to give 
an account. Mannheim made the intellectual, or the reflective consciousness, 
central first to his philosophy of history and culture, and later to his sociology and 
social theory, in order to show that the knower was necessarily a part of what is 
known, that knowing was itself an act, a moment of doing Thus, for Mannheim, 
thought and action were part of one another.
The problem with which Mannheim was preoccupied was that of converting 
the global unity of cultural life into a conceptual unity accessible to thought He 
attempted to develop comprehensive categories that allowed the thinker to know, 
if only provisionally, the obscure totality of culture and the cultural process. 
Initially, in wartime Budapest, this was seen by Mannheim as a matter of 
cultivating, through the apprehension o f cultural objects, the “soul” -  specifically, 
the collective, generational consciousness of the “European intellectual” The 
intellectual, by taking upon him- or herself the tasks of cultural renewal, would 
achieve an ethical knowledge of the cultural totality -  a hermeneutic 
understanding of the whole through an active assimilation and articulation of its 
parts
During the period when Mannheim began to work out a systematic sociology 
of knowledge, having left Hungary after the counter-revolution of 1919, he began 
to focus upon a more strictly methodological emphasis and orientation with 
regard to the experiential/cultural totality. In Weimar Germany he sought to
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elaborate theoretical concepts and a scientific methodology which would provide 
the means whereby a-theoretical phenomena such as those of political and ethical 
life could be made accessible to rational reflection The famous freischwebende 
Intelligenz, or, “free-floating intellectual”, made its entrance at this point, as one 
possessed of a synthetic consciousness which enables him or her to be both part of 
and distanced from the cultural process. The intellectual was still seen by 
Mannheim as necessarily a participant, as one who had to consider him- or herself 
as part of that which he or she was attempting to understand, but this now became 
a methodological consideration -  that is, not a basis for a collective corporate 
consciousness and identity but that which provided the conditions for a new 
scientific objectivity.
Mannheim’s attempt to develop a sociological analysis which encompassed 
both theoretical and practical dimensions, and which offered an account of the 
objective facts of the social world and the interior articulation of those facts as 
values and as specific forms of consciousness, eventually foundered on the facts 
of historical experience in the Europe of the 1930s In his later emphasis upon the 
need for planning in social and political life can be seen an abandonment of the 
idea of a “dynamic synthesis” of competing historico-social points-of-view or 
modes of thought and the acceptance of the necessity for the imposition of a 
natural-scientific paradigm of knowledge upon all other forms of thought This 
development is readily evident in the division that took place within the 
intellectual On the one side there now stood the active planner devising concrete 
programmes and policies, a Deweyan pragmatic social reformer who based his or 
her proposals and conclusions upon a sound base of scientific knowledge, on the 
other was the marginal figure of the critical intellectual who should be allowed a
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cposition from which he or she could reflect upon the functioning of society and 
envisage future possibilities. The two functions would be structurally related, but 
they had become, precisely, functions -  there was no longer seriously presented 
the possibility of wholesale social and cultural renewal. Spirit had become that 
which had to be managed.
Theoretical Resources
Mannheim’s thought drew heavily upon German social and cultural philosophy 
and sociologies of knowledge and culture. As such, it had its roots in the 
hermeneutics and Weltanschauungslehre of Dilthey, in the Lebensphilosophie of 
Georg Simmel, in historicist thinking, and in Scheler’s and Max Weber’s 
sociologies of value In their different ways these approaches shared a common 
concern with the subjective conditions of knowledge and with the 
interdependence of fact and value. Their emphasis was with the contextual or 
conditional character of knowledge, its roots within specific concrete contexts, 
conceived either experientially, phenomenologically, or socio-historically. The 
subject and object of knowledge could not be assumed to be separate, and thus 
knowledge had to be seen as not knowledge o f objects for a disembodied, 
disinterested consciousness but as knowledge fo r  subjects with specific purposes 
To know should be seen as participating within particular social or existential 
processes; and the truth of particular “objective” propositions and claims could 
not be detached from their meaning within those processes.
Chief among these influences, one should place the figure of Georg Lukács. It 
was Lukács who in Budapest provided the focus for the so-called “Sunday Circle”
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which met to discuss metaphysical and idealist philosophies and ‘antirational 
phenomena’ (Gluck, 1985: 156) which asserted the importance of “spirit” and 
subjectivity in the face of the optimistic positivism prevalent amongst the 
Hungarian progressive intelligentsia. Lukács had connections with Weber and his 
circle, and with Simmel, and the Sunday Circle provided a context and a forum 
for the self-consciously marginalised intellectual. However, Lukács was also 
important to Mannheim as the author of History and Class Consciousness (1923), 
which was itself the product of the union of historical materialism, philosophical 
idealism and Weberian sociology (see Kettler, 1967 for an account of this). In that 
work Lukács affirmed the class consciousness of the proletariat, as the collective 
subject of history, as not merely the reflexive by-product of determinant material 
forces but as itself the essential factor in revolutionary transformation, as the 
dialectical realisation o f its historical agency (Lukács, 1971: 70-71).
Though Mannheim never accepted the ‘marxist account of the proletarian 
mission’ (Kettler, 1967: 421), he did, like Lukács, and in Ideology and Utopia 
(1936) particularly, theorise a connection between consciousness and political 
agency But for Mannheim the subject of that agency came to be the individual 
intellectual (though it has been argued that Lukács’ ‘Hegelianised Marxism’, with 
its philosophic bent, amounted to the same thing (see, most recently, Harding, 
1997)). Ultimately, the sociology of knowledge was conceived of not merely as a 
way of thinking about the relationship between the object and the subject of 
knowledge, between thought and its origins in particular experiential contexts, but 
sought to realise itself by seeking actively, through the agency of the intellectual, 
to reflect itself back into those contexts. These two moments, the theoretical- 
conceptual and the practical, were seen as inseparable. As such, the sociology of
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knowledge appeared to stand in a positive relation to Marxist theory. However, 
Mannheim was concerned with appropriating that theory for non-revolutionary 
ends; ultimately he sought a new, “dynamic” objectivity, rather than a 
revolutionary, class science, upon which the intellectual’s activity could be 
founded. The synthetic consciousness of the intellectual could provide the 
possibility of a rational politics of progressive cultivation.
Thus, drawing upon such an individualist conception of the intellectual, it 
became possible for Mannheim to posit the achievement of •se/f-consciousness as 
the individualised intellectual’s principle activity. An autonomous subjectivity, one 
might say, was the intellectual’s characteristic work, and the means by which he 
or she became socially and politically significant. The paradox of Mannheim’s 
sociology of knowledge was that though it sought to identify knowledge as part 
of wider social processes, and to see the contents and structures of subjective 
consciousnesses as themselves objective, it was only able to achieve this at one 
remove from real practical contexts and conditions. This paradox has been noted 
by a number of commentators, and in the next chapter I outline the objections of 
Critical Theorists such as Horkheimer and Adorno made from this position. David 
Frisby, for example, writes:
On the one hand there is evidence to suggest that the sociology of 
knowledge is a response to crises in German society and that the key 
figures who developed [it] saw its concrete practical aims as every bit as 
important as the theoretical aims On the other hand, there is nowhere a 
concrete analysis of the crises of German society. This suggests that, in
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fact, the perception of these crises is largely in theoretical terms. (Frisby, 
1992: 24)
Frisby goes on to refer to Mannheim’s statement in the original German version of 
Ideology and Utopia that ‘this book is itself conscious o f an intellectual crisis 
situation.’ For Mannheim, as for his fellow sociologists of knowledge, ‘[t]he crisis 
is a crisis for intellectuals’; it is a crisis which ‘arises out of the conflict and 
struggle between systems of world-views, ideologies and forms of life’, but ‘any 
delineation of these forms of life.is largely absent.’ (Frisby, 1992: 25, 24) Such a 
crisis, moreover, might be viewed, optimistically, as more open to resolution than 
the concrete social and political antagonisms which that crisis supposedly 
expressed. As we shall see in the next chapter, it was precisely this criticism - of a 
facile, essentially idealist optimism - that was levelled at Mannheim early on by 
members of the Institute for Social Research
At the same time, it should be pointed out that the persistence of such a 
distance between experiential reality and theoretical conceptualisations is precisely 
that which the sociology of knowledge was supposed to address. Mannheim 
hoped to locate in the consciousness of the intellectual the possibility of a 
synthesis (albeit a dynamic synthesis) and the resources for cultural renewal. But 
in so doing, I would argue, he undermined the validity of such a synthesis, and 
thus the characteristic effectivity of the intellectual as a political agent for which 
he had argued. Because, for Mannheim, the intellectual him- or herself, as a 
specific, individuated subject, was identified with the dynamic socio-historical 
process of, he or she was necessarily aligned with no existing collective social or
6
political force, and as an intellectual (though not necessarily as an individual 
active within a particular profession or occupation) could not be so aligned 
However, this meant that with the advent of fascism in Germany, when 
irrationalism threatened to end the possibility of any sort of progressive synthesis, 
Mannheim was forced effectively to abandon the synthesising intellectual 
grounded in the historicist sociology of knowledge.
The prospects for wholesale cultural renewal arising purely out of the realm of 
spirit and impelled by the spontaneous dynamic of becoming had been destroyed; 
indeed, it could be said (see, for instance, Marcuse, 1968: 124-125) to be spirit or 
culture itself, now embodied in the intangible, irreducible essence of race and 
nation, which constituted the gravest threat to progressive pluralist culture Thus, 
in the face of the crisis which fascism represented, Mannheim in his later work 
exchanged the idea of the dynamic and open-ended synthesis for that of planning 
Whereas previously the future could be left to itself - or rather, to the progressive 
unfolding of an intellectually inspired history - now it had to be brought 
scientifically into being. And in the process of this exchange the intellectual, as the 
agent of a spontaneous transformative critical practice, was itself “rationalised” 
and subordinated to existing social and political conceptions and priorities The 
‘optimism’ of the freischwehende intelligenz seeking a transcendent objectivity in 
the synthetic operations of consciousness eventually was supplanted by the hard- 
edged, scientistic objectivity of the planner attempting to stem the tide of 
irrationalism I
I shall now seek to explore more closely some of the critical conceptual and 
historical forces and contexts referred to above which led Mannheim early on to
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place great emphasis upon the dependent relation between knowledge and the 
living situation, between thought and action, and thus to represent the intellectual 
as an especially significant category in social development. In the process we will 
see his early emphasis upon the effectivity of a primarily cultural praxis. The first 
important location for Mannheim’s elaboration of the intellectual is Budapest in 
the first two decades o f this century.
Social and Cultural Renewal
I shall not rehearse at length the political and social circumstances of Hungary 
at this time, other than to say that they were marked by a keen sense amongst the 
Budapest-based intellectuals of the need for a radical transformation of Hungarian 
society - a transformation of what was seen as a near feudal social and economic 
system, and of an antiquated and undemocratic political system which revolved 
around privilege and corruption. The most significant organisation for those 
intellectuals in this context was the Sociological Society, which was founded in 
1900. Dismayed with the backwardness of Hungarian society, the Sociological 
Society espoused a Western outlook (looking, as Mary Gluck points out, 
especially to Britain and France (Gluck, 1985: 85-6)) and endorsed the cause of 
social progress; it was, according to one of its leaders, ‘for a generation the bridge 
of communication with Western progress’(Jaszi, 1969: 25) The Society 
compared itself approvingly with the Fabian Society in Britain, and shared the 
latter’s belief in the value of applying a positivistic scientific method to social 
problems and issues. (The first issue of what became the Society’s journal, 
Huszadik Szdzad ( Twentieth Century) carried a letter of greeting and endorsement
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from Herbert Spencer (Gluck, 1985: 88)). Like the Fabians - and like the slightly 
later Deutsche Hochschule fu r Politik (see Gay, 1968: 38-40) - the Sociological 
Society sought the development of a rational polity through the provision of 
public education in social and political science. To this end, it mounted a 
programme of open lectures and Free Schools (the institutional strategy par 
excellence of reforming intelligentsias in the early part of this century) which 
aimed to familiarise ‘the elite of every social layer, irrespective of age and 
sex with the most important tenets, methods, and achievements of modem 
sociology.’ (Gustav Gralz, cited in Gluck, 1985: 87-88)
In 1905, in the wake of the so-called “Somlo Affair”, a controversy centred 
on the claims made for the social and political implications of science (Gluck, 
1985: 98-9), the Society split into radical and conservative sections, and the latter 
eventually seceded After this, there was a movement on the part of those left 
towards an outright political and critical stance According to Jaszi, sociology 
became a ‘battle cry’, a ‘dividing agent which separated Hungarian middle-class 
society into a progressive and a reactionary section ’ (cited in Gluck, 1985: 101) 
‘Gradually’, writes Gluck, ‘the claims of scholarship gave way to those of politics, 
and by 1907 there seemed to be little doubt in Jaszi’s mind about the underlying 
political goals of radicalism ’ (Gluck, 1985: 99) A strongly Platonic notion of the 
intellectual as philosopher providing guidance in public affairs and thus grounding 
public conduct in reason developed ‘Guidance for the ideal politician’, 
proclaimed Jaszi, ‘can only come from the Platonic ideal: an age is to come when 
public life is controlled by philosophers, when men of complete theoretical 
knowledge and complete moral purity take on the leadership’ (cited in Kettler,
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1971: 47). Jâszi made this pronouncement at the foundation of the Radical Party 
in 1914, which sought actively to institute just this rationalisation of Hungarian 
politics and public affairs. Furthermore, he himself played a leading part in the 
bourgeois revolution of October 1918, and sat on the National Council which 
ushered in the Kârolyi régime. The October Revolution represented, as far as Jâszi 
was concerned, an attempt to establish the fundamental principle of ‘the 
sovereignty of the industrious masses of peasants and town workers in the State, 
under the guidance of the genuinely creative intelligenzia [sic.].’ (Jâszi, 1969: 36)
Thus, as represented by the Sociological Society and the Radical Party, a large 
section of the Budapest intelligentsia endorsed the civilising, rationalising and 
modernising responsibility of the intellectual In this, o f course, they placed 
themselves within the Enlightenment current of the “man of ideas” resisting the 
forces of irrationalism and of tradition Intellectuals such as Jâszi sought to 
employ science upon the “material” of society and politics, and in the process 
aimed to bring about social renewal As we shall see, in the long term this proved 
to be method and the aim of Mannheim’s scientific practice. However, in 
Budapest during the First World War he identified himself more closely with other 
methods and aims, in his involvement with the Sunday Circle gathered round 
Georg Lukács.
The Sunday Circle
The Sunday Circle was culturally modernist and philosophically idealist in 
orientation It exhibited a commitment to the modem in art (a commitment which 
Lukács had demonstrated early on with the foundation of the Thalia Theatre in
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Budapest in 1904, which put on performances of, amongst others, Ibsen, 
Strindberg and Wedekind); however, this was part of a more general commitment 
to culture as that which kept alive the possibility of a wholesale transformation of 
the contemporary order. Their commitment was to culture first and foremost, and 
the Circle was characterised, at least before the communist revolution o f 1919, by 
its focus upon the need for ‘cultural rebirth’ (Gluck, 1985: 9) and for an 
essentially “spiritual” solution to the contemporary political and cultural crisis. 
Indeed, in the words of one of its members, Anna Lesznai, the group ‘had a closer 
resemblance to a religious gathering than to a political club’ (cited in Gluck, 1985: 
24).
As such, therefore, in contrast to the scientism and rationalism o f the 
Sociological Society, the members of the Sunday Circle were interested in 
mysticism and the antirational for their capacity to gesture at possibilities as yet 
unrealised, worlds yet in the making, and in such “obscure” phenomena o f spirit 
as love and the forms and practices of folk culture. As David Kettler points out, 
‘[t]he guardian saints of the group in [its] early times were Kierkegaard and 
Dostoevsky’ (Kettler, 1971: 59fh), strong heroes of an individualist philosophy of 
inwardness. Moreover, the Circle situated itself within the orbit of German 
philosophy and thought Lukács, Mannheim and the poet Bela Balazs all studied 
with Simmel in Berlin. The group valued the Lebensphilosophie of the latter and 
the Geisteswissenschafien of Wilhelm Dilthey, as well as the thought of Weber 
and Nietzsche, as leading the way for an understanding of the objective world 
which went beyond understanding it as a dead object However, they criticised the 
older generation of thinkers for not following up the metaphysical consequences
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of their thought (see Gluck, 1985: 145ff). They saw a need for transcendence in 
the modem world, and sought to trace the shadow of futurity as it fell upon the 
present. Hence, it was with the culture of the future rather than the politics of the 
present that the Circle was explicitly concerned.
But, even with such a metaphysical emphasis the Circle was yet allied with the 
rationalist and positivist radical intellectuals against the Hungarian régime. 
Looking back upon the period in 1967, Lukács summed up their position thus:
Our [the Sunday Circle’s] common standpoint was that we were 
absolutely opposed to the growing Hungarian reaction, and in this respect 
we were in complete alliance with Huszadik Szdzad, but in the realm of 
philosophy, we were in sharp opposition to their free-thinking positivism 
(cited in Gluck, 1985: 94).
Similarly, Bâlazs, writing to Lukács in 1911, expressed an awareness of being 
caught between two apparently contradictory impulses:
Whenever I read an article by a radical or even a socialist, I always feel a 
violent opposition or antipathy toward their superficial enlightenment and 
antimetaphysical rationalism On the other hand, whenever I read 
conservative, religious writings, then 1 realize that in spite of everything, I 
am a man o f the Enlightenment; that I find their outlook narrow, ignorant, 
inhumane (cited in Gluck, 1985: 95).
The ambivalent and dualistic outlook of the Circle meant that the metaphysical 
and transcendent were seen not as existentially realisable in the present but as no
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more than obscurely figuring some far distant future, and this found expression in 
Mannheim’s conception of the intellectual. As Gluck writes:
For the Lukács group, antirational phenomena such as mysticism, erotic 
love, and the world of fairy tails were merely oblique symbols of 
metaphysical possibilities in some far-off future, rather than genuine 
options and solutions for the present. They in fact stated quite explicitly 
that neither art nor mysticism nor love could provide a lasting resolution 
of the cultural crisis they experienced as a generation. (Gluck, 1985: 156)
The Circle thought that a lasting solution to the present crisis would only be 
found in a future which was itself deeply uncertain. Such as it was, therefore, that 
solution would not be found through social or political means and action, but was 
the task of the culturally minded intellectual. However, the intellectual could only 
keep alive the possibility of a perfect future by committing herself to and working 
within an imperfect present The cultural tasks of the intellectual, therefore, 
necessitated a mode of participation within the present which required the 
recognition that those tasks might never be completed.
It was with such a consciousness of the present tasks of cultural renewal that 
the Circle organised a series of lectures and seminars under the aegis of the Free 
School for Geisteswissenschaften in 1917-18 for which Mannheim prepared what 
Frisby describes as ‘a programmatic statement of the group’s intentions.’ (Frisby, 
1992: 110) In this lecture, later published as Soul and Culture (U lek es 
Kultura), Mannheim tried to give an overview of the group’s central philosophical 
concerns and orientation, and in so doing sought to articulate a generational
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consciousness, to foment an awareness amongst his audience of a shared ethical 
purpose The alienation of intellectuals from society and culture was in fact a 
crucial aspect of the distancing of culture from itself. Due to this distancing, 
Mannheim claimed, ‘the inner structure of the cultural world has become 
transparent to us’; the outsider status of the intellectual as intellectual allowed his 
or her insight into the deeper recesses of the structure and functioning of culture 
as a whole. Moreover, it is in such periods o f estrangement or marginality, he 
went on, that ‘critical thinking becomes primary: logic, aesthetics, the philosophy 
of history come to the fore in scholarly works’, as it had in the historicist and 
humanistic scholarship which had developed in Germany. It is worth quoting the 
rest of the passage here.
I believe that the most valuable task of today’s intellectual generation lies 
in this direction. . . It is on the basis of this unique intellectual perspective of 
ours that I would wish to indicate our particular historic mission as a 
generation. And if we accept this mission, the outlines o f the solution 
already become clear (cited in Gluck, 1985: 75).
Mannheim’s conception of the tasks of the intellectual had a strong flavour of 
what Lukács, writing of his own position, was later to dismiss as ‘revolutionary 
messianism.’ (Lukács, 1971: xv) The ‘novel type of European intellectual’ that 
Mannheim considered had come into being might never get to see and to 
experience ‘the new contents embodied in the clarity of new cultural forms’; 
however, he or she would have ‘prepared the way for the new culture by making 
the old one comprehensible ’ (cited in Gluck, 1985: 182, 170) Such an 
intellectual would not seek to anticipate history by imposing inflexible “scientific”
14
solutions upon the future, but rather would be content with working in the here- 
and-now. The way toward the new culture is through the existing ‘products’ of 
the old, which have to be made understandable not as independent objects 
apprehended by an instrumental rationality but through their active appropriation 
by the “soul”.
The influence of Georg Simmel was strong upon Mannheim at this point; it was 
from Simmel that he took the idea of a contemporary ‘tragedy’ of cultural 
alienation which was manifested in the opposition between ‘objective’ and 
‘subjective’ cultures. According to Simmel,
[pjarticularly in periods of social complexity and an extensive division of 
labor, the accomplishments of culture come to constitute an autonomous 
realm, so to speak Things become more perfected, more intellectual, and 
to some degree more controlled by an internal, objective logic tied to their 
instrumentality, but the supreme cultivation, that of subjects, does not 
increase proportionately. (Simmel, 1971: 234)
Mannheim mirrored this conception in his description of objective culture as an 
‘independent leviathan’ which may overwhelm us and grow ‘beyond our grasp’ if 
we are unable to enter into a transformative relationship with it in which 
subjective and objective cultures become mutually dependent (cited in Frisby, 
1992: 110). Cultural regeneration is seen not as a matter of producing more and 
more perfect - more perfectly rational - objects but o f bringing culture to life, of 
reuniting ‘the totality of the objectivations of the mind’ (cited in Frisby, 1992: 
111) with the mind that created them. Writing only a few years before Mannheim,
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Simmel gave clear expression to this idea of the transformation of objects: ‘all 
objectivity, the object of all knowledge, must be transformed into life. Thus the 
process of cognition, now interpreted as a function of life, is confronted with an 
object which it can completely penetrate since it is equal in its essence.’ (Simmel, 
1971: 387) The appropriation of objects is simultaneously an extension of the 
subject; we no longer “possess” knowledge of things apart from ourselves, but 
instead knowledge is part of a total process of life, thinking an extension of living.
Within the Simmelian vision spelt out in Soul and Culture Mannheim presented 
the intellectual not as an agent of social and political enlightenment, not as one 
who provides guidance to a benighted society, but as one who through reflective 
thought enacts or articulates a cultural dialectic In terms of that dialectic the 
subjectivity of the intellectual (the “novel type of European intellectual”) -  the 
soul - becomes his or her principal work as an intellectual. Through reflection the 
intellectual makes possible the synthesis of object and subject, each becoming part 
o f the other in the living process of knowledge. Thus, in the context of what 
Kettler has called the Sunday Circle’s ‘revolutionary culturism’ (Kettler, 1971: 
36), that is, its insistence upon the need for comprehensive cultural renovation, 
Mannheim developed a conception of the intellectual as not simply a figure 
possessed of a stock of knowledge which she places at society’s disposal in 
accordance with the dictates of reason or conscience, but as one for whom life 
and thought are inseparable, and whose intellectualism resides in overcoming the 
conflict between the two. This context was removed with the success of the 
counter-revolution in Hungary, however, Mannheim went on to elaborate his
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ideas about the particular cultural-social significance of the intellectual within the 
context of the sociology o f knowledge in Weimar Germany.
The Renewal of Science
Mannheim moved to Germany in the wake of the counter-revolution and the 
establishment of the Hôrthy régime in Hungary. Though not forced immediately 
into exile like many others, his Jewishness and his willingness to work under the 
Soviet régime (Mannheim was appointed by Lukács, then the commissar for 
education, to a post at the university in Budapest (Woldring, 1986: 16-17)) 
ultimately counted against him. The revolutionary and counter-revolutionary 
events of 1918-19 had made the taking of sides unavoidable Mannheim, along 
with other members of the Circle, had come out onto the streets to demonstrate 
his support for the bourgeois October revolution. (Gluck, 1985: 198)
Furthermore, as events progressed, Lukács and many of the Circle, though not 
Mannheim, joined the Communist Party. Though Lukács framed this participation 
initially in familiar ethical and “transcendent” terms, referring to it as a sacrifice 
which had to be undertaken at the behest of the ‘imperative of the world-historical 
situation’, and as ‘a historico-philosophical mission’ (Lukács, 1972: 10) to install 
a new cultural, moral and spiritual order (Jâszi, 1969: 144), within the context of 
the Communists’ ascent to power and the establishment and defence of the Soviet 
Republic Lukács’ and the Circle’s adherence to a transcendent metaphysics was 
inevitably greatly modified, if not abandoned altogether. Thus, when Mannheim 
applied for readmission to the Circle, now reassembled in exile in Vienna, in 1921
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he was denied on the grounds of his political unsuitability - to wit, his lack of 
revolutionary conviction. (Kettler, Meja, Stehr, 1984: 38)
With the politicisation and subsequent dispersal of the Sunday Circle Mannheim 
lost the immediate, and metaphysical, context and focus of his conception of the 
“mission” of the new European intellectual. However, re-location in Germany 
(Mannheim ended up in Heidelberg in 1921) exposed him to sustained and 
frequent contact with leading figures in sociological and historicist thinking 
through his participation in the Weber Group. (Woldring, 1986: 20-21) As 
Kettler, Meja, Stehr point out, such participation seems at first surprising given 
that also active in Heidelberg at the time was the Stefan George Circle, which was 
primarily a literary group involved in spiritual explorations much like the Lukács’ 
group in Budapest (Kettler, Meja, Stehr, 1984: 38-39, for the George Kreis, see 
Gay, 1968: ch.3). However, in this new context Mannheim dismissed ‘the George 
community’ as too wrapped up in itself, deluding itself with notions of its own 
significance and effectiveness: ‘[t]hey deceive themselves with the feeling of 
having ground under their feet. They have drawn inward, covering themselves 
with a blanket of culture, leaving the world out and becoming lost in themselves’ 
(cited in Kettler, Meja, Stehr, 1984: 39).
The crucial issues for Mannheim and his cohorts in Budapest had been the 
possibility of cultural renewal and the necessary participation of the intellectual in 
that historical process As such, the European intellectual was, or should be, 
engaged on an ethical mission to save culture, to salvage that which had to 
survive from it for the sake of its renewal. In Heidelberg he turned to sociology as 
offering the best chance for ‘historical understanding and practical development.’
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(Kettler, Meja, Stehr, 1984: 40) In investigations in cultural sociology and then 
the sociology of knowledge Mannheim sought for ways of making cultural 
phenomena - phenomena of the spirit - the objects o f science without objectifying 
them in a negative sense, and thus making possible the renewal of science as no 
longer opposed to the inner ‘spiritual structures’ o f  culture. (Kettler, Meja, Stehr, 
1984: 40) The focus of his intellectual activity -  his activity as an intellectual -  on 
the one hand became more practical, that is, became concerned with the empirical 
data of everyday life, with the material substrata o f ideas and modes of thought 
On the other hand, Mannheim’s removal from the Hungarian political and cultural 
context represented a disengagement from a situation in which the intellectual 
was forced to engage in the practical, ethico-political life of a nation. One could 
say that as German culture represented Mannheim’s intellectual “home” (this 
being the most important sort of home to him), and, moreover, that as one 
concerned with the new type of European intellectual specific national contexts 
would be relatively unimportant to him But this re-location led to the distancing 
of Mannheim, referred to by Frisby, from precisely those practical phenomena and 
situations which he went on to theorise as inseparable from the structures and 
processes of thought
Science in Ferment
In an essay written in 1921-22, “On the Interpretation o f Weltanschauung', 
Mannheim expressed his belief in an essential change having taken place in the 
realm of science The ‘mechanistic method’ of the natural sciences seemed about 
to be displaced by methods concerned more with treating their objects holistically, 
and as part of this, with attempting to give an account of ‘higher-level phenomena
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of meaning.’ (Mannheim, 1952: 82) The meaning - the what and the why - of 
objects had begun to become the concern of science:
Modem nominalism seems to be supplanted by a realism which recognises 
universals (such as, for example, ‘spirit’), if only as methodologically 
warranted constructs. The concept of ‘substance’, which had practically 
been ousted by that of ‘function’, is again coming to the fore, and we no 
longer ask only about the How of things but also for a definition of What 
they are. (Mannheim, 1952: 82)
This new methodological direction and emphasis in science constituted a 
movement away from the sort of positivism, the systematic tone deafness ‘to the 
nuances of the inner life’ (Lukács, cited in Gluck, 1985: 92), which Mannheim 
and his cohorts had seen as characterising sociology in Budapest. Mannheim 
considered this transformation in science to be part ‘of a much more far-reaching 
cultural transformation ’ The conditions had arisen whereby science and culture 
were no longer necessarily in opposition to one another, they could now be seen 
as part of the same process, that of history
In his essay “The Crisis of Historicism” F.mst Troeltsch, himself part of the 
Weber circle, wrote o f ‘the historicisation of our whole knowledge and experience 
of the intellectual world’, and of everything having entered ‘the flux of becoming’ 
(cited in Frisby, 1992: 14). Similarly, in his cultural sociology Mannheim saw 
history taking centre-stage
The fact that natural science had to restore to history its rightful 
autonomy, that there is a dawning understanding of the distinctive nature
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of the mental and historical, that we are striving after a synthesis and 
would like to draw the meaning and form of pre-theoretical date within the 
orbit of science - all this is a sign that science along with all our whole 
intellectual life is in ferment; and although we see the trend of this process, 
we cannot anticipate its final outcome. History never repeats itself literally. 
(Mannheim, 1952: 82-83)
By this reckoning, science, caught up in the contemporary ‘Yerment”, is no 
longer divorced from other, pre-theoretical elements within life, but is united, 
upon the ground of history, with them. “Cultural science”, properly so-called, is 
part of the process which it seeks to investigate and to comprehend, and no longer 
stands over against it. It is just such a cultural science that Mannheim was 
interested in, or rather, he was interested in determining the methodological 
profile of such a science. For, as indicated in the citation above, the turn toward 
synthesis was seen by Mannheim as having had already taken place, and he was 
concerned only with bringing that change to light, with making that change 
conscious. The specialised disciplines in the study of culture had begun to 
manifest an interest in ‘questions of the philosophy of history.’ Mannheim, 1952: 
37) This interest, according to Mannheim, ‘manifests itself by a growing need to 
fit particular findings into some global historical scheme, and by the readiness to 
use unorthodox methods’, such as attempting to correlate the previously isolated 
objects of ‘abstractive procedures’ with one another (Mannheim, 1952: 37, 36) 
The process whereby individual disciplines address themselves to the problems 
situated at their margins - problems which revolve around ‘a difficulty o f 
procedure which makes the investigator stop and reflect’ (Mannheim, 1953: 35) -
21
was considered by Mannheim to be well advanced in the contemporary intellectual 
ferment. His methodological investigations sought ‘but to make explicit in logical 
terms what is de facto  going on in living research.’ (Mannheim, 1952: 37)
In his essay on the Weltanschauung Mannheim suggested that in the study of 
culture we come up repeatedly against the fundamental problem of conducting a 
theoretical investigation into an essentially a-theoretical phenomenon - the given 
totality of ‘the global unity of culture.’ (Mannheim, 1952: 39) As Martin Jay 
points out, Mannheim at this point was making use of an ‘irrationalist’ conception 
of totality derived specifically from art history. (Jay, 1985: 65) Such a totality is 
fundamentally resistant to conversion into theoretical terms, theory being itself 
part of it But if we are confronted, time and again, with the seeming impossibility 
of the task, why do we persist in attempting it? The answer to this question, 
according to Mannheim, lies in the irreducibly plural and heterogeneous character 
of the human being: ‘[i]t is because it touches upon a fundamental property of 
human life and mind This fundamental trait is that man is the citizen of several 
worlds at the same time.’ (Mannheim, 1952: 40) The mind is essentially 
heterogeneous and open to the totality of cultural experience ‘The life of the 
mind’, Mannheim tells us, ‘is a constant flux, oscillating between the theoretical 
and a-theoretical pole’, and thus mental life involves ‘a constant intermingling and 
re-arranging of the most disparate categories of many different origins’ 
(Mannheim, 1952 40), in short, is a process of (re-)interpretation and translation
from the perspective of the cultural study of the Weltanschauung, the two 
poles of rationality and irrationality, experience and theory, even object and 
subject cannot be easily separated out from one another, but must be seen as
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interpenetrated. As a consequence of this, according to Mannheim, the activity of 
theorising - to the extent, that is, that theorising is an activity - should not be 
viewed as beginning and ending in science, but rather, we should recognise that 
‘everyday experience is shot through with bits of theory.’ (Mannheim, 1952: 40)
We are, then, impelled to theorise because theoretical awareness is itself an 
element in our concrete existence, or of our cultural experience, the two being 
regarded by Mannheim, as Frisby points out (Frisby, 1992: 127), as the same 
thing. The difference between theoretical as opposed to other categories of 
experience (ethical, religious, or aesthetic, for example) is that the former seeks to 
impose its own particular pattern of rationality upon those others, and in the 
process becomes (self-)reflexive. Thus “theory” attempts to dominate the whole 
of our fundamentally plural experience, ultimately forcing upon it a false unity and 
coherence according to which only the theoretical is recognised as valid and 
objective (the latter becoming the prime measure of validity), and which works 
continuously to legitimate its own principles and methodology. Construed in this 
way, Mannheim’s methodological pluralism constituted the continuation of a 
mission to renew culture:
our task now is to define the methodological departure to characterise the 
decisive step by which a cultural objectification can be looked at, as it 
were, from a new side, and. pointing beyond itself, can be seen as part of a 
new totality beyond the cultural objectification level. (Mannheim, 1952: 
42)
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Significantly, however, the shadow of the future cultural order was now cast more 
strictly methodologically, rather than in terms of the critical-moral stance and 
perspective of the marginalised intellectual. Or, more accurately, the ethical 
dimension of intellectual activity - the messianic tasks of the spirit -  was 
incorporated within the activity of methodological innovation.
Documentary Meaning
Mannheim’s attempt at constituting a methodology adequate to the tasks of a 
truly cultural science centred upon the idea o f  the Weltanschauung, as the totality 
of the heterogeneous cultural life of an epoch, being comprehended through 
hermeneutic ‘documentary’ understanding or interpretation. Such interpretation is 
worked up from cultural traces and fragments (evidence), though it is concerned 
not with the reconstruction of objects as they have really existed in any particular 
period, or as they were experienced as meanings by those who created or 
originated them, but with the more than temporal. Documentary meaning, 
according to Mannheim, ‘is a matter, not o f temporal process in which certain 
experiences become actualized, but of the character, the essential nature, the 
‘ethos’ of the subject which manifests itself in artistic creation.’ (Mannheim, 1952: 
55)' Documentary interpretation does not seek to re-live a unique past 
experience, nor is it a method of simply reading off the signs visible upon or 
inherent within the object, rather, it is a subjective act of the realisation of 
essence. Mannheim was in accord at this point with the phenomenological 
sociology of Max Scheler, for, like Scheler, his concern was with allowing the 
ethos, the whole complex of meanings and values of the historical subject -
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obscure to that subject - to emerge through the subjective participation of the 
present ‘participant observer’, the latter thus attaining a species of sympathetic 
‘ethical knowledge’.2
In his chapter on Mannheim in Hermeneutics and the Social Sciences (1978) 
Zygmunt Bauman describes documentary meaning as
an analytical concept; an ‘extraneous’ meaning imputed to action not by 
its subject, but by an objective observer who remains permanently 
‘outside’ Through documentary understanding, the student of culture can 
grasp meanings of which actors of cultural drama are unaware. (Bauman, 
1978: 91-92)
Documentary meaning may be said to  have something in common with Lukács’ 
notion, continued by Goldmann, o f a revolutionary consciousness that can be 
‘imputed’ to the proletariat, a revolutionary-theoretical consciousness which has 
no necessary present empirical counterpart (Lukács, 1971). In this way, 
Mannheim exhibited the roots in idealism, hermeneutics and historicism he shared 
with Lukács, which he, however, developed in a non-revolutionary direction. The 
meaning gathered through the documentary method cannot be intended by the 
subject, but rather, ‘is a wholly unintentional, unconscious by-product’ 
(Mannheim, 1952: 55), and exists, Bauman states, ‘nowhere but in the scholar’s 
discourse.’ (Bauman, 1978: 92) There is no empirical subject corresponding to 
the “collective spirit” which is the object of documentary interpretation 
Therefore, because such an interpretation cannot be reduced to concrete
' Sec above (p.22) for the art historical context o f  Mannheim's essay.
25
collective subjects, it cannot be refuted by reference to empirical sociological or 
anthropological categories. Such an interpretation enjoys an ‘empirical immunity’ 
(Bauman, 1978: 94); elements of documentary meaning can only be corroborated 
by other such elements.
As Mannheim saw it, there opens up a ‘discrepancy’ between these two kinds 
of subject -  ‘the subject of collective spirit...and the anthropological or 
sociological subject’ - which makes it necessary ‘to interpolate an intermediate 
field of concepts capable of mediating between these two extremes.’ (Mannheim 
1952; 60) Whereas Lukács saw it as the function of the Party, as the concrete 
organisation of revolutionary consciousness, to fill the gap between empirical 
reality and the “ideal type” of revolutionary subjectivity, Mannheim sought to 
identify “an intermediate field of concepts” articulated within the synthetic 
consciousness the individual intellectual to bridge that divide What was for 
Lukács a problem of making the ideal material, for Mannheim was a matter of 
accounting for the deficit in materiality in ideal terms.
Existing in an apparent state of a-temporal autonomy sealed off from the 
possibility of empirical verification or control, the Weltanschauung posits a view 
of historical development as fundamentally a succession of rationally 
unaccountable epochal cultural “states of mind”. Depending upon the particular 
aspect of culture we choose to focus upon (in Mannheim’s case, the aesthetic), 
history becomes a phenomenological-ethical succession of one ‘ideal essence’ 
(Mannheim, 1952: 59) after another - from “classic spirit” to “renaissance spirit”,
For a recent elaboration of the concept o f 'ethical knowledge' (phronesis) in the context of 
political philosophy, see Chantal MoulTc, The R e tu rn  o f  the P o litic a l (1993)
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and so on. On the other hand, the dominant positivism of the empirical sciences 
yields a wholly objectivised subject which appears to stand outside of the stream 
of history In both instances, history is lost What Mannheim proposed was that in 
order to regain the consciousness of historical situatedness it was necessary for 
the cultural sciences to pursue ‘a third way.’ (Mannheim, 1952: 72) This would 
involve such a science fixing upon the reflective, theoretical moments within the 
Gestalt of immediate experience. The effect of this would be to give those proto- 
theoretical elements ‘a firm profile’ and thus ‘to stabilize them’ (Mannheim, 1952: 
72) as theoretical phenomena, but as phenomena which retain their a-theoretical 
particularity. By these means, it would be possible to constitute a new scientific 
subject between the realms of spirit and empirical science, this subject being part 
of a more than theoretical whole, but because of that very fact, allowing that 
whole to become part of that which can be studied scientifically.
For Mannheim, the re-situation of science within history was not the end of its 
validity but rather represented its extension into the realm of the ‘dynamically 
changing.’ (Mannheim, 1952: 62) Science becomes more important and more 
relevant, not less so, when it is able to draw into its orbit the data of everyday 
existence and when it can develop methods of analysis which enable it to 
approach the totality of culture, understood as a structure of meanings, formerly 
ignored by science or considered inimical to its essential functioning By extension 
- and of essential relevance to this discussion - the individual scientists who 
participate in this analytical enterprise are in themselves absolutely central figures 
For cultural science, as historical science, depends upon the subjectivity o f the 
analytical observer for the knowledge it produces The content of that knowledge.
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according to Mannheim, is bound up with ‘the nature of the subject. . .and some 
aspects of the object to be interpreted are accessible only to certain types o f m ind  
(Mannheim, 1952: 61; my emphasis). This can be explained by the fact that, unlike 
the ‘timeless’ knowledge of mathematics or the natural sciences, that which is 
yielded in historical understanding is ‘itself shaped by the historic process in 
philosophical self-reflection.’ (Mannheim, 1952: 61-62)
Bauman attributes this emphasis upon the part played by subjective 
consciousness to Mannheim’s ‘umbilical’ attachment to the ‘ “sympathetic magic” 
of Dilthey’s empathy’ (Bauman, 1978: 95), that is, to the latter’s insistence upon 
the interdependence o f the individual life and history (see Dilthey, 1961: ch.2). 
One can, in turn, also look back to Mannheim’s adoption of Simmel’s idea of the 
division of culture into subjective and objective moments. For Mannheim seems to 
have transposed this idea into the sphere of science, seeking to re-vitalise both in 
the process. Undoubtedly, continued in his scientific articulation of the situation 
was the stress upon the essentially obscure and distanced character of culture as a 
whole which can only be reflected upon, and thus overcome, by “certain types of 
mind” entering into the cultural process, though now this was through the practice 
of a cultural science.
The Politics of Reflection
Throughout the time he spent in Weimar Germany Mannheim deepened his 
adherence to sociology. In 1930 he was appointed to the post of Professor of 
Sociology at Frankfurt in a specially established College of Sociology His ideas
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continued to revolve around a central conception of mind and thought as part of a 
larger process. However, as he extended his sociological study, Mannheim fixed 
more definitely his ideas about the exact character of that “intermediate field of 
concepts” called for in his “Weltanschauung” essay. He was led to propose the 
sociological consciousness as the latest (and fullest) stage of cultural 
development. To this end, in a study of the intelligentsia, Mannheim declared that 
‘the ground for the self-interpretation of man has shifted once more No longer 
does he see himself in the mirror of a personal God, reason, history, or a 
IVeltgeisl, but in the perspective of his social pursuits.’ (Mannheim, 1956: 94) 
Mannheim identified in sociology both a new “ethos” and also the means by which 
that ethos might be comprehended. Sociology enabled self-clarification; in the 
facts of his or her social life the individual is able to come to a surer, a ‘more 
inclusive and basic’ (Mannheim, 1956: 94) knowledge of him- or herself and of 
the world in which he or she lives. Indeed, in sociology, knowledge of the self and 
knowledge of the world beyond the self become part of one another Mannheim, 
like Sartre (see chapter five), made this interdependence central to his conception 
of the intellectual, though Sartre sought to maintain the possibility of a materialist 
philosophy in doing so, while for Mannheim philosophy was transcended by 
sociology.
The basic claim of the sociology of knowledge as developed by Mannheim was 
that thought had to be placed ‘in the concrete setting of an historical-social 
situation’ (Mannheim, 1954: 2), if individuals were to be able to ‘find [their] 
bearings in the present state of affairs.’ (Mannheim, 1956: 95) The dynamic 
character of modem societies requires individuals to develop ‘a continuous
29
awareness of social change’, they can no longer depend upon established ways of 
thinking, but must foster an ‘independent judgement free from conventional or 
mythological delusions.’ (Mannheim, 1956: 99) However, such independent 
judgement only initially evolves individually, for, as it is fundamentally a capacity 
to identify material interests, it soon takes on a collective character. According to 
Mannheim, independent judgement arose when individuals were forced to make 
economic choices. The bourgeois entrepreneurs, ‘who must live by [their] wits 
and seize [their] opportunities’ (Mannheim, 1956: 99), were thus required to 
determine their best interest and then “had to direct and organize economic units 
according to their own more or less rational interpretation of the course of 
events.’ (Mannheim, 1940: 59).
Thus, for Mannheim (in common with Marx and Engels in The Communis! 
Manifesto), independent judgement originated in the eminently practical context 
of economic decision and rationalisation. Furthermore, as an essential part of this 
activity, the new competitive economic environment not only provided the 
conditions for the individuation of interest and judgement but also, 
simultaneously, made the conscious identification of interests and judgements 
necessary, in new collectivities, for the sake of survival Individuals located in 
similar economic situations were able ‘to discover the common elements in their 
position and arrive at a common definition of their roles.’ (Mannheim, 1956: 99)
It is these “common definitions” that Mannheim termed “ideologies”, the 
particular Weltanschauungen of social collectivities which, though rooted in the 
real concrete conditions and interests of those latter groups, systematically appear 
as disinterested and abstracted products of a universal and independent
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judgement Though apparently united in the (bourgeois) individual, judgement and 
interest are divorced from one another in the context of the collectivity And it is 
precisely this systematic and reflexive misrepresentation which constitutes the 
specifically modem  nature of ideology. For as Mannheim maintained in Ideology 
and Utopicf, ideology in the shape of ‘unconscious collective motivations, [has] 
always guided the direction of thought’ (Mannheim, 1954: 35), but such 
“motivations” never appeared to themselves as self-legitimating universal 
principles However, according to Mannheim, in the modem period it has become 
possible not only for irrational motivations to m/.vrepresent themselves but also to 
be represented rationally to thought. This act of representation revolves around 
politics. For, Mannheim maintained, once politics becomes part of ‘everyday 
experience’ for an ever increasing number of individuals, then it becomes possible 
for them to see how much of that experience is shaped by politics because it is an 
everyday affair (Mannheim, 1954: 35,55) That which previously may have been 
centred on religious conflict, ‘around which the differences in both the 
fundamental attitudes and the Weltanschauungen of various social groups’ 
(Mannheim, 1953: 83) might develop, now is focused upon political struggle. But, 
two important differences are factors in the latter, modem context; firstly, it is 
now possible to uncover the real, the social basis of values and ideas, and, 
secondly, the observing subject can no longer place him- or herself outside of the 
social. The methodological innovation championed and developed by Mannheim, 
which distinguished social from natural sciences, and which required the former to
3 As Kcttler, Meja, Stehr (1984), amongst others, point ont, there arc significant differences 
between the original. German edition of Id e o lo g y  a n d  U topia  and the later. English version. 
However, I feel that as our principal concern is with Mannheim's emphasis upon the 
intellectual's political functioning, which appears in both, one can to a certain extent minimise 
these differences.
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account for the subject in its formulations and conclusions, meant that self­
understanding and understanding of the world about one could not be separated. 
It is only by recognising our own ‘participation in the living context of social life’ 
that we can come to an ‘understanding of the inner structure of this living 
context.’ (Mannheim, 1954: 42)
The sociological consciousness was thus not merely constituted in an 
awareness of social factors and determinants from a position beyond the social but 
rather was a form o f  consciousness constituted within the bounds of the social. It 
was itself a social phenomenon. In this one sees the continuation of Mannheim’s 
attempt to bridge the gap between an all-encompassing realm of spirit which 
constituted the object of knowledge and the plurality of individual subjects with 
their apparently diverse and partial knowledges of that object. It is significant that 
the Weltanschauung at this point was transformed from the transcendent and 
irrational totality o f cultural experience and production, into the partial and 
definitely empirically rooted representations of that totality, representations which 
may be rationally synthesised
This journey between totalities, I would argue, marked Mannheim’s passage 
from culture to politics, a passage which could only be completed, however, by 
making politics itse lf into an element within culture If in its previous incarnation 
the Weltanschauung had only a “methodologically warranted” and a priori 
existence as a “global unity of culture”, it had now become a socio-political 
category Whereas previously it had been a transcendent concept derived from 
Geisteswissenschaften and cultural studies used to invigorate science, now it was 
employed in the service of a scientific politics. However, there is a continuity
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between the earlier and later uses, insofar as, in both cases, the Weltanschauung is 
that which, as an obscure and unexamined, atheoretical layer of reality, must be 
made visible in and to scientific theory. The main difference lies in the fact that 
such theory (the sociology of knowledge) was now proposed as a firm and 
reliable basis for both knowledge and action. At the end of his earlier essay, 
Mannheim assured his readers that ‘science and spirit go their own way’ 
(Mannheim, 1952: 83), one could but attempt to decipher such traces as remained 
and adapt one’s methodological apparatus accordingly. By the time Mannheim 
had fully developed his sociology of knowledge, he adopted a more assertive 
attitude toward the Weltanschauung, he saw it, one might say, as distorting our 
knowledge o f the world, and as something which could be controlled. Such a 
sociological consciousness identified elements in our thinking derived from 
Weltanschauungen as necessarily narrowing our vision and blinding us to our own 
best interests as members of society as a whole.
The advent of a sociology of knowledge makes a truly scientific politics for the 
first time possible, for it enables partial and conflicting Weltanschauungen to be 
synthesised into a new whole. Mannheim made clear his belief in a new state of 
affairs in Ideology and Utopia:
Just because today we are in a position to see with increasing clarity that 
mutually opposing views and theories are not infinite in number and are 
not products of arbitrary will but are mutually complementary and derive 
from specific social situations, politics as a science is for the first time 
possible. The present structure of society makes possible a political 
science which will not be merely a party science, but a science of the
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whole. Political sociology, as the science which comprehends the whole 
political sphere, thus attains the stage of realization. (Mannheim, 1954: 
132)
The science of political sociology was not offered as an entirely independent 
sphere purified of all ideological elements of dependency and interest, rather, such 
a science was to be achieved by working through ideology. Weber’s famous 
dictum that ‘politics is out of place in the lecture-room’, on the basis of there 
being an essential division between *tak[ing] a practical political stand’ and 
‘analyzing] political structures and party positions’(1948: 145), was not rejected 
outright by Mannheim. Indeed, we find him speaking in similarly dichotomous 
terms in Ideology and Utopia, where he states that ‘[i]t is one thing to aim at a 
schematically ordered bird’s eye view, it is quite another thing to seek a concrete 
orientation to action.’ (Mannheim, 1954: 155) However, Mannheim did seek to 
re-constitute the relationship between the two sides o f this dichotomy Thus, for 
Frisby, ‘[Mannheim’s] theory of ideology also posits the development of a value- 
free concept of ideology But, much more than Weber, Mannheim [was] 
concerned to advance beyond the separation of theory and practice.’ (1992: 19)
The sociology of knowledge had made available ‘[a] new type of objectivity in 
the social sciences.’ (Mannheim, 1954: 2) It was no longer the case that science 
had to sever its connections with society and politics, had to choose between 
evaluation and freedom from value in order to function objectively. Instead, 
precisely because it recognised that all political positions and knowledge are 
limited and partisan, the sociology of knowledge allowed a new type of political 
practice to take shape Mannheim held firm with Weber in rejecting the sort of
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practical politics which is achieved only through closing one’s mind to alternatives 
and which is based on unexamined partial assumptions. But, he also saw the 
sociological consciousness as offering up a mode of political practice which 
allows for its own continuous transformation and which is oriented upon the 
continuously changing conditions in which political decisions are made. 
Contemplating such a scientific politics, Mannheim asked:
Must it be assumed that only that is politics which is preparation for an 
insurrection? Is not the continual transformation of conditions and men 
also action?...Is it to be assumed that there is no tradition and form of 
education corresponding to precisely those interests seeking to establish a 
dynamic equilibrium, and which are oriented to the whole? Would it not 
be in the true interest of the whole to set up more centres from which 
radiate those political interests imbued with the vitality of a critical point 
of view? (Mannheim, 1954: 163-164)
Mannheim’s vision of a scientific politics was one in which the individual holds 
the pre-eminent position. Like Weber and Scheler, his emphasis was upon the 
value and efficacy of individual social action. (Frisby, 1992: 16) Scientific politics 
was a matter, first and foremost, of equipping the individual with the intellectual 
wherewithal for making rational political decisions. In its open-endedness and 
orientation upon the whole, such a politics was necessarily resistant to the 
constraints and limits which supposedly characterise ideological collectivist 
politics. Moreover, ‘in a realm [i.e., the political] in which everything is in the 
process of becoming’, the demand by science ‘for an absolute, permanent 
synthesis would mean a relapse into the static world view of [bourgeois]
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intellectualism .’ (Mannheim, 1954: 135) Mannheim was concerned, above all, 
with clearing a space for the reflexive (self-)consciousness of the individual in the 
socio-political process In this he was continuing his earlier Simmelian emphasis 
(itself derived from Hegel) upon the need for a certain type of subjectivity to 
produce itself by appropriating the objectified products of consciousness. In 
relation to politics, the task of the intellectual, as intellectual, was now declared to 
be to achieve the synthesis of conflicting ideological positions which, in their 
absoluteness and illusory distance from their concrete social origins, threaten to 
overwhelm the individual.
For, as Richard Ashcraft points out, Mannheim believed that ‘[t]he very 
existence of ideological conflict, had qualitatively altered the nature of political 
life.’ (Ashcraft, 1981: 39) Rooted in ideology, modem politics had become a 
matter not only of seeking ‘to be in the right’ but also of attempting ‘to demolish 
the basis of [one’s] opponent’s social and intellectual existence.’ (Mannheim, 
1954: 34) As ideological in nature, in Mannheim’s formulation politics has 
become “objective culture”, in that it had become a collective way of life which 
reached down to the very roots of the individual’s existence and identity from 
“outside”, as it were, and did not appear to issue from within that existence. In 
this context of the alienation of the individual Mannheim located the intellectual in 
the interstices between classes and collectivities so that he or she could occupy a 
position from which political participation could be carried on on an individual 
basis, opening up the possibility of a ‘dynamic mediation’ (Mannheim, 1954: 140) 
between collectivities. The intellectual became the subject o f politics by making 
subjectivity itself the ‘object’ o f politics. Mannheim’s sociological intellectual
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could attain a structural point of view (and thus transcend him- or herself) only by 
working through the limiting ideological conditions of concrete existence and 
identity.4
From Intellectual Synthesis to Social Planning
There is an obvious development in Mannheim’s assessment of the political 
functioning of intellectuals. At one stage in his career in Weimar Germany the 
participation of intellectuals was identified as crucial to the conduct o f a new kind 
of rational politics, and Mannheim stressed the need for the latter to achieve a 
species of collective consciousness grounded in the sociology o f knowledge. 
However, by 1932 at least, Mannheim felt it necessary to express an extreme 
wariness of the possibility of intellectuals’ collective sense manifesting itself in a 
specific politics of intellectuals. In a lecture of that year he made his unease plain:
Anyone who believes that a party of intellectuals is necessary has gotten 
the diagnosis of intellectuals wrong. It would be a complete accident if 
anything at all reasonable came of this. And that can hardly be the basis for 
gaining consciousness Above all, it has to be recognized that there is no 
group that is as divided internally (bank director, professor, yellow 
journalist, bohemian), and that this division is a division according to
4 The idea of the intellectual as functioning through a process of overcoming biographical- 
ideological constraints was also taken up by Sanrc in his conception of the intellectual. In the 
latter instance, however, as I show below, the intellectual was existentially alienated from 
society and thus incapable of reconciling him- or herself to it. A similar idea of the intellectual's 
irreconcilable nature was developed within Critical Theory, as we shall sec in the following 
chapter.
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classes More than that: the formation of a party of intellectuals would 
inevitably lead to fascism (cited in Kettler, Meja, Stehr, 1984: 69).
The advent of fascism, I would argue, ultimately made it necessary for Mannheim 
to re-think the position of intellectuals in relationship to politics, principally 
because he saw fascism itself as ‘the ideology of a stratum of intellectuals who are 
“outsiders’” (Kettler, Meja, Stehr, 1984: 69), intellectuals who were also 
transfixed by irrational manifestations of spirit.
The development of the sociology of knowledge, and of sociology in general in 
Germany, was related by Mannheim to the experience of crisis and reorganisation 
in the Weimar Republic. ‘German sociology’, he wrote from England after the 
Nazis had come to power, ‘is the product o f one o f the greatest social 
dissolutions and reorganizations, accompanied by the highest form  o f self- 
consciousness and o f self-criticism' (Mannheim, 1953: 210; original emphasis). 
That critical experience made possible the accomplishment of a radical self- 
consciousness, enabling certain types of mind, who drew also upon the 
nineteenth-century legacy of German philosophy and social thought, to connect 
facts and concepts horizontally and vertically, socially and historically. ‘The 
import of a period of radical social dissolution’, according to Mannheim, is that it 
makes visible ‘the variability and interdependence of social phenomena.’ 
(Mannheim, 1953: 211) Though negative from one perspective, the political and 
ideological fragmentation of a society in upheaval was seen by Mannheim to be a 
positive process to the degree that it enabled the development of the most 
advanced synthetic consciousness Thus the “social dissolution” experienced 
during the Weimar period itself produced the sociological, synthetic intellectual
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Such an intellectual arose directly out of the sphere of the ideological, the 
irrational and the experiential, and made possible the (self-)transcendence of limits 
and constraints by reflecting upon them.
However, as Mannheim saw it, such a period of social instability could lead in 
two, opposed directions: either, toward the development o f a social self- 
consciousness and an awareness of the ‘relational’ character of norms and values 
which would enable the achievement of a higher rationalism, or, toward the re­
affirmation of old values and norms and the apotheosis of action as revealing the 
authentic character of a people. It was this second route which was taken in 
Germany. Irrationalism was seen by Mannheim to have triumphed Once this had 
happened, the focus of his hopes and of his theoretical endeavours shifted 
Mannheim showed himself increasingly conscious of the difficulty of gaining 
control over modem mass society. The irrationalism (the ideological or 
unexamined elements in thinking) which he had seen earlier as that which could be 
worked through in a process o f dynamic mediation became a structural flaw to be 
overcome and a real force to be resisted. Irrationality now entered into every 
comer of society and every social relation:
If today we often have the impression that in times of crisis mass- 
psychoses rule the world, it is not because in the past there was less 
irrationality, but rather because hitherto it had found an outlet in narrower 
social circles and in private life, only to-day, as a result of the general 
momentum brought about by industrial society, it is forcing its way into 
the arena of public life and even at times dominating that arena 
(Mannheim, 1940: 45)
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Moreover, Mannheim explicitly identified an alteration in the fortunes of 
rationality:
It once looked as if the intensifying conflict of interests in the world to-day 
might culminate in an integration of interests, which, although originally 
antagonistic, could be led to a rational compromise or fitted into a rational 
form of organization. But now it seems as though the irrational is to 
prevail after all. (Mannheim, 1940: 45)
As Kettler, Meja, Stehr observe, as a consequence of this new assessment of 
the irrational Mannheim broke science off from everyday life and experience, now 
positing ‘a stark contrast between scientifically grounded social knowledge and all 
other opinion.’ (Kettler, Meja, Stehr, 1984: 75) This was important because it 
meant that he would no longer hope to ground theoretical reflection in 
experience, or find a synthesis of competing modes of experientially rooted 
thought. Mannheim’s emphasis was now upon planning rather than competition 
and synthesis, upon the identification within society of structural ‘key positions’ 
(Mannheim, 1940: 59, 1951: 69) rather than mediating experience Becoming, we 
might say, became subsumed under being, the sphere of political contestation was 
ultimately subject to regulation From the perspective of planning, society was 
objectified as an external structure.
The emphasis upon planning and social pragmatism in Mannheim’s later work 
and thought, though, as Kettler points out, ‘often ascribed to the influence of 
English common sense’, may be seen as ‘represent[ing] a return to his intellectual 
origins’ (Kettler, 1971: 41), that is, to the Fabian scientism and liberalism of the
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anglophilic Hungarian Radicals described above. Such an assessment is supported 
by Mannheim’s own comments. In a note made in the mid-1930s Mannheim 
observed a ‘[disproportionate development between attitudes and thought: in my 
understanding I have discerned that liberalism is obsolete, but my attitudes are still 
at the liberal level’ (cited in Kettler, Meja, Stehr, 1984: 18). In a letter to Oszkar 
Jaszi Mannheim described himself as ‘an old follower of yours’, and spoke of 
how, in his opinion, ‘both of us are “liberal” in our roots’, the difference between 
them now being that Jaszi had fallen back upon a ‘noble defiance’ of the age, 
whilst Mannheim sought still ‘[t]o carry liberal values forward with the help of the 
techniques of modem mass society’ (cited in Kettler, Meja, Stehr, 1984: 18-19). 
With the advent of fascism and communism, Mannheim looked again to liberalism 
to provide the basis for social renewal, though in contemporary mass society such 
a liberalism required adaptation into social democratic form, had itself to be 
planned and to employ the sociological, educational and psychological techniques 
of mass society. Totalitarianism could not be defeated simply by opposing to it the 
spirit of laissez-faire, a “Third Way” had to be found whereby liberal values 
might be articulated, as C Wright Mills was to put it some time after Mannheim, 
in the ‘realities of modem social structure that might serve as the means of their 
realization ’ (Mills, 1963: 189)
However, the search for concrete correlates in the existing social structure 
which might act as agents for the realisation of liberal values and thus for social 
renewal led to Mannheim’s eventual position of buttressing the existing ruling 
class In his later work Mannheim sought to recognise the strengths of the British 
ruling class especially, and argued for preserving ‘the highest forms of cultural
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achievement’ (Mannheim, 1951: 103) of that class. The emphasis in that work fell 
now upon the pedagogic function, upon instructing the ruling élite in such a way 
as to encourage vision and the ability of the élite subject to adjust him- or herself 
to changing socio-historical conditions. The earlier sociology of knowledge had 
given way to a social and educational psychology.
Richard Ashcraft’s observation that in Ideology and Utopia the political 
practice o f intellectuals was conceived of in no ‘hard’ sociological or existential 
form (Ashcraft, 1981: 42-43) may be seen at one level as a recognition of 
Mannheim’s chariness, as noted above, with regard to a politics and political 
instruments specific to intellectuals. However, in this “soft” or indefinite 
conception, the intellectual may be seen at this point as having been 
comprehended as a practice, as that which equates to a synthetic function, a 
mediation between ideological positions. The intellectual was thus conceived as 
an activity with an orientation upon the totality, in much the same way as Lukács 
conceived of the critical, because totalising, consciousness which he imputed to 
the proletariat in History and Class Consciousness (for this connection, see, 
amongst others, Jay, 1985: 64ff; Kadarkay, 1991: 293-294, Kettler, 1967: 421 ff)). 
However, for Mannheim, the intellectuals’ function lay precisely in their 
irreducibility, their lack of any sort of inherent collective identity 5 His sociology 
of knowledge was dependent upon the central belief that it was possible to 
overcome the specific constraints that particular situations, as situations in which 
particular collective interests and viewpoints dominated, imposed upon
5 One may compare this with Regis Dcbray’s later idea, expressed in his political sociology of 
French intellectuals, of intellectuals as a heterogeneous collectivity, each intellectual qua  
intellectual being irreducible to his or her neighbour (Dcbray, 1981: 22).
42
consciousness, by certain types o f mind working through them. It was in the 
individualised subjectivity, or, at least, in the process of becoming a relatively 
autonomous subject capable of making relatively independent political judgements 
that the intellectual’s political and historical agency inhered.
In positing the possibility of the synthetic agency of the intellectual under the 
‘organon’ (see Kettler, Meja, Stehr, 1984) of the sociology of knowledge, 
Mannheim shared with Lukács and other Marxists the idea of history as 
immanently rational It was possible to climb to a higher level of rationality within 
history. But with the advent within his thought of the organon of “planning for 
freedom” Mannheim began to argue for the possibility of the ‘rational 
transcendence of history.’ (Kettler, Meja, Stehr, 1984: 86) Though the 
individual’s understanding at the stage of planning ‘remains a product of the 
historical process which arose independently of him’, he wrote in Man and 
Society, ‘through his understanding of this determination the individual for the 
first time raises himself above the historical process - which now, more than ever 
before, becomes subject to his own power.’ (Mannheim, 1940: 213)
It was the supra-historical figure of the planner who now took centre-stage in 
Mannheim’s dynamic, transformative sociology, whose efficacy as one who could 
meet the demands of the ‘conscious co-ordination of social processes’ 
(Mannheim, 1951: 175) resided precisely in her ability not merely to bring history 
closer to a rational ideal but to impose rationality upon an utterly irrational 
history. The planner was the agent of structure. Mannheim talked of structure in a 
similar way as he had of the Weltanschauung and the dynamic synthesis of the 
totality of ideologies, describing it as ‘the organizing principle of social reality
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itself [.. .which] can never be directly observed because it is always more inclusive 
than any partial social situation’ (Mannheim, 1940: 230), and thus appeared to 
maintain an anti-positivist and historicist perspective But, structure was now that 
which enabled limits to be placed upon history by establishing itself as just such an 
all-inclusive, dynamic principle.
In the face of the intensification o f irrational conflict in the 1930s Mannheim 
looked to the assertion of a mechanistic-positivistic rationalism. The terms in 
which he came to view society and social life are suggestive in this regard. For 
Mannheim writes of society as a ‘mechanism’ in need o f scientific readjustment, of 
‘actual life’ as a ‘laboratory’, and of ‘history as a field for experiment and 
reform.’ (Mannheim, 1940: 114, 109, 147) In general, life in mass society was 
regarded by Mannheim as pathological and thus in need of diagnosis and 
professional treatment With this in mind, his further statement in Man and 
Society, ostensibly iterating the basic tenet of the sociology of knowledge, that 
‘[t]he form and content of thought vary with the situation we are thinking about’ 
(Mannheim, 1940: 149) masks the fact that as far as Mannheim was concerned the 
whole situation of social life had been determined as simultaneously the object and 
the practice of science The fear of social transformation at the level of mass 
movements led to change itself being immured within an only scientifically and 
conceptually apprehended structure, precisely the difficulty which, as I have 
suggested, the sociology of knowledge was supposed to address and overcome.
Mannheim’s attempt, central to his sociological investigations, to find a 
me/./.anine layer of concepts between the sphere o f  the strictly empirically 
verifiable and the transcendent totality, and his corresponding assertion of the
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inseparability of thought and action, was yet founded on the belief in the primacy 
of thought over action. Thus, as has been observed, ‘[o]nce Mannheim decided 
that the conduct of everyday life is oriented by destructive delusions then the 
vocation of the seeker for knowledge once more appear[ed] simply and perhaps 
hopelessly as the task of Enlightenment.’ (Kettler, Meja, Stehr, 1984: 76) With 
the perceived triumph of irrationalism Mannheim himself appeared to sanction 
precisely that form of “bourgeois intellectualism” which he had previously 
criticised as producing an abstract, formal, universalist consciousness which was 
oblivious to the particularity and conditional character of social and political 
reality
With the installation of planning as the central, connecting principle of social 
and political reflection and action, critical intellectuals were marginalised by 
Mannheim, just as they were in the Critical Theory of the Institute for Social 
Research, as 1 show in the next chapter (though in the latter case this occurred in 
different conceptual conditions and with other ends in view). In the planned 
society it would be necessary to plan criticism itself (Mannheim, 1940: 109). As 
Mannheim wrote in his final work:
One particular social group that should be preserved as a check against 
monotony and levelling tendencies in a planned culture is an independent 
intelligentsia In the past, groups o f independent intellectuals have 
produced a dynamic mentality that reached beyond the boundaries of what 
happened to exist Their function would be hard to replace Rather a 
democratic society should deliberately plan for careers outside the regular 
social and educational ladders (Mannheim, 1951: 264-265)
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The independent intellectuals, whose independence previously had be seen as 
consisting in their irreducibility, as a transcendent moment, were now to be 
situated at the planned margins of society. Such intellectuals would be established 
in ‘oases’ of rationalism for the purpose of ‘testing] new ideas’ (Mannheim, 
1951: 265) in a “laboratory” environment ‘in which absolutely free discussion may 
take place without being exposed to premature and unsatisfactory criticism by the 
broader public.’ (Mannheim, 1940: 110-111)
One may detect in this concept o f free critical spaces parallels with the 
societies and salons, the Tischgesellscha/ten and coffee-houses of the 
Enlightenment, in which, it has been argued (see, for example, Bauman, 1987; 
Habermas, 1989), the very principles o f free criticism and the public legitimation 
of power originated. However, in the planned culture envisioned by Mannheim 
such spaces would exist directly under the aegis of the state rather than in 
opposition to it; their function ultimately would be legitimating rather than de- 
legitimating. In this context small groups of intellectuals (such as “The Moot” 
discussion group in which Mannheim participated, along with such cultural 
luminaries as T. S. Eliot, from the late 1930s until his death (see Kettler, Meja, 
Stehr, 1984: 129ff; Woldring, 1986: 59)) would act as engines for ideas, and their 
transformative power, such as it was understood by Mannheim, would be 
harnessed so as to enable the existing state to deal most effectively with the 
disruption and upheaval caused by critical social change.
In a planned society the independent intellectual was secured within a structure 
of social constraints paradoxically by being situated within a place provided for 
her ‘outside the established social structure.’ (Mannheim, 1951. 190-191)
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Whereas in his earlier period of cultural radicalism Mannheim, saw the social 
marginality of the intellectual as the ground upon which the future might be built 
in the “bad present”- as the Critical Theorists also came to believe - he 
increasingly came to see that marginality as potentially a function of the existing 
whole. The sociology o f knowledge might therefore be seen, in the final analysis, 
as progressively achieving a reconciliation between critical intellectuals and 
society by making critical reflection and the development o f a certain type of 
critical subjectivity a necessary function of the reproduction o f an equilibria), 
optimally effective society. From this perspective, Mannheim’s development of 
the idea of planning for freedom represented only the continuation of this 
tendency within his sociology, though at this later stage the marginality of the 
intellectual was to take a “hard” sociological form.
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Chanter Two
The Intellectual in Extremis: Critical 
Theory. Pessimism and the Loss of
Aeencv
‘Materialism is the sworn enemy o f every attempt to understand reality on the 
basis o f some idealist paradise or o f any purely intellectual order. After Marx, 
we are forbidden any such consolation about the world.' (Max Horkheimer, 
1993: 139)
Introduction
As developed within the Institute for Social Research in Germany and the 
United States during the 1930s and ‘40s, Critical Theory1 sought the preservation 
of critique in opposition to the “consolations” of social theory offered by 
v Mannheim. The intellectual with which Critical Theory identified was apparently 
of a wholly different kind to that manifested in the sociology of knowledge and in 
other “activist” theories. This was an intellectual who claimed the margins, who, 
though he or she emerged out of the same context and conditions o f political and 
intellectual crisis as had shaped the sociology of knowledge, was political and 
social in orientation without being socially or politically active. Critical Theory 
was a critical response that attempted to posit a fundamentally different 
intellectual attitude or stance to social and political conditions to that articulated 
in Mannheim’s activist sociology Thus, it resisted synthetic modes of thought, 
and sought to go beyond the adoption of an “external” position which allowed the 
theorist to totalise the sum of experience and reflection within his or her socio- 
philosophical conceptions - conceptions which then guaranteed the theorist’s 
social or political interventions. However, ultimately Critical Theory seemed only 
able itself to offer the oppositional purity o f the individual intellectual as the basis 
of resistance and as a resource for hope. The intellectual’s ultimate foundation 
and justification was located in his or her autonomous se lf a self that was sure in
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its despair. Critical Theory’s very marginality and lack of external, practical 
efficacy became the “proofs” of its objective value.
As specifically an academic-institutional theoretical formation (one, that is, 
which evolved within a different ‘institutional setting’ Coser, 1965: xiv) to 
revolutionary Marxism), Critical Theory was yet a collective articulation, but one 
broken off from a collective agent and context of realisation. Thus, by the early 
1940s it had come to the position where revolutionary political praxis per se (as 
organised, collective praxis) came to be regarded with deep suspicion. Such 
praxis was itself part of a by now all-encompassing cultural crisis The pessimistic 
perspective which, in focussing upon fundamental material social antagonisms 
that could not be solved on the basis of a realignment, no matter how radical, of a 
“purely intellectual” kind, had denied the intellectual “consolation”, eventually 
included within its purview those very material social forces which had been 
identified by Marxism as the agent of the revolutionary abolition of those 
contradictions. Though Critical Theory originated in an attempt to continue and 
extend the Marxist tradition by making academic social theory dialectical - that is, 
by not allowing it to forget that society is riven by fundamentally material 
contradictions - it might be said that by questioning the possibility of large-scale 
social transformation Critical Theory effectively abstracted or even ontologised 
material antagonisms -  that is, made them characteristic of a transhistorical 
“human condition”. And within this context o f  ultimate irreconcilability, perhaps 
the only consolation for the theorist might be in the theoretical sustenance of 
one’s own position outside of “false”, practical reconciliations.
' Capitalisation is used here to distinguish the Critical Theory of the Institute for Social 
Research from critical theory as a generic description o f  sundry kinds of theoretical practice
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However, at this point I want to say a little more about the active political and 
intellectual background of the so-called “crisis of Marxism” which followed in the 
wake of the revolutionary period in Western Europe after the end of the First 
World War. Amongst these defeats, of course, that which occurred in Germany 
was felt most keenly by the Left, as that which had been key to the spread of 
international revolution, and as that which in the long run was to have the gravest 
consequences That the Institute was established in 1923 at the end of this 
revolutionary period may therefore be seen as an attempt to resuscitate Marxist 
theory in the light of recent political experience. Key to this theoretical enterprise 
was the re-assertion of the importance of dialectics within Marxist thought, an 
attempt which amounted to an emphatic assertion of the value of critical 
consciousness within revolutionary praxis.
Critical Consciousness
Like many commentators, in his book Critical Theory, Marxism and Modernity 
(1989) Douglas Kellner places Critical Theory within the tradition of Western 
Marxism (see also Anderson, 1976; Therbom, 1996). For Kellner, such Marxist 
theorists articulated a concern with the subjective conditions of revolution. He 
writes:
although European civilization had been going through protracted crises 
of war, economic depression, political conflict and so on - which 
confirmed Marxian views concerning the recurrent crises of capitalism - 
the prospects for revolution in Europe and the advanced capitalist
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countries did not seem bright, because revolutionary consciousness, 
culture and organization and a clear notion of socialism seemed to be 
lacking. (Kellner, 1989: 12)
The proletariat was considered to have been incapable of capitalising on such 
critical opportunities as had arisen in Europe due to its low level o f  critical 
political consciousness, its insufficient awareness of its specifically revolutionary 
subjectivity. This inadequacy, however, certainly as far as the Institute for Social 
Research and its associates were concerned, was largely attributable to the 
degeneration of Marxism into the “vulgarity” of the economism and evolutionism 
of the Second International In this guise, it was argued, Marxism had been 
reduced to a species of positivistic theory, hypostatising multi-faceted social and 
cultural phenomena into natural-scientific, objective “facts”. Lukács had written 
of the vulgar materialism of Bernstein and others as transforming the concrete 
‘determinants of social life’ into ‘timeless, eternal categories valid for all social 
formations’, and hence as seeking to propagate a ‘thorough-going opportunistic 
theory’ of social evolutionism according to which one could ascertain the ‘laws’ 
of social development. (Lukács, 1971: 9, 5) Similarly, for the Institute, such 
Marxism had severed the dialectical connection between consciousness and 
reality, between the individual subject and the total social process, it had 
dismissed any recognition of the importance of ‘intellectual action.’ (Korsch, 
1970: 84)
The consequence of such a diminution of critical thought in favour of a 
mechanistic positivism was that the latter, though only one particular realisation of 
reason, was taken as representing reason in iota and then found wanting with 
regard to addressing fundamental social problems. In “Notes on Science and the
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Crisis” (1932) published in the first issue of the Institute’s Zeitschrift Max 
Horkheimer identified the dangers of this disregard for reason: ‘[t]he view is 
abroad that reason is a useful instrument only for purposes of everyday life, but 
must fall silent in the face of the great problems and give way to the more 
substantial powers o f the soul.’ (Horkheimer, 1989a: 53) If positivistic science 
refuses ‘to handle in an appropriate way the problems connected with the social 
process’ Horkheimer, 1989a: 54), then metaphysics is ready to step into the 
breach, is ready, that is, to offer its own understanding of social problems and 
effect its own reconciliation between the individual and society.
The perceived inadequacy of Marxist theory - its reduction to a variety of 
scientific objectivity - could be seen to have led quite directly to the failure of 
revolution in Europe, and consequently, to have been responsible for the triumph 
of the forces of reaction who harnessed the ‘substantial powers of the soul.’ The 
optimism of the Marxist revisionists (Korsch, 1970: 78), who posited the 
achievement of socialism through the progressive control and gradual 
improvement of material conditions, had been rebuffed by the deeply racinated 
antagonisms which existed in capitalist society, which reached down into the 
constitution of subjectivity itself. There was, therefore, a need to reclaim 
dialectics for the Marxist tradition, and to become thereby more “negative”. For 
indeed, the reclamation of the former was seen by dialectical theorists as leading 
quite “naturally” to  the latter, precisely because it was concerned with re­
connecting (theoretical) consciousness with objective reality. In the process of 
such a connection the theorist becomes conscious of the discord which 
characterises socio-historical reality, and becomes aware, furthermore, of his or 
her consciousness’s own responsibility for that disharmony through the lack of
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“fit” between concepts and the reality which they ostensibly apprehend. For 
Horkheimer, it was necessary to overcome “illusory” beliefs in the idea of history 
as a ‘meaningful whole’, of the world as possessed of ‘inherent meaning.’ 
(Horkheimer, 1993: 139, 157) For its part, in order to be ‘free from illusions’, a 
dialectical-materialist social theory ‘can only conceive of human purpose 
negatively, and reveals the inherent contradictions between the conditions of 
existence and everything that the great philosophers have postulated as a 
purpose.’ (Horkheimer, 1993: 156-157)
Thus, the re-introduction of dialectics into Marxist theoretical discourse 
necessitated an emphasis upon critical negativity - upon, that is, the development 
(or exacerbation) of an “unhappy consciousness” which refused to be reconciled 
with the world as it is, but which nevertheless saw itself as implicated in the (re- 
)production of that world. Such a consciousness, whilst finding and recognising 
itself within reality, negated that presence with visions of an absent reality, of the 
world other than it is. The key question which arose from this emphasis upon 
dialectical negativity (a question which was addressed most directly by Walter 
Benjamin, as will be seen below) was in what practical concrete form or forms, if 
at all, such negation might be expressed, how, that is, the dialectical theory of the 
intellectual could be related to, and articulate, the practical struggles of the 
working class. The critique of the vulgar optimism of the evolutionary brand of 
socialism might seem to point quite clearly to Leninism, which positioned the 
intellectual (or rather, the intellectual as professional revolutionary) in the 
vanguard of the working class, seeking to foment the latter’s discontent and 
harness its negative potential. For its part, as 1 will argue, Critical Theory did take 
on certain aspects of Leninism, but at the same time it followed a line of
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development which took it far away from the latter’s political orientation and 
practice.
However, I shall leave discussion of Critical Theory and Leninism and the 
vanguard to the end of this chapter, until, that is, we have gained a fuller picture 
of the intellectual as articulated in Critical Theory, as an intellectual of the 
cultural rather than the political vanguard. This can be done, in the first instance, 
by examining Critical Theory’s critique of Karl Mannheim’s sociology of 
knowledge and his conception of the “reconciled” intellectual
The Critique of Mannheim
Mannheim was considered, by Horkheimer, Marcuse and Adorno, all of whom 
wrote essays on him, to have appropriated Marxist critical instruments for 
academic purposes, something which the Institute itself was seeking to do, and 
therefore might be regarded as a theoretical competitor - one, moreover, who 
described a theoretical trajectory uncomfortably close to its own (Frisby, 1992: 
227)). However, as far as the members of the Institute were concerned, 
Mannheim’s “philosophical anthropology” had drawn the critical teeth of Marx’s 
concepts, prompting ‘optimistic’ ideas of social reconciliation and reconstruction. 
From the critique of Mannheim it is possible to gauge some of the fundamental 
and persistent preoccupations of Critical Theory (as expressed across two 
decades), and to make out a negative “definition” o f the latter’s conception of the 
intellectual
In his 1930 critique of Mannheim’s Ideologic und IJtopie Horkheimer regarded 
his sociology of knowledge as a variety of idealist anthropology. He writes: ‘[f|or
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Mannheim. ..,genuine historical research is supposed to lead to knowledge of our 
own essence Thus, like Dilthey’s human science, Mannheim’s sociology of 
knowledge reveals itself as an heir of classical idealist philosophy.’ (Horkheimer, 
1993: 136) As such, according to Horkheimer, that sociology rests upon an 
anthropological conception of history as the evolution of an essential human 
subject History has, therefore, for Mannheim, an inherent meaning, and sociology 
‘pursues an ultimately philosophical intention’ - that is, is concerned with getting 
at the kernel of that meaning, with the disclosure of the ‘essence of things.’ 
(Horkheimer, 1993: 134) Whereas ‘Marx wanted to transform philosophy into 
positive science and praxis’, Mannheim has gone in the opposite direction and 
sought to make the problem of absolute truth and the metaphysical concerns of a 
transcendental historicism matters for sociological investigation (Horkheimer, 
1993: 134) Thus, Horkheimer’s charge against Mannheim echoed that made by 
Karl Korsch, at one point a close associate of the Institute, against Hegel that the 
latter ‘inserted the world into philosophy far more than he did philosophy into the 
world.’ (Korsch, 1970: 81)
In his 19532 essay on Mannheim’s Man and Society in an Age o f 
Reconstruction, Adorno continued these basic themes of Horkheimer’s critique. 
Mannheim was found guilty of a positivism which leads him to hypostatise facts 
and hence to abstract them from the social process which is ostensibly his object 
of study. According to Adorno, echoing Lukács’ criticism of vulgar materialism, 
‘social phenomena are taken “as such” and then classified according to general 
concepts. In the process, social antagonisms invariably tend to be glossed over.’
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(Adorno, 1978: 453) Again, in this way sociological positivism and metaphysics 
are seen as joining hands behind the back of a dialectical materialism according to 
which social analysis must always be rooted in the fundamentally antagonistic 
nature of capitalist class society. For Adorno, Mannheim’s sociology of 
knowledge ‘is based on the somewhat transcendental presupposition of a harmony 
between society and the individual’; however, it is precisely ‘[t]he absence of such 
harmony [which] forms one of the most urgent objects of critical theory.’ 
(Adorno, 1978: 457) As in Horkheimer’s critique, Mannheim was seen as finding 
an inherent order and meaning within an historical process which is understood as 
being ‘guided by an inherently univocal subject embodying the whole of society.’ 
(Adorno, 1978: 458)
Like Horkheimer, Adorno saw Mannheim as neutralising formerly critical 
concepts and categories (although by 1953 explicit references to Marx had been 
dropped by Adorno). Like existentialism and other forms of “anthropology”, the 
sociology of knowledge ‘calls everything into question and criticizes nothing’, ‘it 
employs the terminology of social criticism while removing its sting.’ (Adorno, 
1978: 453, 454) As such, dialectical concepts, which are centred upon the reality 
of class antagonisms, are ‘translated] into classificatory ones’, which results in 
the resolution of social classes into neutral logical-conceptual classifications 
(Adorno, 1978: 458). Thus, according to Adorno, Mannheim’s analysis ultimately 
provides only a superficial and abstract picture of society which represents the 
‘stubborn facts’ of that society as ‘mere differentiations’ which may be collected 
under formal ‘general units’ of logical classification and, importantly, may be then 1
1--
Published a little after the 'classic' phase o f Critical Theory which is our focus, this essay yet 
exhibits the latter's characteristic preoccupations with respect to Mannheim and the sociology of
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employed as ‘laws’ in accordance with which society is organised and may be re­
organised (Adorno, 1978: 460). This formalism, whereby real divisions and 
differences are compelled to conform within an abstract conceptual scheme, leads 
Mannheim ‘to overestimate the significance of ideologies as opposed to what they 
represent.’ (Adorno, 1978: 463) Moreover, and again importantly, it results in an 
optimistic overestimation o f intellectual agency. That is to say, with the 
abstraction of social conflict into an irrational struggle of ideas, it becomes 
possible to entertain the idea o f ending that conflict, as Mannheim did, through 
the rational planning or organisation of the putative epochal consciousness - the 
optimum consciousness of the “Man of the age”.
This, of course, would be carried out by the intellectual organisers. And, for 
Adorno, this revealed the contemporary appeal of the sociology of knowledge: 
‘[t]he real attraction of the sociology of knowledge can be sought only in the fact 
that those changes in consciousness, as achievements of “planning reason”, are 
linked directly to the reasoning of today’s planners.’ (Adorno, 1978: 464) 
Mannheim provides intellectuals with a theoretical basis and justification for 
effective social action, whilst at the same time ensuring that that action serves the 
interests of those who already control the means by which society is “rationally” 
dominated.3 In a concluding ringing judgement upon Mannheim’s position, 
Adorno dismisses the sociology of knowledge as enabling the ‘homeless 
intelligentsia’ to ‘forget itseir by making it believe that its positivist, ideological 
‘conformism’ is in actuality the practice of criticism (Adorno, 1978: 465, 463). 1
knowledge.
1 Compare C. Wright Mills's similar criticism of planning in chapter fipur.
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Adorno was concerned directly with Mannheim’s freischwebende Intelligenz, 
whilst Horkheimer in his earlier essay did not refer to the latter directly. However, 
in both cases Mannheim’s theory is considered to be idealist in character, working 
from ideas and ideologies “downward” into social reality. Moreover, Mannheim is 
criticised for his optimistic conception of the power of a rational, synthetic 
consciousness to effect fundamental social change and integrate social 
antagonisms. One may summarise some of the key conceptions and emphases of 
Critical Theory that may be drawn out from this critique:
(i) Such a theory seeks the dialectical transformation of existing conditions rather 
than their superficial harmonisation or rationalisation.
(ii) Theory is consistently opposed to the idea of inherent historical meaning and 
to philosophical abstractly realised totalities.
(iii) Consequently, it is also opposed to abstract intellectual integration, to 
illusions of an end to “homelessness” in finding a purely “idealist paradise”. The 
fundamentally antagonistic nature of material social reality forbids this.
(iv) As an intellectual (or, more properly, as a theorist) it is necessary to maintain 
one’s distance apart from such false solutions The theorist is a marginal and 
pessimistic figure
(v) Thus, one may conclude, there is no decisive place for intellectuals as 
intellectuals in concrete political struggles The progressive engagé intellectual (of 
which France and Germany especially had provided many examples) is put into 
doubt by Critical Theory Its statements become explicitly opposed to a particular 
variety of political intellectual
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(vi) However, and paradoxically, one may see that Critical Theory articulates 
philosophy’s continuing need for practical-social realisation and supersession 
(Aujhebung) (though the possibility of this is increasingly considered unlikely by 
most Critical Theorists). A social science which maintains “metaphysics” in the 
shape of positivism, and which, consequently, remains purely idealist in character, 
is rejected.
Having given this brief outline of some of the more significant features of 
Critical Theory, I will now go on to give a fuller account of its conception of the 
position of the intellectual and the role of theory in relation to social and political 
praxis.
The Marginal Intellectual
The maintenance of distance from concrete political struggles was made a 
central tenet of Critical Theory. The Institute for Social Research was itself 
founded upon such a distance. Phil Slater reports that the Institute’s benefactor, 
Felix Weil, would have been happy for it to have been called the Institute for 
Marxism, ‘but that this title was sacrificed in the interest o f  formal academic 
recognition.’ (Slater, 1977: fn 149) And in his inaugural address, the Institute’s 
first director, Carl Grunberg, made this position clear, when he announced ‘that 
when I speak of Marxism here I do not mean it in a party-political sense, but in a 
purely scientific one, as a term for an economic system complete in itself, for a 
particular ideology and for a clearly delineated research methodology’ (cited in 
Wiggershaus, 1994: 26). The Institute’s concern was not to intervene in ‘day-to­
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day politics’ but to explore Marxism’s theoretical-methodological potential 
(Slater, 1977: 3-4). And although under Horkheimer’s directorship the Institute 
shifted in the direction of confronting science with “philosophy” and raised its 
theoretical constructions to a higher level of complexity, it remained the case that 
theory - theory as an academic activity - was its prime object of attention (see 
Wiggershaus, 1994: 133-134,210).
The Institute was a wholly academic body, and as such, its organisational 
structures, priorities and problems were different to those o f the revolutionary 
party. (On the academisation of Marxism, see Anderson, 1976: 32-34, 49; 
Debray, 1981: 59.) To say this is not just to make a moral point (though such 
points are important in the discussion of intellectuals, because moral 
considerations have been central to the ways that intellectuals have been 
constructed). Rather, it is to point out that institutional locations set certain 
parameters or horizons to action and expectation; they work to suggest the 
viability o f some modes of action and agencies over others. This institutional 
dimension will be returned to in the following chapters, and, in the next chapter, 
as a counter-example to that of the Institute, I will show how Gramsci kept 
practical political problems at the heart of his political theory and theory of the 
intellectual.
For Helmut Dubiel, the self-marginalisation of the critical intellectual by the 
later 1930s had become essential to the adequacy of Critical Theory. He writes: 
‘[t]he argument that the segregation, isolation, and marginalization of a group of 
intellectuals not only does not restrict but rather confirms the validity of its 
theoretical work appears in the years from 1937 to 1940 in all of the theoretical 
texts and in numerous letters.’ (Dubiel, 1985: 52) By 1937, according to Dubiel,
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Horkheimer - to whom I shall return below -  ‘maintains repeatedly that, for the 
sake of the adequacy of the theory, the critical intellectual must be able to endure 
marginalization from the addressee of his theoretical work.’ (Dubiel, 1985: 53) 
And as Marcuse declared in his essay “Philosophy and Critical Theory” (1937), it 
was not the task of the “philosopher” as philosopher to bring about social change; 
‘[tjhe philosopher can only participate in social struggles insofar as he is not a 
professional philosopher.’ (Marcuse, 1989: 66) It is, seemingly, only a collective 
historical-social agent that can effect social transformation. However, in the 
process of divesting the left of its illusory optimism, Critical Theory also put the 
proletariat as just such a collective subject into question. If a concrete agent was 
needed to perform the deed of social transformation, there seemed to be no 
actually existing force adequate to the task.4 History appeared no longer able to 
answer the questions it had set itself.
For Marcuse, Critical Theory aimed at overcoming ‘the pseudo-philosophical 
concreteness that condescends to social struggles.’ (Marcuse, 1989: 66) 
Underlying such patronising participation was an “identity theory”, which, in 
Martin Jay’s definition, entailed ‘the belief that the ultimate oneness of subject and 
object, essence and appearance, particular and universal underlies the 
contradictions of the apparent world either inherently or potentially.’ (Jay, 1985: 
21) Such a theory enabled its proponents to imagine, amongst other things, a 
unity of ideas and material reality, of abstract concepts and concrete social forms, 
thus encouraging a belief in the intellectual’s (or, “philosopher’s”) practical social 
“function.” However, it was precisely the intellectuals’ closeness to praxis that
4 Marcuse, however, continued to look for such an agent, finding hope in the counter-cultural 
explosion of the 1960s (see A n  E ssay on L ibera tion , 1969).
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was responsible for their failure. Thus, Horkheimer wrote o f the ‘refugee 
intellectuals’ that they had been ‘robbed not only of their citizenship, but also of 
their minds’ (Horkheimer, 1989b: 77) because they had nailed their theoretical 
colours too firmly to the mast of a revolution which had come crashing to the 
ground Hence, for Horkheimer,
It is utterly naive to encourage the German workers from abroad to 
revolution. Someone who can only play at politics should keep away from 
it. The confusion has become so general that the truth receives more 
practical dignity the less it eyes self-styled praxis. Theoretical insight is 
needed and its transmission to those who will eventually lead the way. The 
optimism of the political appeal arises today from dejection. ( Horkheimer, 
1989b: 93-94)
Praxis is reserved, as declared in ‘messianic’ tones paradoxically reminiscent of 
those of Mannheim and Lukács in wartime Budapest, for ‘those who will 
eventually lead the way’; optimism denotes nothing other than its opposite, 
pessimism and despair The “function of the refugee” (see Mannheim, 1945), such 
as it is, is the preservation of “mind”, as realised in the hard truth o f theory
Abstraction and Materialism
In the 1937 essay, Marcuse endeavoured to spell out the relationship between 
Critical Theory and idealist philosophy (indeed, in this essay all philosophy 
becomes idealist); he postulated a dialectical relationship between idealism and
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materialism, between philosophy and Critical Theory. For Marcuse, insofar as 
‘philosophy has...made its peace with man’s determination by economic 
conditions, it has allied itself with repression. That is the bad materialism that 
underlies the edifice of idealism, the consolation that in the material wcurld 
everything is in order as it is.’ (Marcuse, 1989: 70) However, that “bad 
materialism” ‘is overcome in the materialist theory of society’ of which Critical 
Theory is the heir. For that latter theory ‘opposes not only the production 
relations that gave rise to bad materialism, but every form of production that 
dominates man instead of being dominated by him: this idealism underlies its 
materialism.’ (Marcuse, 1989: 70) Thus, Critical Theory, according to Marcuse, 
holds on to the positive in philosophy, it presupposes that ‘philosophical concepts 
and problems really contain truth’, and that Critical Theory is ‘linked to these 
truths’, which are preserved in its ‘economic and political concepts.’ (Marcuse, 
1989: 67, 73)
Marcuse argues that it is this irreducibility of philosophy - the fact that it 
contains truths that stretch out beyond itself, as it were - which is its strength It is 
certainly true that philosophy is determined historically, that its concepts ‘are to 
be explained precisely by the material conditions of life.’ (Marcuse, 1989: 67) But 
it is also true that its transcendence is itself historical, that it is in its ‘historical 
forms' that philosophy ‘points beyond previous society and thus cannot be 
completely reduced to it.’ (Marcuse, 1989: 67, emphasis added) For the truth of 
philosophy could only be reduced to existing social conditions ‘in a form of 
existence where consciousness is no longer separated from being’, it is of the 
essence o f such truth that it does “surpass” that social reality from which it arises, 
and that, furthermore, that surpassing truth may only be grasped by ‘those
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particular historical subjects whose consciousness expresses itself in Critical 
Theory’, and thus itself stands in opposition to ‘existing social conditions.’ 
(Marcuse, 1989: 67) The dependent limitation and the abstract independence of 
thought are alike determined in and through ‘bourgeois society’s domination’, and 
thus the abstract activity and contents of independent thought, in their very 
abstractness, save the truth of that society. ‘What is true is so only to the extent 
that it is not the truth about social reality. And just because it is not the latter, 
because it transcends this reality, it can become a matter for Critical Theory.’ 
(Marcuse, 1989: 69)
For Marcuse, it is the economism of the orthodox Left, which seeks to separate 
the economic and political spheres, and to make the former alone the locus of 
struggle, which constitutes the true heir of the bad materialism o f philosophy. 
That is to say, economism, like philosophy, accepts the determination of human 
beings by economic conditions as unchallengeable For its part, the criticism of the 
economistic perspective takes the shape of concerning itself with the philosophy 
of the past in order to salvage abstraction’s promise, precisely because, according 
to Marcuse, the nineteenth-century idealist culture of the individual has been 
superseded only by ‘authoritarian barbarity.’ (Marcuse, 1989: 73) On the basis of 
the “idealism which underlies its materialism” Critical Theory is .ve//-critical 
Ultimately, the given dominant conditions of existence of Critical Theory include 
both its practical articulation and ‘the social forces that make up its own basis.’ 
(Marcuse, 1989: 72) In this way, it might be seen that theory’s allegiance is to 
that which might never be realised in practice, to a truth which might always 
remain “surpassing”. As Marcuse went on to write in Reason and Revolution 
(1941):
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Theory accompanies the practice at every moment, analyzing the changing 
situation and formulating its concepts accordingly. The concrete 
conditions for realizing the truth may vary, but the truth remains the same 
and theory remains its ultimate guardian. Theory will preserve the truth 
even if revolutionary practice deviates from its proper path Practice 
follows the truth, not vice versa. (Marcuse, 1955: 322)
Truth remains the same because it transcends the society that produces it, and as 
its “guardian” theory preserves the transcendence of that truth. It is this which 
gives Critical Theory its authority over practice, as the latter, according to 
Marcuse, is always limited by specific historical conditions - that is, by the fact 
that political practice must always take concrete forms. It is the very materiality 
of practice that counts against it.
The Subject of Critical Theory
Though Marcuse talked about the criticism of social forces in principle, he did 
not go on to develop this concretely, or in any detail. He said nothing about the 
actual position and function of the critical intellectual in this essay However, in 
what was effectively a companion-piece (appearing alongside Marcuse’s essay in 
the Zeitschrift), “Traditional and Critical Theory” (1937), Horkheimer was mpre 
explicit, more concrete about the intellectual. There he wrote about the
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relationship of the intellectual to the working class, and about the subject of 
Critical Theory.5
Already in the 1920s Horkheimer was writing of the supposed ‘impotence of 
the German working class.’ (Horkheimer, 1978: 61 )6 That class was now 
fragmented and no longer necessarily capable, as a whole class, of achieving 
revolutionary consciousness or a totalising theoretical perspective, as had been 
argued by Lukács (Horkheimer, 1978: 61-63). Dubiel sees continuity in respect of 
Critical Theory’s pessimism, as elaborated by Horkheimer: a continuous 
orientation upon the experience of the revolution’s defeat in Weimar Germany 
(Dubiel, 1985: 73). And indeed, the criticism of intellectuals of the left which 
Horkheimer made in notes written during the Weimar period was expressed in 
similar terms to that of refugee intellectuals which we have already noted. Thus, 
for Horkheimer, the ‘[ljoyalty to materialist doctrine [of left intellectuals] 
threatens to become a mindless and contentless cult of liberalism and personality 
unless a radical turn soon occurs.’ (Horkheimer, 1978: 64) The characteristic 
deficiency of theory amongst such intellectuals leads them to a potentially 
disastrous over-reliance upon a scientistic and determinist conception of material 
“success”.
By 1937, as Dubiel points out (Dubiel, 1985. 49), Horkheimer more firmly and 
explicitly than before expressed the conviction that the self-determination of 
Critical Theory was a necessary condition for its realisation. Critical Theory, as a 
theory oriented upon totality, as the ‘unfolding of a single existential judgement’
5 Horkhcimcr’s "Traditional and Critical Theory" is considered to be the principal 
programmatic statement of Critical Theory; in his book. Slater calls it a ‘manifesto’ (Slater, 
1977: 27IT)
6 Though, for a view of the failure of revolution in Germany as largely a failure of leadership, 
sec Gluckstcin. 1985: 138-161.
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(Horkheimer, 1972: 227), must remain independent of all particular expressions, 
concrete political forms, or ‘material accomplishments.’ (Horkheimer, 1972: 218, 
219) As in Marcuse, the political struggle was seen as necessarily going ‘along 
lines determined by the theory itselP (Horkheimer, 1972: 229), and as not 
reducible to moments within that struggle. Moreover, Horkheimer assumed a 
necessary relation between the autonomy of theory and the independence of the 
theorist. If Critical Theory was the articulation of an “existential judgement”, it 
was that which had to be enacted by concrete existing subjects Horkheimer was 
critical of the “missionary” intelligentsia (Horkheimer, 1972: 223) and of the 
“optimistic”, aligned intellectual But the question then arises of how certain 
intellectuals could become “subjects of critical activity” (Horkheimer, 1972: 
208?). In his essay, Horkheimer writes of ‘small groups of men’ in whom ‘the 
truth may reside’ (Horkheimer, 1972: 241), and of the characteristic activity of 
the thinker as that of theoretical self-determination (Horkheimer, 1972: 242-243) 
However, one might ask, if Critical Theory is itself .vt'/^-determined, is 
independent, how do theorists themselves also become so? Might one not see in 
this merely a reinstatement of a variety of spontaneity - a presumption of an 
unmediated harmony between particular and universal, the individual and the 
totality (that is, truth) in and through (ideological) consciousness - which Critical 
Theory criticised in optimistic Left intellectuals and in Mannheim?
Spontaneity and Voluntarism
In his study, Dubiel points to Horkheimer’s criticism of “I.uxemburgian” 
intellectuals who assume a spontaneous connection between themselves and the 
proletariat, who, that is, attribute to the proletariat the capacity for developing
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revolutionary consciousness within itself and conceive of themselves as merely 
articulating that spontaneous consciousness, thus finding ‘an ultimate guarantee 
for theoretically correct knowledge.’ (Dubiel, 1985: 50) However, Slater, on the 
other hand, identifies exactly the opposite tendency at work in Horkheimer He 
sees an anti-Leninism in the sense of a rejection of centralism and the directive, 
organisational function of the Party which is in line with the Luxemburgist 
emphasis upon seeking the dictatorship of the proletariat from below based upon 
the latter’s capacity for spontaneous self-organisation (Slater, 1977: 64-65). As 
such, for Slater, spontaneity is precisely what Critical Theory does espouse.
This division arises partly through differences in emphasis in these respective 
conceptions of the Luxemburgian. The first position highlights Critical Theory’s 
critique of mass-culture, its identification of the proletariat as susceptible to 
“illusions”, the second highlights its anti-authoritarianism As such, one might say, 
both perspectives are right, for Critical Theory was both fearful of the spontaneity 
of the masses and also ultimately endorsed the critical power of the autonomous 
will That will, however, rested, at least potentially, in the critical intellectual If 
we look at another o f Horkheimer’s essays, this becomes apparent
Slater finds support for his position in Horkheimer’s essay “Authoritarian 
State”, written in 1940 Douglas Kellner has described this essay as the last 
positive statement of the possibilities of revolutionary transformation made by 
Horkheimer (Kellner, 1989: 76) And indeed, in this piece Horkheimer exhibits an 
anarchistic anti-authoritarianism; he celebrates the energies of revolt as manifested 
in the “voluntaristic”, “spontaneist” moments of the Councils movement in 
Germany and Italy, and in the events of 1871, 1905, and the like., as that which 
must be reclaimed and re-affirmed. (Horkheimer, 1978b: 104) But, in anarchist
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fashion, he is critical of mass parties and the bureaucratic élites which head them, 
and is critical, moreover, of the idea of “development” and an immanent law of 
historical progress.
For Horkheimer,
Dialectic is not identical with development Two contradictory moments, 
the transition to state control and liberation from it, are seized as one in 
the concept of social revolution. Revolution brings about what would 
happen without spontaneity in any case: the socialization of the means of 
production, planned management of production, and the unlimited control 
of nature. And it also brings about what will not happen without resistance 
and the constantly renewed efforts to strengthen freedom: the end o f 
exploitation. (Horkheimer, 1978b: 107)
History has both possibilities and dangers, the theory that represents the 
bourgeois economy as determined according to ‘an immanent law of development 
in the transition to freedom’ (Horkheimer, 1978b: 107) endangers that transition 
by removing the crucial element of conscious will from that process. Dialectical 
determination is expressed in both necessity and will. The possibilities for freedom 
within a post-revolutionary state would be kept alive only through the 
continuation of resistance and ‘the uncompromising independence of the 
citizenry. ’ (Horkheimer, 1978b: 112)
This emphasis within Horkheimer’s theory, as I have indicated, is essentially 
anti-bureaucratic (and, it could be said, anti-intellectual, insofar as it is 
intellectuals who have become political functionaries) in character. In the Weimar
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Republic the mass revolutionary organisations, through a process of 
bureaucratisation and by their maintenance of authoritarian structures, reproduced 
the domination which they supposedly set out to abolish (Horkheimer, 1978b: 
99). For its part, the success of the Russian revolution -though not referred to 
directly by name - has resulted in increased control and oppression. The 
revolution has now become that in which a ‘career’ may be made and power and 
celebrity sought in the party hierarchy (Horkheimer, 1978b: 112).7 But for 
Horkheimer, the direction the revolution had taken was not necessary, such an 
authoritarian development was dependent upon the ‘belief that one is acting in the 
name of something greater than oneself (Horkheimer, 1978b: 112), to which one 
submits, and in which one may find justifications for enforcing the submission of 
others.
In its positivist, optimistic version, the revolution is degraded to “progress”, to 
a world-historical movement and Enlightenment conception of increased rational 
control. However, as we have seen, Horkheimer saw revolution as also containing 
a contradictory moment of liberation, which may only be brought about through 
increased resistance and by ‘leaping out’ of progress (“progress” being 
understood as the increased domination of instrumental rationality and the 
extension of control by bureaucratic élites and systems) (Horkheimer, 1978b: 
107) This latter moment, in the context of mass politics and society, becomes a 
struggle against collectivism (understood as the political principle of organising
' Earlier, however, in his notes of the 1920s, Horkheimer had described the 'revolutionary 
career’ as ‘not a scries o f banquets and a string of honorific titles...It is a passage toward the 
unknown, with misery, disgrace, ungratefulness and prison as its way stations.' (Horkheimer. 
1978a: 41)
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masses) and the seizure of power, against planning and the theoretical 
anticipation of a still undetermined future
Horkheimer was conceptualising a struggle against the principle of authority, 
and for the freedom to choose a new, existential principle upon which political 
action could be founded The struggle for liberation is essentially one of 
individuals and small political groups, as the ‘authoritarian state has to fear the 
opposing mass parties only as competitors’ who ‘do not threaten the principle of 
the authoritarian state itself’ (Horkheimer, 1978b: 103) That struggle is 
dependent upon creative will and imagination, upon spontaneous action in the 
here-and-now and ’the active intervention of men ’ (Horkheimer, 1978b: 117) In 
this way, the ‘isolated individual’ becomes a ‘power’, but a power of a different 
sort; his is the power of saying ‘what everyone knows and at the same time 
forbids himself to know’, of a transgressive and negative agency which does not 
seek simply to reproduce the existing structure of power, an agency which does 
not rely upon force (Horkheimer, 1978b 113) Horkheimer’s endorsement of 
imaginative, spontaneist liberation ultimately found a strong resonance in 
Marcuse’s aestheticist, liberatory oppositionism of the 1960s.
Horkheimer’s individuation of struggle involved a necessary emphasis upon 
self-dependence, for the individual engaged in the struggle for freedom there is 
nothing beyond the self to be relied upon ‘[wjhoever cares for a human 
arrangement of the world can look to no court of appeal, to no existing or future 
power.’ (Horkheimer, 1978b: 113) To do otherwise would be to look to 
“something greater than oneself’ which would be fundamentally unaccountable 
and thus threaten the free democracy which Horkheimer seeks However, in the 
same movement whereby the self is made self-reliant, the self as a subject
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possessed of theoretical truth is erased by Horkheimer; the truth of Critical 
Theory is not a ‘property’ (Horkheimer, 1978b: 106) fit for such ownership. 
‘Thought itself is already a sign of resistance’, he writes (Horkheimer, 1978b: 
116); and signifying such resistance in itself, theory does not seek to offer 
anything concrete upon which a specific socio-political subjectivity may fix, tpid 
around which it may cohere.
The “spontaneity” of Critical Theory is that of ‘unthinkable thought’ (Jay, 
1973: 80), rather than that o f  a concrete historical subject. By this I mean that the 
Critical Theorist related first and foremost to Theory itself, not to a social group; 
it was Theory which went its own way, and which the Theorist was obliged to 
follow. Moreover, the Critical Theorist could claim independence based upon that 
Theory because the latter can only exist independently and spontaneously - that is, 
it can only arise within the thought (and lives) of independent thinkers. This of 
course constitutes a circular and self-confirming position (which in the absence of 
a concrete subject of theory might be said to be the only position that could be 
taken). Independent thought confirms its independence only through being lived, 
it can determine itself only through the self-determination of a specific, situated 
consciousness, which at the same time is self-determining only insofar as it is 
determined by independent thought It is in this way, therefore, that Critical 
Theory may be said to represent “the unfolding of a single existential judgement”.
An Existential Theory
In his elaboration of Critical Theory, Horkheimer endorsed Marcuse’s positive 
evaluation of self-criticism and abstraction Distance, independence and the
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spontaneity of thought were not merely the accidental products of the 
circumstance of exile but made necessary conditions of Critical Theory. In the 
prevailing circumstances of mass manipulation and totalising ideologies, perhaps 
the only viable option for holding on to the possibility of an alternative way of 
things, as far as Critical Theory was concerned, resided in the “loneliness” of 
small groups of intellectuals. In a passage often quoted from “Traditional and 
Critical Theory” Horkheimer wrote:
Even to the proletariat the world superficially seems different from what it 
really is. Even an outlook that could grasp that no opposition really exists 
between the proletariat’s own true interests and those of society as a 
whole, and would therefore derive its principles of action from the 
thoughts and feelings of the masses, would fall into slavish dependence on 
the status quo. (Horkheimer, 1972: 213-214)
The distorted, false nature of the outlook of the proletariat was precisely what 
made distance, and pessimism, necessary However, the severing of the link 
between knowledge and the social situation of the proletariat threw up the 
question of what constituted the grounds upon which the correctness of Critical 
Theory might be tested Ultimately, as 1 have suggested, this came down to the 
individual existence of the Theorist. Knowledge cannot be had of revolutionary 
change until that change has come about, as Horkheimer put it, if the proof of the 
theoretical “pudding” which he and his Institute colleagues were concocting was 
in the eating, ‘the eating here is still in the future’ (Horkheimer, 1972: 221), and 
could not be legitimately anticipated The Theorist had, therefore, only the present 
and his or her specific existence in that present to work in and with
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In this way, Critical Theory shared in common with existentialism an emphasis 
upon self-choice and self-determination in and through “authentic” theoretical acts 
referred to no final court of appeal. The meaning of such acts is found in their 
transcendence of determinate conditions. Theory provides the possibility of 
transcendence and self-determination; in the process, Theory determines itself. 
The self-determination of the thinker is theoretical in character - that is, is a 
moment within a total unfolding of a “single existential judgement”, but an 
unfolding, or “disclosure”, which never ends, which is, therefore, ever present. 
Notwithstanding its criticisms of existentialism and phenomenology (see Adorno, 
1978; Horkheimer, 1993, however, throughout his career Marcuse pursued a 
more positive engagement with existentialism (see, Jay, 1985: ch. 1, Kellner, 1984; 
ch.2)), like these latter, Critical Theory tended to  locate the guarantee of 
knowledge in self-realising, self-creative, theoretical action. If, as Sartre declared, 
‘we have no means, no intellectual instrument, no concrete experience’ (Sartre, 
1963: 34) which allows us to gain a conception of the free society and thought of 
the future against which we may measure our present thought and action, then it 
could be said that we have nothing but the spontaneous elaboration o f ourselves 
to fall back on. Like Mannheim’s sociology, Critical Theory maintained a 
conception of a transcendent, or self-founding, intellectual subject.
Beniamin and ‘the organisation of pessimism’
I turn my attention now to Walter Benjamin’s conception of the relation 
between intellectuals and masses, and of the position o f art and culture in relation 
to political struggle. I look at Benjamin principally because he attempted to marry
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Critical Theory’s “pessimistic” concern with the “crisis of Marxism” and the 
subjective conditions of revolution (or lack of them) with an explicit orientation 
upon the intellectual’s commitment to concrete social and political struggles. 
Benjamin sought to organise the liberatory energies of revolt, to place the 
dialectical negativity of Theory in the service of the revolution. He stood at the 
margins of the Institute specifically (for instance, remaining in Europe, ultimately 
with fatal consequences (see Arendt, 1970), when the latter re-located in 
America) and of academia generally. He was, therefore, less subject to the rigours 
o f  the alternative theoretical line pursued by the Institute, and exercised by its 
most prominent members. As such, Benjamin stimulated contention within 
Critical Theory about the meaning of independence and commitment, especially as 
articulated in the contribution of Adorno, which I go on to examine below. One 
may thus employ him in order to bring out some of the tensions within the 
disparate “project” of Critical Theory
Benjamin expressed his approval to Horkheimer of the latter’s description of 
the situation of the critical intellectual as spelt out in “Traditional and Critical 
Theory” (Dubiel, 1985: 51; Slater, 1977: 57). Indeed, in an essay of 1929 on 
Surrealism he had been similarly dismissive of bourgeois intellectuals’ ‘moralizing 
dilettantism.’ (Benjamin, 1989: 179) The express objects of his criticism in that 
piece were French literary and aesthetic intellectuals standing in the tradition of 
Zola, as French cultural politics was the area in which he was making his 
intervention. However, Benjamin also considered that his German familiarity with 
‘the crisis of the intelligentsia’ (Benjamin, 1989: 172) placed him in an 
advantageous position to make such a critique.
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Benjamin berates ‘the so-called well-meaning left-wing intelligentsia’ in strong 
terms:
It is typical o f these left-wing French intellectuals - exactly as it is of their 
Russian counterparts, too - that their positive function derives entirely 
from a feeling of obligation, not to the Revolution, but to traditional 
culture. Their collective achievement, as far as it is positive, approximates 
conservation. But politically and economically they must always be 
considered a potential source of sabotage.
Characteristic of this whole left-wing bourgeois position is its 
irremediable coupling of idealistic morality with political practice 
(Benjamin, 1989: 178-179).
It is only in relation to this latter emphasis upon “sentiment” and the conservative 
idealisation of an old morality and culture that the incendiary romanticism and 
occultism of Surrealism can be understood. According to Benjamin, ‘[o]ne finds 
[Surrealism’s] cult o f evil as a political device, however romantic, to disinfect and 
isolate against all moralizing dilettantism.’ (Benjamin, 1989: 179) With regard to 
the intellectual’s connection with the proletariat, what is needed is not sympathy 
or sentiment, nor the adoption of a contemplative, intellectual-passive “attitude” 
and a “realist” portrayal of the proletariat’s plight. For Benjamin, the importance 
of Surrealism is that its aesthetic presentation is also an attempt to realise in 
actuality the form of existence that its art presents. Thus, the literary products of 
the Surrealists are not simply “literature” ‘but something else - demonstrations, 
watchwords, documents, bluffs’, their ‘writings are concerned literally with 
experiences, not with theories and still less with phantasms ’ (Benjamin, 1989:
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173) They are authentic acts. And the essential method for achieving the 
‘Surrealist experience’ (a method in and by which technique and material, 
knowledge and being are brought together) is that of ‘profane illumination’, 
envisaged as making the mundane, the world of ordinary, even outmoded, objects 
and events into things strange, making them parts of a ‘revolutionary experience ’ 
(Benjamin, 1989: 173, 174, 175) Later, in “Paris -  Capital of the Nineteenth- 
Century”, Benjamin went on to  develop this idea as a general principle of the 
cultural production of the utopian transfigurations of present society:
In the dream in which every epoch sees in images the epoch which is to 
succeed it, the latter appears coupled with elements of prehistory -  that is 
to say, of a classless society. The experiences of this society, which have 
their store place in the collective unconscious, interact with the new to 
give birth to the utopias which leave their traces in a thousand 
configurations of life. (1983: 159)
It is the experiential, lived, intoxicating character of what one could call 
Surrealist “art-acts” - their ‘moral exhibitionism’ (Benjamin, 1989: 174) - that 
makes them significant to Benjamin as that which adds up to a ‘radical concept of 
freedom’ (Benjamin, 1989: 180), as a living demonstration of such freedom 
However, he acknowledges another side to this when he asks: ‘are they [i.e, the 
Surrealists] successtul in welding this experience of freedom to the other 
revolutionary experience that we have to acknowledge because it has been ours, 
the constructive, dictatorial side o f  revolution? In short, have they hound revolt to 
revolution?’ (Benjamin, 1989: 180; emphasis added) There is a need ‘[t]o win the 
energies of intoxication for the revolution’ (Benjamin, 1989: 180), otherwise there
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is a danger of sinking into an undialectical celebration of such energies, a danger 
of ‘subordinating] the methodical and disciplinary preparation for revolution 
entirely to a praxis oscillating between fitness exercises and celebration in 
advance.’ (Benjamin, 1989: 181) (The hazards of intoxication are of course those 
of the “soul”, as evinced by Horkheimer above (and Marcuse (see 1968: 112ff).) 
Moreover, the negation of self in intoxication and the fascination with mystery for 
mystery’s sake are phenomena - and decidedly “earthly” phenomena at that - with 
which we are very familiar in our own, ‘New Age’ times.)
For Benjamin, the pessimism o f revolt - the rejection o f conventional freedoms 
and morality - demands organisation. Adducing Pierre Naville, a former Surrealist 
and author of the essay “La Révolution et les Intellectuels”, Benjamin poses 
another key question: ‘where are the conditions for revolution? In the changing of 
attitudes or of external circumstances?’ (Benjamin, 1989: 181) In dense, complex 
passages at the end of his essay Benjamin answers this with reference to the 
extension of the ‘organisation o f pessimism.’ To organise pessimism is 
understood, cryptically, as ‘nothing other than to expel moral metaphor from 
politics and to discover in political action a sphere reserved 100 percent for 
images ’ (Benjamin, 1989: 182) What this means for Benjamin is that intellectuals 
should no longer, in contemplative style, continue to supply optimistic 
metaphorical representations of a better life to come for the proletariat Instead, 
they must position themselves within the ‘image sphere’, ‘the world of universal 
and integral actualities’ (Benjamin, 1989: 182) the sphere in which that which is 
represented in its absence (the socialist future) is made present, as simultaneously 
ideal and real, in which the collectivity of the proletariat is produced in 
experiential and political reality. The activity of intellectuals must therefore be an
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activity o f the technical production -  that is, the cultural-technological 
production, the production in image and in reality - of the revolutionary 
collectivity 8 The intellectual is significant in his or her productive activity
The Author as Producer
Like Horkheimer and Marcuse, Benjamin sought a more profound connection 
between the intellectual, the intellectual’s theoretical or cultural practice, and class 
than they saw at work in both social democracy and Russian communism. In the 
1934 essay, “The Author as Producer”, Benjamin presented his ideas on this 
relationship more clearly than he had five years earlier. In this essay Benjamin 
addressed the question of the “political correctness” of the left-wing writer, of 
‘tendentious’ writing (Benjamin, 1978: 255). He sought to show that the correct 
political tendency of such writing can not be detached from its formal-technical 
tendency and quality. For
the tendency of a literary work can only be politically correct if it is also 
literarily correct. That is to say that the politically correct tendency 
includes a literary tendency The correct political tendency of a work 
includes its literary quality because it includes its literary tendency. 
(Benjamin, 1978: 256)
For Benjamin, as long as the literary-intellectual remains a ‘characterological 
type’, an individual possessed of certain ‘spiritual values’ and securely superior in
“ Such activity is the subject o f  Benjamin’s most famous essay. “The Work o f  Art in the Age of 
Mechanical Reproduction'^1936) (Benjamin. 1992: 211-244).
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this possession (Benjamin, 1978: 260), without an awareness of his or her place 
and function in the (cultural) production process, then the intellectual’s tendency 
has a ‘counterrevolutionary function.’ (Benjamin, 1978: 260)
It is from this perspective that Benjamin attacked the Activist and Neue 
Sachlichkeit cultural-political movements of Weimar Germany for their adoption 
of a critical position ''beside the proletariat.’ (Benjamin, 1978: 261) Such an 
attitudinal, characterologically disposed intellectual becomes nothing more than a 
‘benefactor’ or ‘ideological patron’ of the proletariat (Benjamin, 1978: 261), who 
condescends merely to take its part. Conversely, the “productive” intellectual 
seeks the ‘transformation of the forms and instruments of production’ (Benjamin, 
1978: 261); his or her activity does not seek only to use the productive apparatus 
in the name of the working-class but to transform that apparatus for its use. ‘What 
matters’, according to Benjamin, ‘is the exemplary character of production, which 
is able first to induce other producers to produce, and second to put an improved 
apparatus at their disposal.’ (Benjamin, 1978: 265) Truly revolutionary cultural 
activity improves the productive apparatus, and this improvement comes about 
through turning consumers into producers.9 Such work may be said therefore to 
have an organising function It is not concerned simply with expressing the 
individual’s pessimism and disillusionment with the given but with organising that 
pessimism and disillusionment in such a way as to produce collective political 
participation in cultural activity In the process, the collectivity is engaged in 
producing itself as a critical force
* In recent times, the new communications technologies (the Internet, digital broadcasting) have 
been talked of in this way Such talk, however, has tended to autonomisc technology, leading to 
a type of determinism. In many eases, the instantaneous exchange of information is regarded as 
necessarily resulting in politically revolutionary, or at least, democratic, conclusions, rather than 
simply facilitating the expansion and extension of existing politico-economic models
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Benjamin took his close friend and intellectual companion Bertolt Brecht, the 
originator of Epic Theatre, as exemplary of this self-conscious author-as- 
producer Established theatre ‘has become a means against the producers’ over 
which they have no control (Benjamin, 1978: 266). Such theatre is enmeshed in a 
‘competitive struggle’ with ‘newer instruments of production’ such as film and 
radio (Benjamin, 1978: 266). Epic Theatre, on the other hand, ‘seeks to use and 
learn from them’, and to make possible the exposure of ‘what is present’ 
(Benjamin, 1978: 266, 267). Andrew Arato sums up Benjamin’s view:
Brecht’s theater is a “dramatic laboratory” which uses all of its technical 
sophistication to make the self-education of audiences possible The play, 
“an experimental setup”, fosters two dialogues: one between the 
producers of the play with the technical means of communication, and 
another between actor, author, technical personnel and the “reduced men 
of today ” The two dialogues allow the audience to become coauthor, 
coactor of the production. (Arato and F.bhardt, 1978: 214)
By such dialogic means Brecht brings about an (Imfunktianiervng o f the means of 
production, that is, through his intellectual activity he transforms the productive 
apparatus in such a way as it may serve the class struggle, for he produces a form 
of theatre which depends upon the realisation of a collective critical consciousness 
for its own realisation
For Benjamin, following Louis Aragon, the revolutionary intellectual’s 
transformation of the productive apparatus constituted a ‘betrayal’ of the
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intellectual’s class of origin (Benjamin, 1978: 268) Such a betrayal was regarded 
as necessary and valid, in contrast to that with which Julien Benda had recently 
charged intellectuals in his book La Trahison des Clercs, which was published in 
1927.10 It distinguished the revolutionary from the traditional intellectual - that is, 
such a betrayal made intellectuals give up their “spiritual” or “characterological” 
self-conception, and enabled them to transcend a purely contemplative (idealist 
and attitudinal) opposition to capitalism, an opposition rooted in and determined 
by traditional (that is, bourgeois) culture. As far as Benjamin is concerned, ‘the 
more exactly [the intellectual] is informed on his position in the process of 
production, the less it will occur to him to lay claim to “spiritual” qualities ’ 
(Benjamin, 1978: 269) Ultimately, with the intensification of the revolutionary 
struggle, the basis for the intellectual’s oppositional efficacy will only be found in 
his or her “organic” connection with the proletariat in the production process, 
‘[f]or the revolutionary struggle is not between capitalism and spirit but between 
capitalism and proletariat ’ (Benjamin, 1978: 269) What is necessary are not more 
professions of revolutionary ideals and fa ith  but “treacherous” acts of cultural 
appropriation
Benjamin’s classification of intellectuals bears a close resemblance to that 
developed by Gramsci at much the same time. As we shall see in the next chapter, 
Gramsci was less directly concerned with specifically aesthetic issues than 
Benjamin (and, importantly, was situated in a different institutional location, in 
which he was concerned with practical political problems of organisation and 
education) but both men sought to tie together “pessimistic” intellectual-cultural
Wc will see in a later chapter Sartre's further development of the idea of the intellectual's 
betrayal of his or her class of origin in his P lea  f o r  In te llec tu a ls  (1965).
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with “optimistic” political-organisational activity. Moreover, in each case this 
theoretical endeavour resulted in criticism, though from wholly different 
directions. For Gramsci, this largely entailed entering into intra-party debates with 
comrades over questions of tactics and strategy. For Benjamin, in the first 
instance, criticism arose from members of the Institute such as Adorno.
The Critique of Beniamin
As I have indicated, Benjamin’s ideas were drawn from the same pool of 
concerns as those of Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse. Like them, he was 
concerned with the marginality of the intellectual and the theoretical elaboration 
of critical, pessimistic consciousness and culture. However, unlike them, he 
remained more closely fixed upon the idea of the intellectual as actively oriented 
upon the concrete manifestations of the revolutionary cause. It was for this reason 
that Benjamin was regarded by Horkheimer and Adorno as developing Theory 
“undialectically”, as seeking to identify Theory too clearly with the limited (one­
sided) particularity of existing socio-political subjects and institutions.
In letters he wrote to Benjamin commenting upon his work on Baudelaire and 
the essay “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction”, Adorno 
spelt out his criticisms He lamented Benjamin’s immediate relation of elements 
within the superstructure to the material base of society (Adorno, 1980: 129), and 
bemoaned the fact of the latter’s forced incorporation o f ‘materialist categories’ 
into his thought (Adorno, 1980: 130). In Adorno’s opinion, Benjamin had added 
external ‘ingredients’ to his ‘specific insights and conclusion’ which had made 
these latter ‘distasteful to swallow’ even for himself (Adorno, 1980: 131).
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Benjamin’s adoption of such an unpalatable materialism was attributed in large 
part by Adorno and others to the ‘baleful’ and ‘disastrous’ influence of Brecht 
(Gershom Scholem, quoted in Arendt, 1970: 167).11 The two men had been 
friends since 1929, and as we have seen already, Benjamin considered Brecht’s 
dramatic praxis as of the highest political importance. Moreover, Benjamin 
explicitly endorsed the “crude” thinking advocated by Brecht, whilst saying of the 
latter: ‘my agreeing with Brecht’s production is one of the most important and 
most strategic points in my entire position.’ (Arendt, 1970: 168) But Brecht’s 
committed, “collective” art was roundly questioned by Adorno in his 
correspondence with Benjamin, the former even suggesting Brecht’s opposition to 
l'art pour I'art meant that he formed a de facto  ‘united front’ with the Nazis 
(Adorno, 1980: 122).12 Adorno argued for the need for ‘more dialectics’ of a 
negative kind (Adorno, 1980: 124) as an antidote to what he saw as a dangerous 
slide back into a variety of identity theory, even a kind of positivism.
For Adorno, Benjamin’s Brechtian defence of a technological, collective, 
‘utilitarian’ (Adorno, 1980: 124) art in “The Work of Art” and “Author as 
Producer” essays rested on seeing autonomous art purely as compromised or co­
opted, as ‘unfree’ in comparison to committed art Benjamin ‘underestimated the 
technicality of autonomous art and overestimated that of dependent art.’ (Adorno, 
1980: 124) However, the truth is that ‘[bjoth bear the stigmata of capitalism, both 
contain elements of change Both are the tom halves of an integral freedom, to 
which however they do not add up.’ (Adorno, 1980: 123) In championing cinema
11 For his part, Brecht derided the Critical Theorists in the United States as ‘Tuis’, that is, 
passive, politically impotent, academic intellectuals (sec Jay, 1973: fn.338; Slater, 1977: 144- 
145).
12 See also Adorno’s 1962 essay “Commitment” (in Arato and Ebcrhardt, 1978) for a 
continuation of his assault upon Brecht and committed art
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and the Epic Theatre of Brecht, Benjamin, according to Adorno, was guilty of an 
‘anarchistic romanticism of blind confidence in the spontaneous power of the 
proletariat in the historical process’, of attributing to the proletariat, as the subject 
of cinema and drama, with theoretical consciousness and a decisive historical 
subjectivity (Adorno, 1980: 123, 122).
Thus, Benjamin was equated by Adorno to the “Luxemburgian” intellectuals 
and metaphysical positivists who take the given (whether it be the “fact” of 
proletarian consciousness or existing socio-economic conditions) as the 
unequivocal basis for their theoretical observations In a later letter criticising 
what was eventually to become ‘The Paris of the Second Empire in Baudelaire” 
Adorno made this charge of an undialectical, uncritical factuality explicit: ‘[i]f one 
wished to put it very drastically, one could say that your study is located at the 
crossroads of magic and positivism.’ Benjamin had ended up engaging in little 
other than ‘a wide-eyed presentation of mere facts ’ (Adorno, 1980: 129) Again 
Adorno called for more theory, the study of cultural phenomena requires 
mediation ‘through the total social process' (Adorno, 1980: 129), which could 
only be carried out theoretically
Critical Theory and ‘Leninism’
It is significant that Adorno took recourse to Lenin in his critique of Benjamin, 
for this was to raise again the issue of spontaneity and the exact nature of the 
intellectual’s relationship to the practical workers’ movement, and that between 
the cultural and political vanguards. In his critique, Adorno drew upon Lenin’s
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conception of the introduction of revolutionary-theoretical consciousness into the 
proletariat from “outside” of that class as expounded in What is to be Done? 
(1902) (Lenin, 1988: 143-144). For Adorno too the proletariat only achieves such 
consciousness ‘through a theory introduced by intellectuals as dialectical 
subjects.’ (Adorno, 1980: 122) Lenin argued that the proletariat was incapable of 
anything more than a corporate, economistic consciousness, and Adorno, in 
accord with Horkheimer’s argument in “Traditional and Critical Theory”, 
adjudged the actual consciousness of workers to be “mutilated”, as bourgeois. It 
would thus be impossible for the working-class to make a revolution without the 
intervention of an external agency -  that is, revolutionary intellectuals.
However, whereas Lenin considered this intervention to be the role o f the 
revolutionary party - the tightly organised, highly disciplined, “Jacobin” 
revolutionary party -, Adorno looked elsewhere. He did not envisage the function 
of the theoretical subject ‘in the sense of an activist conception of “intellectuals’” 
(Adorno, 1980: 125); the relationship of the intellectual to proletariat is not one of 
acting on its side, as Benjamin - one might say, in Leninist fashion - argued. 
Instead, it is matter of maintaining solidarity with the working-class through 
following the “truth” of theory. It is not the party which, as Trotsky was to 
declare at the founding of the Fourth International, should demand the individual 
‘totally and completely’ (Trotsky, 1974: 86), but theory and theoretical 
reflection. To the “corporate” consciousness of the working-class would be 
counterposed the “universal” consciousness o f the intellectual, which would 
remain universal as long as it was not universalised in practical concrete forms. 
The “revolution” foreseen by Adorno was revolutionary precisely insofar as it 
remained unrealised.
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The “Leninism” endorsed by Adorno (and, one might say, which characterised 
Critical Theory more generally) was one in which the revolutionary vanguard of 
the Party was displaced by the cultural vanguard of the subjects of Critical 
Theory. But whereas the Leninist party intellectual was grounded in the necessity 
of the activist, organisational tasks of enabling the proletariat to fulfil its historical 
role, to become conscious o f its historical subjectivity, Critical Theory saw the 
intellectual’s task as exactly the reverse. It became a revolutionary theory without 
agency. Solidarity was maintained with the proletariat precisely through 
maintaining the gap between the critical intellectual and the masses The 
“backward”, “mutilated” consciousness of the proletariat constituted exactly the 
reason not to act as it had for Lenin to act. Adorno’s citation of Lenin’s dictum on 
the insufficiency of the proletariat’s spontaneous consciousness in support of his 
critique of Benjamin itself represented the “tearing in half’ of Lenin’s 
revolutionary thesis, whereby Adorno appropriated its negative, purely theoretical 
moment whilst discarding the positive, practical moment
As such, Critical Theory was not concerned first and foremost with the 
changing of people and conditions but, rather, with the preservation of a critical 
space at the margins of an increasingly conformist and hyper-socialised society. 
From this perspective, the mass revolutionary party, as Horkheimer argued, 
represented only another manifestation of the repressive and rigidifying rationality 
which had penetrated all levels of social and political practice. Faced with 
contemporary rigidification the intellectuals of the Institute could find ready 
justification for their withdrawal from practice Moreover, as Zygmunt Bauman 
points out, such a withdrawal (or ‘surrender’) from the point-of view of the
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“philosophers” of Frankfurt, itself could be seen as having its own practical 
efficacy or potency:
Even in their surrender (particularly in their surrender?) philosophers 
remain incessantly and painfully conscious of the practical connection of 
the cultural ideal. Its impotence is as much a constituting factor of their 
discourse as its assumed all-conquering potency was of the discourse of 
their Enlightenment ancestors. Impotence itself becomes now potency, the 
cultural ideal stays pure and worthy as long as it is not contaminated by 
intrinsically impure reality; it stays pure and worthy because it steers clear 
of practical success. And yet, in a curious twist of mind, this pure, 
ethereal, cultural ideal is believed to be reality’s best chance. (1992: 20) 
According to this account, the eventual detachment of Critical Theory from an 
“impure” practical reality might be seen as the preservation of an alternative form 
of (using Bauman’s term) “legislative” practice on the part of a group of 
intellectuals who had abjured the modem(ist) intellectuals’ attachment to the 
political realisation of their rational ideals. It was these latter - and especially 
those who sought to pursue rational schemes of social and state planning - who 
positioned the intellectual at the very heart of the socio-political process of 
totalisation, in which all social phenomena were “reconciled” to existing reality 
within the terms of a rational political calculus. For Critical Theorists, Mannheim 
had brought about just such a reconciliation, as had, in their different way, the 
activists of the revolutionary party who, by identifying the interests of a debased 
and “mutilated” working-class, fell into a “slavish dependence on the status quo”.
However, though Critical Theory sought to reject a specific conception of a 
totalising intellectual activity, as Bauman indicates, they did not manage to avoid
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perpetuating that very mode of activity. In the process of overcoming the 
intellectual’s attachment to practice, Critical Theory presented itself as ‘a form of 
practice’ (Adorno, cited in Anderson, 1976: 73); in disavowing the modem(ist) 
intellectual’s conciliatory, centralising impulses, Critical Theory permitted the 
intellectual only the possibility of performing work at the social margins which 
necessarily could have no present benefit. If such a marginal intellectual was 
forced to forego the consolations of a “legislative” practice directed at the world 
beyond the boundaries of his or her coterie, he or she might yet legislate, might 
yet provide the foundational categories and methods from which intellectuals 
could derive authority within their own tradition(s) (Bauman, 1987: 5), a process 
which, as I argue in chapter six, has characterised contemporary conceptions of 
the intellectual But, these two spheres (or practices) of authority are not 
separable; the production of a decontaminated Theory which would serve as a 
vessel for a perhaps unrealisable future was itself dependent upon the operation of 
particular institutional and procedural mechanisms which enabled that Theory to 
exert a specifically cultural and moral effectivity.
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Chanter Three
Ideas in Action: Gramsci and the 
Creation of Conviction
Introduction
In the preceding two chapters I have looked at attempts to re-evaluate the 
relation between the intellectual and the masses, and that between reflective 
consciousness and the diverse domains of experience in the light of revolutionary 
crisis and the subsequent apparent failure of revolutionary socialism in Western 
Europe In the case of Mannheim, the re-evaluation of the intellectual constituted 
an integral part of his totalisation of the Marxist ideology-critique as a sociology 
of knowledge, whereby socialism was displaced into social science. Mannheim 
proposed the possibility of a new objectivity, a “universal”, social consciousness, 
but one that was not class-based For its part, Critical Theory sought the recovery 
of idealism out from under the inert body of a mechanistic materialism, and as part 
of this, attempted the reclamation of dialectical thought as destabilising the 
possibility of the progressive “socialisation” of the individual and the optimistic 
reconciliation of antagonistic classes and social factors.
There can be seen in both these cases an effort to re-introduce consciousness 
back into the socio-historical process as an active determinant element. The 
sociology of knowledge and Critical Theory were developed upon the premise 
expressed by Karl Korsch that ‘[intellectual life should be conceived in union 
with social and political life,... should be studied in union with social 
consciousness , as a real yet ideal (or “ideological”) component of the historical 
process in general.’ (1970:71) Consciousness, therefore, could and should be seen 
not as a mere “reflection” of reality, as argued by Lenin in his contribution to 
epistemology, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism  (1909), but as part o f reality 
itself This meant that, as Korsch indicated, it was possible to regard the operation
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of the intellectual consciousness, in ideological or cultural activity, for example, as 
a particular and distinct type of “action”.
For Mannheim, that active consciousness was synthetic in character; for the 
Critical Theorists, it was conceived of as dialectical-critical. There were, as I hope 
to have shown, differences between these constructions of consciousness, 
especially with regard to their respective relationships to Marxism and 
revolutionary consciousness However, one may say that both Mannheim and the 
Critical Theorists came to similar positions with regard to their idea (and practice) 
of intellectual action In that conception, intellectual action was ultimately equated 
to: i) the privileging of an in some way removed intellect, ii) not merely the 
severance of the relationship between theory and practice but suspicion of, even 
hostility to, the latter, iii) the end of the intellectual’s organisational-agitational 
function, and, iv) a process of institutional re-location consequent upon the latter, 
v) the re-attribution or even loss of political agency, and, vi) the affirmation of a 
transcendent truth potentially apprehendible by the intellect - a truth not available 
from within the practical-political but only beyond it.
In short, the emphasis upon the active character of the intellect was marked by 
a removal of emphasis from the efficacy of other kinds of consciousness 
Intellectual consciousness was distinguished as allowing access to dimensions of 
reality barred to forms of experiential consciousness Experience was that which 
imposed limits upon consciousness, situated it within specific practical 
circumstances and conditions which confined it within dominant 
Weltanschauungen. In this, one can discern an Enlightenment conception of the 
intellect as that which rises beyond power, as that which is based upon brute self- 
interest, and which renders it rational, objective, and hence “disinterested”, in one
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case, or sees it as totalising, as totally contaminating all aspects of experience and 
individual and social life, in the other. Both Mannheim and the Critical Theorists, 
one positively, the other negatively, continued the philosophes’ ‘promise’ 
(Bauman, 1987: 24) of the possibility of establishing knowledge as an alternative 
to  power and to the limited particularity of practical experience.
Gramsci and Intellectual Action
It is within the general context o f the emphasis upon intellectual action that 
Gramsci is often situated This position is backed up by reference to Gramsci’s 
continued concern with subjective consciousness, culture, philosophy - with 
moments of the social and ideological “superstructure” (see, for example, Kellner, 
1989: 12). On this score, Gramsci has been placed, with Lukács and Korsch, at 
the head of the Western Marxist tradition. However, in making such an 
attribution, Perry Anderson at the same time points to Gramsci as alone amongst 
Western Marxists in ‘embod[ying] in his person a revolutionary unity of theory 
and practice ’ (1976: 45) This latter unity consisted, specifically, in the unity o f 
intellect and will, of consciousness and power. For Gramsci, by this reckoning, 
the development of thought was carried on not at the expense of experience but 
was, rather, its continuation.
In his study, Walter Adamson too sees Gramsci as alone amongst the original 
Western Marxists in taking Marxism in ‘a uniquely political [i.e., practico- 
organisational] direction’ (1980: 3: my emphasis). I do not feel qualified to 
undertake a detailed comparison o f Korsch, Lukács and Gramsci, however, in 
general terms one can say that Korsch and Lukács performed what they
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considered to be the essential task of “Hegelianising” the revisionist Marx of the 
Second International (see Lukács, 1971: xxi) but that this was, unsurprisingly, an 
enterprise which was, first and foremost, philosophical in character. Thus, in his 
1967 critique of his own “subjectivism”, Lukács recognised the disparity between 
his revolutionary practice and methods, and the distanced philosophism of History 
and Class Consciousness, which led to the contemplation of socio-historical facts 
as trans-historical universal categories.
By contrast, Adamson places Gramsci on a radically different “fVeg zu Marx": 
‘[ujnlike Lukács, [Gramsci] did not come to Marx at the end of an essentially 
intellectual quest. He came to Marx as he had come to socialism: in search of 
answers to practical political problems’ (1980: 34). This emphasises Gramsci’s 
pre-eminent concern with action, and with the practical contexts and conditions of 
consciousness. Moreover, it explains Gramsci’s openness to a variety of ideas and 
philosophies as part of a search for such answers. The manifest influence of such 
diverse figures as Machiavelli, Croce and Kant, Gramsci’s interest in the Italian 
Communes and in the Reformation bears witness to this openness. This 
ecumenism, at least in part, is behind the appeal of Gramsci to a wider 
constituency than revolutionary Marxists. In directly political terms, the 
apparently “soft” pluralist contours of Gramsci’s thought had great allure for the 
architects of post-war Eurocommunism in Italy and elsewhere, insofar as the latter 
sought theoretical foundations for a more “open” and collaborative political 
strategy centred between parliamentary democracy and revolutionary struggle 
(see Rosengarten, 1994: 26)
Gramsci’s distinction, by this account, lay in his continued search for new 
modes of political organisation and education, for new ways of relating to the
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concrete experiences of the working-class. Gramsci passed through various 
theoretical and practical positions in pursuit of solutions to practical-political 
problems of organisation and education. In doing so, he made these central to the 
whole question of revolutionary politics. Moreover, and importantly from our 
perspective, Gramsci made the intellectual, or rather, made the making o f 
intellectuals, as “intellectual and moral reform”, and as hegemonic practice, key 
to the matter of the transformation of the forms and locations of revolutionary 
struggle Whereas Lukács, certainly at the time of History and Class 
Consciousness, “imputed” a revolutionary (totalising) consciousness to the 
working-class as that to which that class under certain objective conditions might 
come, Gramsci saw consciousness much more as that which would be created in 
conjunction with the proletariat. Gramsci saw revolutionary consciousness as that 
which had to be given an ethical and practical reality in the everyday life and 
thought of the proletariat, it needed to become that of which that class was 
convinced, had to be rooted in subjective conviction.
One of the chief tasks of the revolutionary was to create within the proletarian 
masses the conviction of the possibility and desirability of revolution The 
transformation of society would occur only if the working-class could achieve 
subjectively the cultural and ethical readiness for such a transformation 
Convinced of the legitimacy and superiority of its own culture and way of life, 
that class would be prepared to gain hegemony over all other classes. The 
achievement of conviction, the commitment to its own values and forms of life 
constituted the solid experiential and ethical basis upon which the proletariat 
could build the new socialist society, for the sake of which it needed to be 
prepared to make many sacrifices. Conviction embodied both the ethical ends to
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which the class aspired, and the political means by which those ends were to be 
achieved. Politics and ethics were united within conviction.
However, as well as being seen as open and ecumenical, Gramsci has also been 
represented as more or less “totalitarian” in persuasion. Neil Harding’s recent 
damning assessment of Gramsci as an imperious Ideologist or Jacobin (1997: 
21 Off) is a recent example of such an analysis. In fact, Harding exhibits a very 
restricted and monological view of Gramsci, as basically attempting to impose an 
austere and relentless philosophy upon an unsuspecting (and presumably non- 
philosophical) people But, this being said, the question of discipline, authority, 
and centralisation is relevant with regard to Gramsci. In seeking to unite 
revolutionary theory and practice, Gramsci was often faced with holding together 
the competing demands and imperatives of organisation and education, of party 
discipline and ideological unity, and the expansive, “democratic” development of 
a mass critical consciousness.
Gramsci was concerned with the problem of uniting the two dimensions of 
popular participation and centralised authority and discipline, expansive 
autonomous consciousness and united political-ideological outlook throughout his 
revolutionary career. His later, mature conception of hegemony constituted his 
most sophisticated attempt at combining the two, bringing together, in the 
memorable image of Machiavelli’s Centaur, the two levels of ‘force and 
consent,...the individual moment and the universal moment’ (1971: 170), party 
and mass. The problem encountered of the possibility of a clash between 
educative and political-organisational imperatives (see Adamson, 1980: 38-39) 
was addressed in the hegemonic struggle for cultural and ideological dominance.
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Such dominance was to be achieved through the elaboration of an ever-widening 
stratum of “organic intellectuals” and by situating cultural-educative activity, that 
is, by making it a practical process tied into concrete means and ends, rather than 
being concerned with constituting dispassionate, distanced intellectual subjects.
However, that conception, along with the famous delineation of “organic” and 
“traditional” intellectuals, was elaborated at length only in the reflective space of 
prison The exact details of the party’s response to Gramsci’s theory of political 
organisation are difficult to determine (see Bellamy and Schecter, 1993: 84; 
Adamson, 1980: 97-98) But in general one can say that Gramsci’s insistence 
upon a dialectical relationship between individual and universal moments found 
little resonance in the authoritarian party of Stalin, and that Gramsci himself was 
critical of developments within the party which led in an authoritarian and 
mechanicist direction. (1971: 419ff) Indeed, as has been pointed out (see Hoare, 
1985: xxiii-xxiv), it may well be that it was the isolating and to some degree 
insulating experience of prison itself which enabled Gramsci to maintain the unity 
of intellect and will, reflective critical consciousness and power.
At the same time, one should recognise that Gramsci’s emphasis upon the 
cultural and ethical dimensions of politics initially situated him within a wider 
tradition of cultural activism amongst Italian intellectuals, for whom it was 
imperative to secure popular commitment to, and belief in, the Italian nation state. 
At the head of this tradition stood Benedetto Croce, but such intellectual activity 
was also the concern of authoritarians and elitists such as Papini, Prezzolini, 
Marinetti and Mussolini For these intellectuals, the urgent task was that of 
providing the state with intellectual and ethical foundations, and to this end they,
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along with Gramsci, saw themselves as members of a general movement seeking 
intellectual and moral reform, to which I now turn.
Intellectual and Moral Reform: Unfinished Risorgimento
In a recent piece Richard Bellamy has argued that Gramsci should be seen as 
fitting into a tradition within Italian social and political theory the main emphasis 
of which was upon “making Italians” (1997: 39). Within this tradition the 
unification of Italy constituted the dominant concern. Cavour’s diplomatic efforts 
during the Risorgimento period had, as Adamson writes, ‘extended the control of 
one of [Italy’s] provinces, Piedmont, over all the rest’, but had not initiated ‘a 
genuine social revolution out of which a political mandate might have grown.’ 
(1980: 19) Consequently, unification had remained merely a political veneer 
spread over Italian society, with little depth and substance, resulting in the uneven 
economic and political development of the different regions, and allowing the 
dominance of the South of the country by the North.
By this reckoning, the Risorgimento project o f unification had failed because it 
had not brought about ‘a political and ethical unity between the people and the 
state’ (Bellamy and Schecter, 1993: 5), it had not become an experiential and 
moral-intellectual fact for the majority of the Italian populace, had not been 
internalised as a conviction. For many, what was needed was ‘a “second 
Risorgimento” of moral regeneration to complete the political settlement obtained 
by the first’ (Bellamy, 1994: xxxix), and different forces from across the social 
and political spectrum sought to bring this second phase about After his 
imprisonment, Gramsci offered an assessment of his own involvement with this
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movement for intellectual and moral reform According to this account, ‘during 
the first fifteen years of the century’ Italian intellectuals found themselves ‘on a 
common ground’, namely, as participants in a broad movement for national 
rejuvenation, and in this drew upon a common intellectual-philosophical heritage 
(that is, an activist, militant idealism) at the head of which stood the global 
cultural figure of Benedetto Croce (Gramsci, 1994a: 56, 164).
Croce
In the first instance, Croce’s importance to Gramsci consisted in the former’s 
attack upon positivism, a phenomenon which, as we have seen in previous 
chapters, swept across Europe in the early years of the century. Positivism, it was 
thought, led to deterministic, mechanical conclusions, and to an over-reliance 
upon “objective” causality and laws of development. Moreover, according to 
Croce, here echoing Horkheimer and Marcuse in the previous chapter, positivism 
paved the way for ideologies and philosophies of “‘intuition, pragmatism and 
mysticism’” , through its failure ‘to create a new and satisfying religion’” in the 
place of that which it had deposed (cited in Adamson, 1980: 20).1 As a counter to 
the positivist trend, Croce proposed ‘spiritual activity’ (1946: 21) as central to the 
historical process. He sought a ‘saner and truer rationalism.’ (Adamson, 1980: 32) 
For Croce, as for Korsch, thought and action were not ontologically distinct but 
rather should be considered as interdependent moments within the progressive 
unfolding of reality (see, for example, 1913: 18) Hence, it was possible for him to 
posit a totality o f ‘ethico-political history’ in which each sphere of human activity
' O f course, this is precisely what did happen in Italy, where positivism, rationalism, historicism 
and democracy were lumped together and rejected as whole (sec Fcrrarotti, 1981: 148).
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- the economic, technical, aesthetic, moral, etc. - though distinct and autonomous 
as activities, and thus as articulated expressions of the “spirit”, were yet 
dialectically related (see 1946: 73-74; Hoare and Nowell Smith, 1971: xxiii). In 
this way it was possible to imagine a fuller, “two-sided” rationality which 
encompassed will and understanding, subjective belief and objective truth. Politics 
and morality, state and society, became interdependent moments within an 
encompassing spiritual process.
Croce thus placed great emphasis upon action, but understood as “spiritual 
activity”, the conscious, subjective creation of culture and history, and therefore 
of the nation state. In a later work, Politics and Morality (1946), Croce indicated 
what he described as an Aristotelian conception of the relationship between theory 
and practice, and between ‘the active and the contemplative life’, writing ‘that not 
only the actions which turn towards the facts are practical, but even more 
practical are the contemplations and reflections which have their origin and end in 
themselves and which, by educating the mind, prepare for good deeds.’ (1946: 
43)
One can see in this identification of “reflective activity” an exact counterpart to 
Mannheim’s notion of a political science encountered in chapter 1. For Croce, as 
for Mannheim, politics was not merely a matter of preparing the way for an 
insurrection but was, or should be, concerned with educating individuals into self- 
consciousness and habits of good judgement. Unreflective political practice 
carried with it the danger of “contaminating” sound ‘historical judgement’ with 
elements of expediency, which could deprive that judgement ‘of tolerance and 
fairness.’ (1946: 43)
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Gramsci retained something of Croce’s emphasis upon the value and necessity 
of political-educative activity, though he did not accept the latter’s (and by 
association, Mannheim’s) explicit exclusive opposition between the education of 
reflection and practical political engagement. Indeed, it was precisely the problem 
of establishing a dialectical relationship between the two that constituted the 
foundation of his thought and activity. But his early writings do contain a strong 
measure of Croce’s ideas o f politics as spiritual activity and of the latter’s concern 
with the ethico-political. They also exhibit the influence of Georges Sorel - who 
himself owed much to Croce -, whose elevation of practice over doctrine and 
delineation of the dimension of mythical action was influential on Italian 
intellectuals more generally. For Sorel, myths were those sets of ideas which are 
integrated by people into their lives in such a way as they become immovably part 
of their sense of reality and of themselves; as such, they ‘are not descriptions of 
things, but expressions o f a determination to act’, and must be either accepted or 
rejected as they stand. (1961: 50) Myth is that dimension where thought and will, 
practical reality and consciousness meet. It was just such a conjunction that was 
Gramsci’s focus throughout his work and life. However, I want now to look more 
closely at some of Gramsci’s key early essays in order to show how he developed 
ideas about the ethical and experiential dimensions of politics and political 
activity, and about the relationship between the intellectual and the social and 
cultural life of the people.
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Gramsci’s Early Writings: Spiritual Activism
In his famous “defence” (1914) of Mussolini’s advocacy of the PSI’s 
abandonment of a position of absolute neutrality towards the First World War (an 
advocacy that preceded Mussolini’s expulsion from the party) Gramsci exhibited 
his commitment to an activist position.2 In this piece, Gramsci’s argument rested 
on two related points: (i) the PSI needed to take on specifically national tasks, to 
engage with the international political situation on a national basis, the party had 
to become autonomous in its authority to judge day-to-day interventions in the 
national context (1994b: 4); (ii) the general importance of activity, as “spiritual 
creation” - the policy of absolute neutrality might lead to the proletariat’s 
becoming little more than an ‘impotent spectator’ (1994b: 5), standing aside in 
‘passive contemplation’ (1994b: 7) at the onrush of events, a stance with which 
the ruling class would be quite happy. A policy of “active neutrality”, on the other 
hand, would force the ruling-class ‘to assume its responsibilities’ for the current 
situation, a position which would ‘restor[e] to national life its original character as 
a class struggle’ (1994b: 5). Under these conditions, the ruling-class would be 
shown up as inadequate to the tasks of national life, as incapable of overcoming 
the current crisis, and the proletariat would begin to see itself as the only class 
which was so capable.
F.ssentially, therefore, Gramsci was arguing for a situation in which the 
working-class could become the active subject of national life, which could, that 
is, enable the creation of a state which at that time existed only in potentia 1
1 As Fcrrarotti makes clear, at the beginning of the war the Italian avant garde was pervaded by 
an interventionist mood. (1981: 154) Ferrarotti emphasises the Sorclian character o f this: one 
should commit oneself to action of any kind, the act o f commitment being more important than 
the specific nature of the act itself. (1981: 152)
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(1994b: 4), a state which would be set upon the foundations of new forms of life 
and new values.
Due to Mussolini’s subsequent political trajectory, Gramsci was dogged by this 
his first foray into political journalism (see Hoare and Nowell Smith, 1971: xxx). 
He was dubbed an interventionist and wrote nothing for a year after this 
experience The editors of the English translation of the Notebooks comment on 
the fact that Mussolini had great authority among the party in Turin, and that 
therefore it was not surprising that Gramsci would speak up for him However, 
from our perspective, Gramsci’s ethical-activism may be seen as part of the 
characteristic national intellectual-political tradition, which sought commitment to 
specifically Italian forms of consciousness and action. Gramsci’s alignment with 
Mussolini was provisional, each proceeding thereon in opposed directions, but 
was nevertheless consequent upon their having shared concerns - with practical 
activity, spiritual creation and national-popularity In his work of the years 19lb- 
19 Gramsci went on to engage further with these concerns, and it is to some of 
these pieces 1 want to turn now.
Socialism and Culture
In an essay of 1916 Gramsci outlined a conception o f  culture, as critique, as a 
concrete activity of spirit, derived quite explicitly from Romantic and idealist 
thought For Gramsci in this piece culture was necessarily active, it consisted, that 
is, in the activity of ‘critique’, the latter being thought o f  as the disciplined effort 
(that is, by implication, as that to which one is committed) to know oneself 
through knowing others, through ‘knowing their history, the succession of efforts 
they have made to be what they are, to create the civilization they have created ’
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(1994b: 11) Thus, according to Gramsci, one cannot separate out knowing from 
being, the “objective culture”, to recall Simmel’s phrase, of a people, as 
manifested in its “civilisation”, from the subjective work of making one’s own 
identity. Culture is critical in the sense that it involves a process of becoming 
‘master of oneself, and of asserting one’s identity by imposing ‘one’s own order’ 
upon the accumulated material history of the world (1994b: 11).
Culture was envisaged by Gramsci, a la Croce, as a continuous subjective 
historico-spiritual process, rather than a matter of ‘natural evolution.’ (1994b: 11) 
Each revolutionary stage in history was ‘preceded by a long process of intense 
critical activity’, a cultural ferment during which ideas spread throughout various 
social groups (1994b: 10); what was, in fact, a mythologising, in Sorel’s sense, or, 
hegemonising process. Gramsci closely paralleled what Mannheim was claiming 
for culture at much the same time. As we have seen, in his lecture on “Soul and 
Culture”, Mannheim emphasised the historical necessity for a cultural critique 
which could pave the way for an as yet unseen future culture One may elicit 
similarities of tradition and national-cultural context between the two. Gramsci 
and Mannheim drew upon similar philosophical traditions and intellectual 
formations; both were caught up in the pan-F.uropean crisis instigated by world 
war, both were active in countries where intellectuals sought wholesale 
intellectual and moral regeneration, and both sought to make ideas into concrete 
forces for change However, these similarities apart, for Gramsci cultural critique 
was the precursor to social revolution, was that which prepared the way for 
political action, for Mannheim, on the other hand, such a critique foreshadowed a 
new moral order, but political action was that which was to be guarded against
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The critique could not be expressed in the concrete form of a particular socio­
political force.
The significance of critical activity for Gramsci’s conception of revolutionary 
change meant that it enabled him to recover the Enlightenment as a moment of 
revolutionary cultural ferment. Displaying a perhaps slightly confusing looseness 
of terms, Gramsci proclaimed the Enlightenment to have been ‘a magnificent 
revolution in itself, which created ‘a kind of pan-European unified consciousness, 
a bourgeois International of the spirit.’ (1994b: 10) The Enlightenment signified 
the cultural-historical conjuncture when thought became a kind o f action, when 
ideas became a “force” in themselves, and when “individual and universal 
moments” were united.5 Gramsci described the interrelationship of Enlightenment 
culture and the political transformation (the modernisation) of Europe in an 
extraordinarily sure and evocative passage:
In Italy, in France, in Germany, the same things were being discussed, the 
same institutions, the same principles. Each new play by Voltaire, each 
new pamphlet was like a spark running through the wires which already 
stretched between one state and another, one region and another; and it 
found the same sympathizers and the same opponents everywhere at the 
same moment. The bayonets of Napoleon’s armies found their way already 
cleared by an invisible army of books and tracts, which had been swarming 
out of Paris since the first half of the eighteenth century, preparing men 
and institutions for their badly needed renovation. (1994b: 11) 1
1 On the Enlightenment transformation of ideas into a socially transformational force, sec 
Bauman. I9K7: eh. 7.
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The significance of this process had three aspects: i) it meant that intellectuals 
could be seen as having an important politico-historical function, ii) that bourgeois 
(“traditional”) culture could not be simply ignored as ‘pedantic, arid 
intellectualism’ (1994b: 10) but had to be seen as having existed in an active, 
practical (“organic”) relationship with historical reality, and iii) it focused 
attention upon the necessity of preparing the cultural and social ground before a 
class could ascend to political power. These were insights which Gramsci would 
later make central to his twin notions of the intellectual and hegemonic activity.
Russian Revolutions
In his initial response to the first (February) Russian revolution (as indeed to 
the October revolution) Gramsci took up the optic of Crocean idealism in his 
analysis of events. He immediately fixed upon the perceived ethical and actional 
aspects of the revolution. In a piece published in April 1917 in 11 Grido del 
Popolo, “Notes on the Russian Revolution”, he was dismissive of parallels with 
the French Revolution, on the grounds that the latter had been ‘Jacobin’ in 
character (1994b: 32), that is, had been an event characterised by the transfer of 
power alone. For Gramsci, the February Revolution was to be seen not merely as 
‘a matter of power’ but as ‘a revolution in people’s behaviour, a moral 
revolution.’ (1994b: 31)
Again, one can see a post-Risorgimento, moral-regenerative emphasis at work 
in Gramsci’s thought. Jacobinism is a ‘bourgeois phenomenon’ (1994b: 32) 
because it involves the imposition o f  the limited, corporate ends of one class upon 
all others. ‘Socialist revolutionaries cannot be Jacobins’, as far as Gramsci is 
concerned, precisely because they have universal ends, that is, because they
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‘pursu[e] an ideal which cannot be limited to the few’ (1994b: 32). Such 
revolutionaries were the proper heirs to the Enlightenment philosophes, with their 
achievement of cultural hegemony, in which ideas became practical and concrete 
in their directly political and ethical value. In a resoundingly optimistic conclusion 
to his essay, reflecting upon the release of prisoners under the new regime, 
Gramsci made this connection explicit:
The Russian Revolution has turned man at his most abject - the ‘common 
criminal’ - into man as envisaged by Immanuel Kant, the theorist of 
absolute reason: the man who can say ‘beyond me, the vastness of the 
skies; within me, the imperative of my own conscience’. What these little 
news items reveal to us is no less than the liberation of the human spirit, 
the initiation of a new moral sense. It is the advent of a new moral order, 
which coincides with everything the prophets of our movement told us. 
(1994b: 34)
At this point, Gramsci was more particularly interested in the moral and 
intellectual dimensions of the revolution than in its purely organisational and 
institutional aspects. The February Revolution became - and this was from the 
fragments of reports, as he himself acknowledged - the spiritual expression of the 
‘conscience of the people’ (1994b: 32), and of the Russian people specifically, 
who had showed their cultural readiness for such revolutionary change. The 
revolution had created a ‘new way of life’, a ‘new moral atmosphere’ and a ‘new 
freedom of spirit.’ (1994b: 33) Gramsci considered the act of liberating the 
prisoners to be symptomatic of the achievement on the part of the Russian 
proletariat as a whole of a new moral consciousness and a state of cultural
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preparedness. The proletariat had, in Sorelian terms, integrated, intuitively, as a 
matter of conviction, the myth of its own triumph over the bourgeoisie. (Sorel, 
1961: 41-42)
In this largely philosophical analysis of events, Gramsci actions and ideas, 
deeds and thoughts were brought together under the sign of a unifying “spiritual 
activity” Gramsci collapsed ethics and politics, society and state together on a 
conceptual-philosophical basis. The criminal became “Kantian Man” not as the 
result of a specific political-organisational intercession - or rather, the specifically 
political intervention of organised revolutionaries was not alone responsible for 
this ascension - but was a matter of the autonomous spiritual or cultural 
development of the Russian people, which had achieved a collective 
consciousness and a national identity which found expression in a unified will, 
which the revolutionaries “reflected” in their political activity. From such a 
perspective, the revolution was not a political event, in terms o f signifying the 
relative development of the institutional organisation of class forces, but was 
primarily cultural and moral in character. It signified the development of a certain 
level of consciousness and spiritual civilisation within the Russian people.
However, this perspective, which took a view of the revolution as an act which 
evinced a certain state of subjective cultural and moral readiness, as almost a 
wholly subjective act, carried with it the danger of equating o f political power, 
which is necessarily objectified in institutions and organisational structures, with 
the spontaneous subjective will and consciousness. It was just such a charge of 
“spontaneism” which was directed at Gramsci by his critics on the revolutionary 
left in Italy. Taking in Gramsci’s career as a whole, such a charge seems 
unwarranted; it was his intention, as I make clear further on, to overcome the
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opposition between spontaneous and revolutionary consciousnesses, between 
experience and reflection. At this point, however, one may say that initially 
Gramsci exhibited an “intellectualist” tendency towards the over-valuation of 
subjective consciousness, and saw the problem of power as that which could be 
solved by the force o f ideas in themselves.
The fact that in his initial responses to events in Russia Gramsci tended to 
concentrate upon their intellectual and moral significance, and less upon their 
political and economic dimensions must be seen also as a reaction to the direction 
of development of syndicalism and reformism within Left politics in Italy These 
had become empiricist, disintegrated and one-sided. Gramsci’s primary aim, on 
the other hand, was that of integrating all forms of social activity In 1918 he 
wrote of the situation within Marxism in Italy:
What has happened now is that the syndicalists and the reformists, through 
the same kind of error in their thinking, have specialized in the empirical 
language of socialism. The first have arbitrarily extracted one term from 
the unified whole of social activity - the term ‘economy’. The others, 
equally arbitrarily, have chosen the term politics. (1994b: 48)
One may find the idea of arbitrary choice somewhat disingenuous in this context, 
however, the burden of Gramsci’s approach was the need for a synthesis within 
Marxist politics, which could ‘restore the original unity of all social activity.’ 
(1994b: 48) Socialism had developed in a static, undialectical direction, under the 
aegis of the reformists and syndicalists it had become fossilised as an abstract 
dootrine which was no longer driven forward by the dynamic of contradictions 
between the constituent moments of the socio-historical process.
It was against this static backdrop that Gramsci celebrated the October 
Revolution in Russia as a “Revolution against Capital”, that is, as contradicting 
the prevailing abstract positivist spirit within international socialism. According to 
Gramsci, the Bolshevik revolution was ‘made up of ideologies, more than events.’ 
(1994b: 39) Its significance lay in refuting the positivism and naturalism of Marx’s 
reformist and economist legatees, and in signifying the supersession of the strict 
division between basic economic facts impelling the course of History and the 
thought and actions of men and women so impelled. The revolution had shown 
the true character of Marxist thought, which, according to Gramsci,
has always identified as the most important factor in history not crude, 
economic facts, but rather men themselves, and the societies they create, 
as they learn to live with one another and understand one another; as, out 
of these contacts (civilization), they forge a social, collective will; as they 
come to understand economic facts, and to assess them, and to control 
them with their will, until this collective will becomes the driving force of 
the economy, the force which shapes reality itself (1994b: 40).
The creation of such a collective will and consciousness was understood as a 
critical-cultural process, much as envisaged in “Socialism and Culture” the 
previous year, that is, it was conceived as a process of the proletariat’s increased 
understanding both of itself and o f the world about it (the two moments being 
mutual). But, the creation of collective class consciousness and of a moral-cultural 
disposition sufficient to revolutionary change were seen by Gramsci as nationally 
specific, they were dependent upon the peculiar character of Russian social and 
political development, upon the specific combination of the effects of war and of
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socialist propaganda in Russia (1994b: 41). These created the conditions for the 
development of a revolutionary subjectivity and for the integration o f a 
revolutionary will.
The first of these moments was “mechanical” - that is, economic and physical; 
the second factor, “organic”, that is, political and organisational-institutional. 
With his culturalist emphasis, the element which Gramsci fixed upon within this 
latter moment was the ‘socialist education’ (1994b: 42) which the Russian 
proletariat had received from the Bolsheviks. It was this education which had 
enabled it to re-live ‘the whole history of the proletariat’ ‘in thought’ (1994b: 41), 
which enabled it to throw off the chains o f mechanical determinism (the logic of 
Capital), and thus to overcome its supposed lack of experience as a working-class 
within a “backward” nation. The Bolshevik party was conceived as most 
importantly an educational instrument, educating the will of the Russian workers 
(making convictions) so that its socio-economic backwardness would be no bar to 
making a revolution. It was this example that Gramsci sought to put to good use 
in Italy, as such another “backward” nation.
A Cultural Association
Thus, in the period immediately after the October Revolution Gramsci helped 
establish an institution for the provision of a specifically working-class education, 
the Club di Vita Morale. The Club was to perform the task of creating the moral 
and cultural conditions for revolution, and in this, Gramsci continued his concern 
for the integration of all spheres of social activity The Turin section of the PSI 
was a strong political force, and had created a similarly potent economic 
organisation. For Gramsci, however, it was necessary to set up an organisation
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which could perform specifically cultural tasks. Political and economic 
organisations were not equipped to address the philosophical, religious and moral 
problems ‘which underlie political and economic action’; the Club, however, 
would provide ‘an appropriate forum for discussing and clarifying these 
problems.’ (1994b: 37) The role of the cultural association was that of ‘creating 
convictions’, envisaged as ‘priming’ the rank-and-file of the workers’ movement 
intellectually and morally, and so to ensure a ‘deep-rooted consensus which 
provides a solid foundation for action’ (1994b: 37). The association would thus 
function to provide the cultural foundations in Italy for a new society and way of 
life, would provide ‘new models of association’ and solidarity (1994b: 51) as had 
been seen in Russia.
In considering the “mentality” of the Italian people, Gramsci emphasised the 
dimension of national differentiation in the development of class consciousness 
and collective will (for this, see Brennan, 1989: 10-11). (This national dimension 
was later articulated in Gramsci’s ideas about the key differences between “core” 
and “peripheral” capitalist states, about which more below.) For Gramsci, 
Catholicism and Jesuitism had instilled a ‘dogmatic and intolerant mentality’ 
(1994b: 37) in the Italian people, and had consequently left the latter intellectually 
enfeebled and in a state o f ethical-dispositional unpreparedness. It was the 
function of the Club to counteract this influence at the very base of cultural life. 
The socialist cultural organisation could lay dispositional foundations, could effect 
a new consensus and stimulate ‘a new habit of mind’ (1994b: 37-38) for socialist 
action.
I l l
It was also an important part o f the cultural association’s functioning that it 
would provide opportunities and specific tasks for intellectuals in the workers’ 
movement. Up until that time, according to Gramsci, intellectuals had been ‘a 
dead weight’ (1994b: 37) within the movement; an organisation dedicated to 
cultural activity, however, would enable them to put their intellectual abilities to 
the test. With his belief in the importance of ideas and cultural activity to the 
process of making the revolution, Gramsci posited a place for the intellectuals in 
the revolutionary scheme of things. The complex dialectical relationship between 
intellectuals, culture and material reality outlined in “Socialism and Culture” had 
opened up a practical and a theoretical space for the intellectual in the 
revolutionary movement. The full exploitation of the theoretical opportunity was 
yet to come. For the meantime, Gramsci was not making the intellectual, or, the 
making of intellectuals, the centre around which his political theory and practice 
revolved. At this point, Gramsci appeared to regard the intellectuals as little more 
than a problem to be solved. He seemed concerned only to employ the 
consciousness of the intellectual as that which had developed outside of the 
revolutionary struggle, and which would work upon the proletariat from that 
location.
Councils, Party and State
With the rise of the Councils movement in Turin in 1919 there appeared a 
new institutional and actional focus for Gramsci and his fellow socialists gathered 
around the recently established journal L ‘Ordino Nuovo. The journal had been 
staned in May of that year by Gramsci, Togliatti, Terracini and Tasca Gramsci
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took over editorial control from Tasca in June on the grounds that the latter was 
suspicious of the Councils and had abstracted culture from the concrete political 
and economic experience of the working -class. For Gramsci, L 'Ordino Nuovo 
should become the ‘gathering point between the working class and intellectuals.’ 
(Adamson, 1980: 51) The importance of the Councils were precisely that they 
constituted a locus for bringing together economic, political and cultural activity, 
for uniting the concrete specific experience of the working-class and a universal 
revolutionary consciousness. In the Councils it would be possible to forge within 
the working-class a collective revolutionary will which would enable it to take 
power The factories were the nurseries o f the revolution; the revolutionary 
process occurred ‘subterraneously’ within them as an organic ferment o f ‘feelings, 
desires, habits, the stirring of initiative and a new way of life.’ (1994b: 164) 
Industrialisation had ‘produced a certain degree of intellectual autonomy in the 
masses, and a certain spirit of positive historical initiative.’ (1994b: 172) Within 
the factories and the industrialised workplaces had appeared the ‘emergent’ 
culture of the working-class, in the sense o f that term given to it by Raymond 
Williams (himself under the influence of Gramsci): the ‘new meanings and values, 
new relationships and kinds of relationship’ which stand in opposition to the 
forms and values o f  the dominant culture (1977: 123) It was to this organic 
oppositional culture that the Ordinovisti wanted to relate.
However, during the Councils period Gramsci was forced to address the 
specific problems o f political organisation and discipline concerning the 
relationship between the revolutionary party and the “organic” institutions and 
consciousness of the working-class, between revolutionary discipline and 
ideological unity, and intellectual and moral autonomy These problems came to
the fore as a consequence of Gramsci’s new emphasis upon the need for the 
proletariat to direct its activity towards the goal of the political conquest of the 
state.
The Conquest of the State
For Gramsci, the Enlightenment had been both the preparation for revolution 
(the dissemination o f new values, new practices, new relationships) and the 
revolution itself This was because it had been a revolution of the spirit. Thought 
had become a kind of action by a process of annexation - the rejection of practice 
not grounded in Reason Napoleon’s political modernisation of Europe, as 
Gramsci had argued, was prepared for by the triumph of Enlightenment 
universalism, and by the assault upon tradition, but at the same time it stood 
against the spirit o f the Enlightenment (see Bauman, 1987: 104-105). It 
represented the re-assertion of practical contingency, particular interest, and 
customary ways of acting. The promise of the Enlightenment - the domination- 
free dominion of Reason - remained unfulfilled
The Enlightenment constituted a “bourgeois international of the spirit”; it was a 
revolution in ideas and culture where these latter became (or, aspired to become) 
concrete forces in reality, but ultimately remained unrealised, finding no social 
agent sufficient to the tasks of universalisation The proletarian revolution, on the 
other hand, was of a wholly different kind, it could only be a revolution if and 
when it was given political-institutional reality
Thus, Gramsci argued for the need for new workers’ institutions and an 
orientation upon the state The universal, permanent revolution of the working- 
class, a revolution which eliminated all contradictions, which realised itself
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completely, and which united theory and practice once and for all - demanded the 
conquest of the state. (1994b: 102-103, 108-114) The state existed only 
potentially in the social institutions and the crepuscular and life of the working- 
class. This justified the need for political intervention and organisation at the level 
of the state. Without it, the class struggle would remain at the level of revolt, as 
just so many ‘passing episode[s]’ in the collective life of the workers, 
impermanent and spasmodic in character (1994b: 102) As Gramsci declared, 
‘[sjociety can only exist in the form o f a State, which is the source and the end of 
all rights and all duties, and the guarantor of the permanence and success of all 
social activity.’ (1994b: 93) Like Benjamin, Gramsci sought to marry the energies 
of revolt, as manifested in cultural life, to those of revolution, which are 
necessarily political in character. However, unlike Benjamin, Gramsci’s integrative 
activity was practical, as well as theoretical - that is, his journalistic and 
intellectual activity was directed towards the institutional and organisational 
elaboration of class struggle, in addition to being a reflection upon it.
In the essay “Workers’ Democracy” (1919), written jointly with Palmiro 
Togliatti, which has been described as the ‘theoretical foundation’ of the Councils 
movement (Gluckstein, 1985: 183), Gramsci spelt out the importance of 
centralised co-ordination and organisation for the conquest of the state:
The socialist state already exists, potentially, in the social institutions 
characteristic of the exploited working class These institutions must be 
linked together, co-ordinated and ranked in a hierarchy of competences 
and powers - highly centralized, but still respecting the autonomy and 
articulations of each individual institution. (1994b: 96-97)
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It was the party (the PSI) which was to take on this leaderly, co-ordinating, 
disciplinary function:
The Party must continue in its role as the organ of communist education, 
the furnace of faith, the depository o f doctrine, the supreme power 
harmonizing the organized and disciplined forces of the worker and 
peasant classes, and leading them towards their goal. (1994b: 97)
The most politically advanced elements of the working-class, organised within the 
party, were enjoined by Gramsci to work within workers’ institutions in order ‘to 
bring about a radical transformation in worker psychology’ (1994b: 99) and 
prepare the latter for its assault upon state power. At the same time, the advanced 
activists of the party should respect the autonomy of the institutions of the class, 
for it was within these that the proletariat developed the qualities, of 
independence and initiative, and experience necessary for the revolutionary tasks 
ahead. However, the cultural and moral preparedness of the proletariat had 
become explicitly a problem of political organisation - that is, a matter of 
“Jacobin” intervention Culture and power politics had become inseparable, 
cultural activism now being subsumed under the political
For this reason, Gramsci has been seen as adopting an unequivocally 
vanguardist position. He is charged with advocating Lenin’s doctrine of the need 
to import revolutionary consciousness into the working-class “from without”, and 
Lenin’s “Taylorist” conceptions of the need for workplace discipline and 
conformity.4 Such Leninism is regarded as exemplifying the universal
4 For a more positive account of Lenin’s ideas about the relationship between centralised and 
spontaneous forms of consciousness, see Shandro. 1995.
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consciousness of Foucault’s Enlightenment “universal intellectual”: the 
vanguardist revolutionary is removed from, or, blind to, the particular 
contingencies of specific situations and experiences, taking upon him- or herself 
the “right” to represent a proletariat which is regarded as incapable of 
representing itself Neil Harding, as indicated earlier, constructs just this sort of 
argument against Gramsci, viewing him as a “philosopher” who sought to impose 
his will upon the people, demanding the conformity of the masses to revolutionary 
discipline, and arrogating to himself “superior” (scientific) knowledge. (1997: 
21 Off) Even Adamson, who is more generally sympathetic to Gramsci, writes of 
him as having ‘instincts [which] were always more puritanical than culturally 
liberating in an expansive and nonrepressive way.’ (1980: 54) By these accounts, 
Gramsci appears as an unreserved Bordigean revolutionary intransigent, an 
austere unrelenting figure who positioned himself at the head o f the vanguard and 
waited for the benighted masses to catch up with him.
However, in his study of the Western Soviets (1985), Donny Gluckstein has a 
different perspective on Gramsci’s vanguardism. He sees Gramsci as departing 
from a vanguardist position once the Councils came into being. For Gluckstein, 
Gramsci began to blur the distinction between the two forms o f power, in the
workshop and at the level of the state (1985: 186) The Councils began to be seen
\
as an existing rather than a potential socialist state (1985: 186) Thus, according 
to Gramsci, it was in the Council that the class was unified ‘into a coherent and 
homogeneous entity, precisely fitted for the industrial process and mastering it 
once and for all’; it was within the Council ‘the the dictatorship o f  the proletariat 
|could] be realized.' (1994b: 120) Initially, Gluckstein writes, the Councils had 
been regarded ‘as a terrain for party propaganda, the PS1 retaining a decisive
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role’; within three months, however, Gramsci’s ‘stress on the party’s central 
importance had disappeared, with the factory council assigned the role of mass 
democracy and vanguard leadership.’ (1985: 187) So, by this account, Gramsci 
was too ready to  give up the leadership of the revolutionary movement to 
ordinary workers who were unable to develop a truly revolutionary consciousness 
because they were bound by the horizons of the workplace. He was fixed too 
narrowly upon the present manifestations of liberation.
Such apparent ambiguity in Gramsci’s position with regard to the question of 
political leadership is understandable in the light of his avowed integrative 
orientation. Predisposed in a post-Risorgimento, Crocean fashion to an emphasis 
upon the establishment of an ethico-political unity, Gramsci sought the integration 
of all forms of activity, political, economic and cultural, and, as part of this, the 
synthesis of experiential and revolutionary forms of consciousness. As Carl Boggs 
writes, ‘Gramsci’s Marxism can be understood as an implicit effort to transcend 
the extreme polarities of Luxemburgian spontaneism and Leninist Jacobinism.’ 
(1984: 218) The attempt to do so left him open to charges from both sides, with 
the accusations o f voluntarism and an adherence to idealism becoming particularly 
familiar to all of those associated with L 'Ordino Nuovo (see Togliatti, 1979: 21- 
27).
Gluckstein’s analysis overlooks the fact that the L ’Ordino Nuovo activists 
sought to take up all of the tasks outlined in the “Workers’ Democracy” article, 
that is, the co-ordination of the characteristic institutions and activity of the 
working-class, but also the preservation of the autonomy of these From 
Gramsci’s point-of-vicw, the PS1 had shown itself to be little more than a 
‘spectator’ to events in Turin (1994b: 157) and was incapable of reacting
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constructively to them. The most important thing, as far as he was concerned, was 
the integration of thought and action, and the creation of an organic relationship 
between workers and revolutionaries. The Councils, in conjunction with L 'Ordino 
Nuovo, were where the promise of the Enlightenment and the Risorgimento might 
be fulfilled, where the ideal could be made real and consciousness embodied in an 
institutional-organisational form.
According to Gramsci, L 'Ordino Nuovo was valued by the Turin working-class 
because its articles sprang from that class’s ‘actual feelings, desires and passions’, 
and because they ‘were almost like a “recording” of real events, seen as moments 
in a process on inner liberation and self-expression on the part of the working 
class.’ (1994b: 181) It was not that the Councils had usurped the role of the 
vanguard, but that an active unity of consciousness and experience had been 
achieved This unity was not a matter purely of the spirit but practical, not a 
corporate phenomenon, indicating the domination o f the many by the view, but 
universal, involving the participation of all, not the abstraction of culture (as 
philosophy, as ideology) but its integration into the quotidian life and outlook, the 
structures of thought and feeling, of the proletariat
The “bourgeois international of the spirit” constituted a “revolution” without 
the conquest of power, an “obscure” revolution which instituted the dominion of 
critical reason, but which was not subject to rational, organisational control itself. 
That is to say, as a revolution the Enlightenment was spontaneous, “passionate”, 
and without duration in concrete institutional-organisational terms With the onset 
of the Councils, on the other hand, according to Gramsci, there began ‘a new era 
in the history of the human race For now the revolutionary process has burst
119
forth into the light of day and entered into the phase where it can be documented 
and controlled.’ (1994b: 165)
Integration and Centralisation
The unity of consciousness and experience represented by the nexus forged 
between the workers and the Ordinovisti was broken with the defeat of the 
Councils movement in 1920. Ultimately, Gramsci and his fellow activists found 
themselves isolated in Turin, and were incapable of leading the proletarian masses 
to revolution. Consequently, Gramsci focused upon elaborating a theory of the 
party which envisaged it as the locus of the integration of revolutionary and 
organic forms of consciousness, an ‘integrated theory of political organisation’, in 
Adamson’s words, which expressed the ‘dialectical relation between the formation 
of critical consciousness in the councils and the symbolic and military guidance 
entrusted to the party.’ (1980: 58)
Hence, in a document that gained the approval of Lenin, Gramsci argued for 
the renewal of the PSI. The revamped party should become the ‘guide and 
intellect’ of the working-class; the party’s task was ‘to draw the attention of the 
masses to itself, to ensure that its directives become their directives and to win 
their permanent trust.’ (1994b: 157) After his experience with the Councils, 
Gramsci now declared that the essential condition ‘for attempting any experiment 
with Soviets is the existence o f  a cohesive and highly disciplined Communist Party 
that can co-ordinate and centralize the whole of the proletariat’s revolutionary 
action in its central executive committee ’ (1994b: 161) For Gramsci, the events 
of 1919 signified the indispensability of structures and mechanisms of political 
authority to the achievement of revolutionary ends. If the initial answer to the
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“Workers’ Democracy” article’s call for the co-ordination and organisation of 
class forces had been the integrative activity of L 'Ordino Nuovo, in the wake of 
the defeat of the Councils his emphasis shifted decidedly to the need for fully- 
fledged political centralisation, by the means of which society and state, 
individual and universal moments would be finally united.
However, this was not the end of the story, as far as the development of 
Gramsci’s theory of political organisation and the relationship between practical 
and revolutionary consciousnesses was concerned. Critics who charge Gramsci 
with “totalitarian” tendencies largely do so on the basis of such facts as his 
support for Bordiga’s purist opposition to the adoption of a united front position 
by the PCI (Gramsci, 1978: 123-125), and his endorsement of the Fifth World 
Congress’s policy of “Bolshevisation” - that is, increased centralisation and the 
enforcement of strict ideological unity - of the International. But, one may point 
out that after the imprisonment of PCI leaders, including Bordiga, Gramsci 
changed his position with regard to the united front policy and refused to continue 
to support Bordiga in his opposition to the Comintern. (1978: 152-153; 173, 177) 
Moreover, one can say that during the time before his incarceration Gramsci ideas 
about and strategy for revolutionary consciousness and organisation sought to 
address and to incorporate the twin dimensions of discipline and participation. 
With the victory of Fascism, he argued for the need for a party which would be 
both tightly controlled and highly centralised and the truly ‘mass organisation of 
workers and peasants required to confront and counter the fascist state’ 
(Adamson, 1980: 84), which would be the object of the voluntary loyalty of the 
working-class. As Bellamy and Schecter write, ‘Gramsci’s Party was designed to
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include all the populace, not just an elite section of it, and to ensure the 
responsiveness of the leadership to the led as well as vice versa.’ (1993: 132)
Such a conception of the party can be seen as signifying the continuation of 
Gramsci’s emphasis upon the ethico-political, seeking the unity of various levels 
of action and modes of consciousness, attempting to give ethical reality in the 
practical, contingent life of the masses to the direction of the party in such a way 
as that leadership becomes nothing less than the centralised organisation of the 
will of the working-class itself. It was, indeed, just such a hegemony over all areas 
of the life of the masses - intellectual, ethical - that Fascism, in the establishment 
of an “ethical state”, and with its “spritualised conception” of politics, had 
apparently achieved This it had been able to do, Gramsci came to believe, by 
mobilising the resources of bourgeois society in its defence, and thus, it was to 
these latter that the embattled revolutionary party would have to turn in order to 
build a counter-hegemony based upon the broadest possible participation.
Hegemony and Bourgeois Society
In the earlier years of his revolutionary activity, Gramsci had foreseen 
revolution as a continuous and continuously accelerating series of moments 
leading to the quick seizure of power. By 1924, with the advent of Fascism, he 
regarded the bourgeois state as more stubbornly entrenched within society 
(religious, educational and media institutions) than previously had been realised. 
The state had demonstrated ‘far greater adaptive capacities’ (Adamson, 1980: 86) 
than expected Thus, in February of that year, Gramsci wrote to Togliatti 
expressing his belief that a new strategy was required for changed circumstances
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in which the domination of the bourgeoisie took a more diverse and mediated 
form than it had in Russia. (1978: 199-200) The search for such a strategy became 
the centrepiece of Gramsci’s work thereon.
This argument, revolving around the need for differentiation and the conception 
of a “Western Front” of the revolutionary struggle, was put forward in the midst 
of the criticism made by Gramsci of the PCI’s organisational ossification The 
Party, he maintained, had
accorded priority in an abstract fashion to the problem of party 
organisation, which in practice has simply meant creating an apparatus of 
functionaries...It was believed, it is still believed that the revolution 
depends only on the existence o f  such an apparatus; and it is sometimes 
even believed that its existence can bring about the revolution. (1978: 198)
The Party saw itself as ‘suspended in the air’, and the Party centre deigned to 
‘stoop[] to the level of the masses’ only when the situation suited it. (1978: 198) 
In short, Gramsci accused the PCI o f having no connection with activity on the 
ground, and consequently, as insensible of practical factors and contingencies 
peculiar to the specific circumstances and conditions of the class struggle in the 
West.
The argument put to Togliatti constituted the beginnings of Gramsci’s theory 
of hegemony. This latter centred on three related points: i) the importance of 
relatively autonomous elements in the cultural and ideological “superstructure”, ii) 
the distinction between the “war of position” and the “ war of manoeuvre” as 
strategies in the class struggle, the former being concerned with the civil-social 
‘trench-systems’ which engird the modern state (Gramsci, 1971: 235), the latter
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being a strategy of frontal assault upon the state, and iii) the need to distinguish 
between East and West - and to make a corresponding distinction between ‘core’ 
and ‘peripheral’ states in the West (1978: 408-409) - in the conception and 
organisation of revolutionary strategy.
As to the first of these points, one may say that Gramsci had made the 
“superstructural” elements of the working-class’s social and cultural life central to 
his political and cultural thought from the beginning. The characteristic forms of 
thought and of social existence of that class were not regarded as dead weight to 
be discounted, or even countered, but were seen by Gramsci as vital in the 
development of the revolutionary process. The proletariat had to be convinced of 
its historical role; though society could only exist in the form of a state, the state 
itself had to be brought to life in the ideas, the beliefs and the actions of the 
people
However, after the triumph of Fascism in Italy, it was bourgeois society and 
culture which Gramsci brought into theoretical focus. As Bellamy and Schecter 
write:
The invaluable lesson of Fascism, in terms of Italian realities, meant 
fighting an ideological and cultural battle not only against capital and the 
State, but also against the Vatican, the school in its present form, and the 
other institutions of civil society promoting traditional modes of thinking 
that maintained the gulf between economic crisis and political revolution 
(1993: 80)
That “gulf’ was maintained by the bourgeois state’s utilisation of ‘political and 
organizational reserves’ (Gramsci, 1978: 408) which were not possessed by the
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Russian state. These were reserves o f ideas and values, resources of technical and 
procedural knowledge - of what might now be termed “cultural capital”. In order 
to bridge the gap between crisis and revolution, it was necessary for the 
proletariat to mobilise its own social and cultural reserves to gain hegemony over 
bourgeois society. Through the hegemonic process, the values, the culture and the 
lived experience of the working-class would become universal moral-intellectual 
facts, its organic culture dominate that of the bourgeoisie to become that of 
society as a whole. Gramsci’s concept of hegemony re-stated, in more fully 
elaborated class terms, his earlier, posX-Risorgimento ethico-political position.
The formation o f a ‘fascist bourgeois/agrarian bloc’ by securing the consent of 
the ‘broad masses o f the people’ (1978: 403, 402) through the ideological and 
cultural activities o f bourgeois parties and institutions for Gramsci demonstrated 
the importance of an intermediate stratum (for example, parliamentary deputies, 
clerical and educational personnel) to the hegemonic process. Such a stratum 
maintained the link between ‘the leading group at the top’ and the mass of the 
members of political and cultural institutions. (1978: 401) In the Prison 
Notebooks Gramsci went on to develop this insight in a revised theory of party 
organisation. There he wrote of the three elements that were needed to converge 
in order for a party to come into being:
1 A mass element, composed of ordinary average men, whose 
participation takes the form of discipline and loyalty, rather than any 
creative spirit or organisational ability...2. The principal cohesive 
element, which centralises nationally and renders effective and powerful 
a complex of forces which left to themselves would count for little or
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nothing... 3. An intermediate element, which articulates the first 
element with the second and maintains contact between them, not only 
2. physically but also morally and intellectually. (1971: 152-153)
Once all three of these elements are in place, ‘a party cannot be destroyed by 
normal means.’ (1971: 153)
This tripartite structure constituted Gramsci’s most sophisticated theoretical 
formulation of the relationship between discipline and participation, experiential 
and revolutionary forms of consciousness, and between economic, political and 
cultural moments. In this formulation, moreover, is recognisable an adaptation of 
Croce’s notion of a dialectical totality of moments of the spirit, in which each 
moment is posited as autonomous but linked within a “dialectic of distincts”. 
(1971: 137) For Gramsci, however, such a dialectic ‘will certainly not be between 
the moments of the absolute spirit, but between the levels of the superstructure ’ 
(1971: 137) The fascist crisis, which demonstrated the intransigence of bourgeois 
social formations, led Gramsci to affirm the relative autonomy of elements of the 
superstructure, their relative independence (“distinctness”) from one another and 
from the economic base
The significance of this conception was that it was dependent upon the need 
for the conscious identification of superstructura! elements with one another, and 
of the superstructure with the base There was a need for an intermediate 
component which could articulate politics as “passion” in Croce’s sense - as 
spasmodic, without duration (as manifested in energetic but unstable revolt) - and 
politics as ‘permanent action’, embodied in organisations, institutions and 
practices - that is, in a specific, organic political culture (1971 138-140) This
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intermediate stratum would ensure the two-way articulation of the spontaneous 
consciousness of the masses and the revolutionary-theoretical consciousness of its 
leaders in the party. And in working to elaborate and establish an integrated and 
permanent organic class culture, such a stratum would enable the proletariat to 
secure its hegemony over bourgeois society.
Organic Intellectuals as the New Philosophes
It was the “organic intellectuals” which Gramsci saw as acting as this 
intermediate, articulating stratum for the working-class. The elaboration of such a 
stratum was central to that class’s achievement of hegemony. For the process of 
the production of organic intellectuals was dialectically related to the cultural 
development of the proletarian masses:
The intellectual stratum develops both quantitatively and qualitatively, but 
every leap forward towards a new breadth and complexity of the 
intellectual stratum is tied to an analogous movement on the part of the 
mass of the “simple”, who raise themselves to higher levels o f  culture and 
at the same time extend their circle of influence towards the stratum of 
specialised intellectuals, producing outstanding individuals and groups of 
greater or less importance. (1971: 334-335)
The need for creating conviction, for creating within the mass of the “simple” an 
active belief in its own historical role and forms of social life, was now conceived 
by Gramsci as a process of producing specialised intellectuals on the
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contemporary politico-cultural terrain. Analysis of the specific nature of Western 
society and of conditions prevailing within the post-fascist “peripheral” Italian 
state had revealed the function of the “traditional intellectuals” associated with the 
dominant bourgeoisie, intellectuals who bound the peasant to the landowner, and 
performed technical-administrative functions for the bourgeois state. Such 
intellectuals legitimised the domination o f the ruling class, although they thought 
of themselves as independent and ‘endowed with a character of their own.’ (1971: 
8) They had themselves been the organic intellectuals of the rising bourgeoisie 
(constituting, as seen above, the ‘bourgeois international of the spirit’) at that 
point when the expanding spirit of intellectual inquiry (the moment of spirit) had 
coincided with the expanding, modernising dynamic of capitalism (the practical, 
material moment). But, with the divorce of these two moments, the traditional 
intellectuals became merely the signs of the continuation of that division - 
simultaneously fatally attached to that (bourgeois culture) which its universalistic 
spirit condemned it to seek to transcend.5
The process whereby specialised intellectuals are created, according to 
Gramsci, was not marginal to the proletariat’s achievement of domination over all 
other classes but constituted the very movement of that hegemonic process itself 
Insofar as the working-class “distinguishes” itself (1971: 334) by producing its 
own intellectuals, so far does it raise the general level of its culture, and is thereby 
enabled to create larger numbers of, and better, more accomplished, organic 
intellectuals, who are thus better equipped to challenge the “traditional 
intellectuals” across the whole terrain o f  bourgeois society and culture. Thus, this
5 See Sartre in chapter five below Tor a recapitulation of this idea in the context of his depiction 
of an existential intellectual practice.
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is a process in which the masses participate and, at the same time, disciplines and 
organises itself as a class. The organic intellectuals would represent the 
concurrent politicisation of culture and the elaboration of politics as culture. They 
would constitute the embodiment of revolutionary political theory in cultural 
form.
For Gramsci, the organic intellectuals effected the re-unification of thought and 
action, where, as with the Enlightenment philosophes, thought becomes a kind of 
action. However, for these the new philosophes the force of ideas would not lie in 
their universalist, abstract dissolution of a practical, contingent reality; rather, for 
them, the power and effectivity of thought lay precisely in its recognition o f its 
own necessarily organic and practical character, and in the understanding that all 
thought has its foundations in contingent, interested conceptions of the world, 
that all ideas are rooted in beliefs and convictions. This recognition was also the 
basis of Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge. But, whereas in Mannheim it led to 
an intellectual practice which sought synthesis and the reconciliation o f social 
contradictions in science, for Gramsci it offered the possibility of the organic 
intellectual, whose function it was, by becoming a “‘permanent persuader’” (1971: 
10), and thereby securing the loyalty of the masses to revolutionary ideology, to 
transform belief - partial, interested belief - into practical, political reality. But, by 
the time of Gramsci’s death, with the ascendancy of the Stalinist bureaucracy over 
international Communism, the organic intellectual remained only a diminishingly 
distant possibility - though one which, as we shall see, remained an active and 
relevant model for oppositional intellectual practice.
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Chanter Four
kA School o f  Awkwardness9: The Uses of 
Experience in E.P. Thompson and 
C. Wrieht Mills
‘A Communist Society -  indeed, any authoritarian régime -  forces indifference 
upon the mass o f the population as an act o f  policy. Indifference is almost a 
social virtue . . . Rut we have not had indifference thrust upon us: we have acquired 
it, and we have accepted it because it makes less tremble, not fo r  our bosses, but 
fo r ourselves. Its classic symptom is the question: Why bother? ' (Mackenzie,
1958: 16)
Introduction
The account given of the intellectual thus far has concentrated upon European 
developments of that concept in the period o f massive political upheaval between, 
roughly, 1910-1940 -  a period encompassing pan-European revolution and 
counter-revolution and global economic, political and cultural crises. For the 
theorists of the intellectual examined so far, this was a period which both 
presented opportunities for intellectual action and in which the very basis of the 
intellectual as a rational social agent was threatened.
So, for Mannheim, the salient fact o f modem social life was that it made 
possible a synthesis of competing collective Weltanschauungen, or ideologies. 
However, this synthesis was also made necessary because, according to 
Mannheim, the public life of society was now permeated by irrationalist 
tendencies and ideas which previously had been confined to the private sphere 
Collectivist political ideologies had penetrated all the way down into the roots of 
the individual’s experience and vision o f the world, thereby making that 
experience and vision, which sought its exclusive generalisation, something that 
had to be compensated for theoretically by intellectuals in order to maintain the 
possibility of social action based upon rational reflection.
Similarly, the Critical Theorists o f the Institute for Social Research, established 
in the wake of the defeat of the German Revolution, came to view all social and
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political practice, whether that of the state or o f the opposition, as bearing the 
imprint of domination and authority. The consciousness and the experience of the 
working-class, as well as the theory and the organisations of its representatives, 
was that from which the critical intellectual should distance him- or herself; 
intellectuals had too readily given themselves over to  the revolutionary cause and 
thereby had lost their negative agency.
For his part, Gramsci maintained, by means o f the dialectic expressed in the 
formulation “pessimism of the intellect, optimism o f the will”, a commitment to 
the cause o f revolution But this did not stop him seeing that changing conditions 
in the West necessitated theoretical innovation with regard to the questions of 
party organisation and the socio-political function o f  the intellectual. Along with 
Mannheim, he recognised that critical conditions (specifically, the retrenchment of 
the bourgeois state under Fascism) required the intellectual to pay heed to the 
everyday, experiential dimension of politics. But, for Gramsci, popular culture, 
understood as the specific traditions and “commonsense philosophy” o f the 
working-class, was not simply to be corrected or dismissed but was the basis upon 
which the hegemony of that class could be built Organic intellectuals would 
emerge out of the collective experience and traditions of “the simple” and would 
thereby serve both to signify its level of organisation and to extend and to deepen 
that organisation These intellectuals would be integrated under the direction of 
the Party, which, as history’s representative, acted as the arbiter over politics and 
culture Thus, the revolution cause and the mundane experience of the class 
would not be opposed but mutually fulfilling.
In this chapter I bring the narrative of the intellectual forward in to the post­
war period, specifically, the 1950s. In addition, I move from a predominantly
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Continental European context to one specifically Anglo-American in orientation. 
This latter shift in focus is significant with regard to the discussion of the Left 
intellectual in two respects, firstly, there are important differences historically 
between Anglo-American and European Left political and intellectual cultures -  
namely, the relative weakness o f the Communist Party as an organising force in 
the former context. (However, common cultural points of reference aside, there 
have been, and continue to be, as I argue below, differences between British and 
American political cultures.) Secondly, and consequent upon the previous point, 
in the circumstances of the Cold War and the moral and intellectual bankruptcy of 
the Stalinist Communist Party the intellectuals discussed in this chapter sought to 
propagate a new internationalism  based upon vibrant national cultural and 
intellectual traditions. In each case, over against the sterility of bipolar Cold War 
politics was counterposed the possibility of creating educated, democratic publics.
“The Shouting under the Window”
But for many intellectuals in the 1950s, the obstacle which barred the way to 
the achievement of such a goal was no longer -  or, no longer only — the ruling 
class, but was the indifference of the exploited class to its historical fate 
“Apathy” was a term that buzzed around intellectual circles. If the 1930s were 
marked by an apparent surfeit of causes -  or, a surplus o f reasons for subscribing 
to the cause -  the 1950s were, supposedly, without causes altogether to which the 
intellectual could subscribe The task of the intellectual, according to those who 
contributed to such volumes as Conviction (1958) and Out o f Apathy (1960), had 
become one of breaking the hold o f Cold War thinking which asserted that things 
could not be other than as they were In the words of the title of Norman
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Mackenzie’s introduction to Conviction, this involved envisioning the possibility 
of life (a truly public life) “after the stalemate state.”
Within the context of the Cold War and the possibility mutual annihilation of 
the superpowers, traditional politics, that is, politics as articulated in ideological 
or scientific systems, politics as occurring only at state-level, the prerogative of 
parties, bureaucracies and representative bodies, was thrown into question, if not 
discredited altogether In order to break ‘the crust of apathy’ (Mackenzie, 1958: 
12) and the false belief in one’s indifference to matters political, it was necessary 
to reinvigorate politics by connecting it again with the everyday lives and ethical 
experience of individuals and groups. In this, of course, one can see the 
Gramscian imperative to unite the ethical and the political, to root political 
thought in the quotidian commonsense o f “the simple” at work. I will return 
below to Gramsci, in a comparison his conception of intellectual practice and that 
of E P Thompson. But, for the moment, one can say that the emphasis upon the 
ethical dimensions of politics in the 1950s was in general intended as making 
possible the development o f a non-aligned political culture which was not, first 
and foremost, organisational -  that is, serving to extend the influence and power 
of one organisation or party Rather, over against the Realpolitik of the Cold War 
state, intellectuals asserted the possibility of a humanist, democratic world order 
in which political relations were set on a firm ethical basis, and as such, could not 
be reduced to membership of, or allegiance to, particular political organisations 
The intellectual’s activity was focused upon extending values and norms formerly 
regarded as proper to private subjects into the public-political sphere; it sought to 
make “the shouting under the window” audible within the public life of society
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Politics and Morality
C.Wright Mills and E.P. Thompson were central figures in the demand for a 
new humanist emphasis in the conduct and concerns of politics in the 1950s. Both 
men sought to make moral values and human agency central to the practice of 
politics, and saw the intellectual as making possible the creation of alternative 
kinds of political identity and solidarity to those sanctioned in and by the bipolar 
global order. The intellectual should try to articulate politics and morality, to 
connect the politics of élites with its practical outcomes in the consciousness and 
experience of living human beings. As such, the intellectual’s concern was less 
with making a state than with regenerating the public sphere as a defence against 
the state, less with capturing power than with resisting its effects.
The public sphere would be strengthened through the free participation of 
individuals acting as conscious agents of reason and morality and as members of 
collectivities which were (self-)organised “from below” - that is, which had their 
foundations not at the level of the “universal” state but in specific communities 
and social groups However, one should also acknowledge that Mills’ and 
Thompson’s moral-humanist criticisms arose within differing contexts and were 
directed at differing targets, issuing in differing specific conclusions and forms.
For his part, Mills’ work arose within the context of the professionalism of 
academic social science in the United States From the beginning of his career 
Mills had contributed to such radical journals as Politics, Dissent and Partisan 
Review (for Mills’ involvement with this radical milieu, see Buhle, 1991: ch.6), 
and his best known works were journalistic and polemical in kind (77ie Causes o f 
World War 777 (1958) and Listen, Yankee (1960) However, he was preoccupied
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with the “betrayal” of professional academics in aligning with military and 
industrial élites in the United States. Indeed, his repeated journalistic forays into 
the public sphere were themselves intended to show the way for “defaulting” 
intellectuals (Miller, 1988: 86). The abnegation of public responsibility of such 
intellectuals itself constituted the ‘central unifying focus or problematic’ which 
some have seen as missing in Mills (McQuarie, 1981: 93). If the “irresponsibility” 
of intellectuals was the problem, as far as Mills was concerned, the solution lay in 
politicising the academy, that is, in making intellectuals address public issues and 
problems in their work not just as ‘objective’ questions of policy science but as 
matters of moral choice and commitment.
At the same time, Mills’ sustained critique of academic professionalism was in 
fact the consequence of a lasting belief, expressed most cogently and evocatively 
in The Sociological Imagination (1959), in the privileged character of social 
science as holding the ‘promise’ of enabling the rational clarification and 
resolution of the ‘crisis of individuality and the crisis of history-making. ’ (1959b: 
173) If for Mills the exercise of the ‘free intellect’ was an essential component in 
the practice of a ‘radical humanfism]’ (1963: 220), it would be true also to say 
that that intellect was identified with the “imaginative” social-science intellectual 
That is to say that Mills, like Mannheim, looked to a specific community of 
professionals to act as agents for rational social regeneration, but, unlike the 
latter, this was to be achieved not by the transcendent synthesis (or neutralisation) 
of personal-experiential elements but by making all choices and decisions 
personal.
135
Unlike Mills, who never belonged to a political party (he was ‘a determined 
non-joiner’, according to Miliband (cited in McQuarie, 1981: 84)), E.P. 
Thompson’s humanism developed within the context o f  the organised workers’ 
movement - as a member of the Communist Party of Great Britain and as a tutor 
within workers’ and adult education. Thompson’s orientation was primarily upon 
the structure, practice and ideology of bureaucratic political organisation The 
crushing of the Hungarian Revolt in 1956 was for Thompson a consequence of 
the Communist Party’s politico-ideological failure to connect the revolutionary 
struggle with the established collective traditions and values of the working class. 
But, though the Party may have failed, Thompson believed that socialism itself 
could be revitalised. This revitalisation was dependent upon counterposing ‘a 
warm, personal and humane socialist morality’ to the dogmatism and impersonal 
abstractions of the Stalinist orthodoxy, upon tapping into the ‘moral attitudes 
always present in the rank and file of the communist movement’ and ranging those 
against the distortions of ‘Stalinist ideology, institutions, and bureaucratic 
practices. ’ (Thompson, 1957a: 116)
Like Mills, for Thompson humanist practice was centred upon the activity of 
the independent and critical intellect However, he saw that activity not as that 
which is performed by a specific group within society but as the collective 
exercise of ‘conscious human agency’ (1957a: 115) by “the people”. The 
Communist Party had severed the dialectical connection between social 
consciousness and social being, and thus had also broken the connection between 
the educator and the world of concrete social and moral experience in and by 
which he or she too is educated. It was this relationship, originally articulated by 
Marx (see Thompson, 1957a. 113), that Thompson was set upon restoring The
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socialist-humanist intellectual had to enter into a fundamentally dialectical 
relationship with the traditions and collective experiences and values of the people 
in order to enable the latter to combat the denigrative effects of a “vulgar” 
Marxist-Stalinist bureaucratic practice which had reduced, as Thompson saw it, 
the supple, creative and humane dynamic of Marx to the outworn inflexible 
determinist materialism of the contemporary Communist Party.
Thompson’s humanist revolt against élitism and bureaucratism may be seen as 
having ostensibly much in common with the politico-philosophical criticism of a 
reductive Marxism that saw consciousness and affectivity as the reflexes of 
material economic conditions which took place during and after the First World 
War, and which, as we have seen, made “intellectual action” central to socialist 
practice. Particularly, of course, one can compare Thompson’s conception of a 
humanist intellectual practice with Gramsci’s notions of hegemonic activity and 
the organic intellectual. For Gramsci, hegemony was conceived as achieved by 
building upon a base of existing popular traditions, experiential forms and 
conceptions, which process being articulated through the creation of intellectuals 
rooted in the working class However, though for Gramsci society should be seen 
as a ‘school’ (1971: 350) in which the lessons of the revolution could be learned 
by such intellectuals, that “school” was ultimately presided over by the 
revolutionary party which sought to exercise centralised control For Thompson, 
on the other hand, the intellectual had to put him- or herself into a ‘school of 
awkwardness’, presided over by no institutional body, a school established within 
the individual’s own moral and cultural experience which provided the 
‘unassimilated socialist’ with the requisite lessons that enabled him or her to resist 
institutionalisation and the impress of power (1978 183)
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Thus far I have sketched only the contours of Mills’ and Thompson’s 
respective conceptions of the significance and characteristic effectivity of the 
dissenting intellectual within the intellectually and politically straitened 
circumstances of Cold War bipolarisation. We need now to return to the principal 
themes identified above at greater length in order to demonstrate more clearly the 
development within the cultural politics of the intellectual of which Mills and 
Thompson were representative.
E.P.Thompson: Education and Experience
Though Thompson’s humanist critique was directed at the abstract determinist 
theory and the elitist and bureaucratic political practice and organisation of the 
Communist Party, it is possible to say that that revolt itself was a direct 
consequence of Thompson’s activities within the Party. For in the immediate post­
war period, the Communist Party in Britain sought ‘to conduct a “battle of ideas” 
in the intensifying cold war struggle against capitalism and bourgeois culture.’ 
(Fieldhouse, 1985: 12) The field o f education became a key site of this struggle 
Certainly the Party organised its own initiatives in this area, but it also saw the 
existing adult and extramural education sector as a potentially fruitful area for 
exercising ideological influence
It was within this context that Thompson joined the Department of Extramural 
Studies at Leeds University as an adult education tutor in 1948, declaring as he 
did so that it was ‘his aim in adult education “to create revolutionaries”.’ 
(Searsby, et al 1993: 3) Equipped with such an unequivocal aim, Thompson then
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went on to engage in a dispute with, amongst others, the director of the 
department, Sydney Raybould, about objectivity and “university standards” in 
adult education. According to Thompson, the advocacy of such a conception of 
objectivity was not simply a matter o f  doing justice to ‘Tacts” but also presumed 
an attitude towards the student whereby his or her social and political experience 
was denied validity and in its stead the tutor sought to ‘prescribe an attitude 
(usually of “tolerance” or some associated response) to situations which might 
well demand an attitude of militancy or indignation’ (cited in Fieldhouse, 1985: 
17). Over against this class-based “objectivity”, Thompson asserted the value of 
“education for social purpose” such as had been enshrined in the original aims 
(1903) of the Workers’ Education Association. In this, Thompson stood up for 
the pursuit of knowledge in the cause of social emancipation, and for healing the 
breach between ‘institutions of higher education and the centres of social 
experience - between “workers by hand and brain” - existing in our society’ (cited 
in Searsby et al, 1993: 5).
The polemic against “objectivity” may be seen as indicative of a commitment to 
the politicisation of adult education at work in Thompson and his fellow 
Communist activists in that sector.1 However, in placing himself within the 
tradition of workers’ education, Thompson also committed himself to ideals of 
working-class participation and independence deeply rooted in British radical 
education Moreover, Thompson and the majority of Communist tutors were 
themselves relatively autonomous in relation to the Party. (According to
1 O f course, other. non-Communisl tutors also worked towards political ends in their work in 
adult education, perhaps most significantly Raymond Williams. Williams, in adult education 
from 1946 until 1961, was in contact with Communist tutors, but distanced himself from them 
politically (Mcllroy, 1993: 12) However, like Thompson, he looked to adult education as an
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Hobsbawm, the historians group within the Communist Party, of which 
Thompson was a member, was generally tolerated by the Party hierarchy at least 
partly because there was less of a fixed line on questions of British history, and 
because that independence enabled it to maintain intellectual credibility in its 
debates and contacts with liberal historians. (1978: 31-34)) They saw the 
adherence to intellectual integrity and to independent thought as the key element 
in their political involvement and efFectivity (Fieldhouse, 1985: 14).
The synchronisation of these commitments - of Party loyalty and loyalty to the 
possibility of independent thought “from below” - was possible for as long as 
individuals could be allowed to remain only fairly loosely disciplined by the Party. 
However, with the suppression of the Hungarian Revolt in 1956 and the 
concomitant suppression of the journal The Reasoner, set up by Thompson and 
John Saville whilst still members of the Party, Thompson demonstrated which of 
the two loyalties had a prior claim upon him by leaving the Party. Moreover, in so 
doing Thompson, in his declaration in favour of “socialist humanism”, displaced 
the “battle of ideas” between capitalism and communism by emphasising a prior 
struggle, ‘the human quarrel between the actual and the potential, between the 
boundless aspirations of life and the necessary limitations of the particular, the 
concrete, the personal.’ (1957a: 129)
This re-foundation of struggle upon the existential terrain of “life” and 
“experience” involved, as Harvey Kaye points out, the enlargement o f ‘the scope 
of what is to be understood as “struggle”’ (1990: 254), as well as the 
transformation o f its character. For Thompson, this meant that ‘the great battle’
important element in the creation of a common culture. (Mcllroy, 1993: 16-17; Williams, 1993: 
H9-102)
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of the day was not the struggle for dominance between the two great ideologies 
but was ‘for the mind of the working people’, which battle could not be divorced 
from the struggle ‘between competing moralities within the working class’ - that 
is, from the struggle for the people’s “heart” (1959: 55,52). Thompson’s 
‘persistent stress on the historical in historical materialism’ (Kaye, 1990: 256), his 
continued relation to and use of popular experience in his tutorial practice in adult 
education (see Searsby et al, 1993: 9) led him to a position where the triumph of 
humanist values in the long battle between the opposed moments o f individual 
acquisitiveness and communality, narrow prejudice and tolerance in the historical 
culture of the people offered the best defence against the ‘corruption o f society.’ 
(1957a: 118)
In a guest lecture read at Leeds University in 1967, given at a time when he had 
withdrawn from active politics, Thompson made a categorical statement in favour 
of the dialectical relationship between education and experience at work in ‘liberal 
adult education.’ (1968: 1) According to Thompson, it is in adult education that 
the necessary mutuality of the educational relationship is most clearly visible, for 
there the experience of the student may not be easily ignored. ‘In the good adult 
class’, he writes, ‘the criticism of life is brought to bear upon the work or subject 
under study’ (1968: 21), which work would otherwise be a labour o f applying 
abstract rules or quasi-mathematical formulae to the material being studied The 
adult student’s experience becomes thereby not simply a passive, abstracted 
“resource” which may be made use of in analysis but a critical agent which 
actively and continually ‘modifies...the entire educational process.’ (1968: 1)
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Such an emphasis upon “life” was, of course, a continuation of the Leavisite 
Scrutiny tradition (itself drawing upon the vitalism of D.H.Lawrence), which was, 
as Eagleton puts it, ‘the focus of a moral and cultural crusade ’ (1983: 33) In this 
tradition, Literature was regarded as serving the moral and social function -  the 
two from its perspective being inseparable -  of providing the foundation for a 
native organic community. Exposure to Literature constituted in fact exposure to 
life -  a vital, affirmative experience which equipped the reader not only with the 
technical capacity for discrimination but also fortified him or her morally. As 
Mcllroy points out, Leavis and Denys Thompson identified adult education as a 
key site in the crusade for national cultural/moral regeneration (1993: 7); 
moreover, in the 1930s attempts had been made explicitly to politicise the 
Scrutiny project, to link critical literary studies with Marxism. These efforts were 
continued in the 1950s by Williams and Richard Hoggart, and it was to this 
tradition Thompson himself related -  and for which they were all criticised by 
Perry Anderson as exhibiting a provincialism typical of the native British 
intelligentsia (1969, Chun, 1993: 28)
It was precisely the “criticism of life” that Thompson had called to be brought 
to bear upon the dogmatic abstractions of the Communist Party in 1956 (1957a:
116). This continuity across the two contexts is unsurprising, as it is proper to the 
continuity of “life” itself. Thus, one can see that Thompson was concerned with 
giving expression to conflicts which were more fundamental than those which had 
been the concern of institutional politics at the level of the state: life versus 
abstraction, intellectual integrity versus dogmatism, and the establishment of a 
‘common egalitarian culture’ (1968: 22) versus the preservation of an elitist 
exclusive culture. The break with the Communist Party over the events of 1956
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had been the specific politico-institutional context in which Thompson had 
developed his humanist critique, but that critique, founded upon enduring moral 
certainties, ultimately was concerned with utilising popular experience to enable 
the people to resist all politico-institutional constraints upon their potential for 
history-making.
Thus, the function of the intellectual, as “educator for social purposes”, within 
the dialectic of education and experience, as Thompson wrote in a commentary 
upon Mills’ conception of the tasks o f the intellectual, is not to act as a leader but 
‘to precipitate a new consciousness and initiate much broader processes.’ (1960b: 
29) The intellectual’s task is to enable the people to choose what is of the greatest 
(moral) value in its own culture and to participate in the socialist re-foundation of 
society. That participation, as participation in the creation of an alternative public 
sphere of a common culture - like Gramsci’s notion of the creation of an organic 
culture of the working-class - itself evidences the ‘maturity and activity o f the 
people’ (1960a: 7), and in its turn makes the intellectual as a member of a 
corporate élite, as “external” organiser redundant.
Thompson as Organic Intellectual?
Thompson’s emphasis upon the mutuality of the educational relationship, with 
his corresponding conception of a type of critical consciousness and activity 
originating in popular experience and the forms and structures of a “‘counter­
public sphere’” (Eagleton, cited in Kaye, 1990: 263), has led a number of authors 
to view Thompson in Gramscian terms. Hence, Lin Chun writes of Thompson as 
an organic intellectual spawned within the tradition of radical political education
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in Britain (1993: 28). Likewise, Harvey Kaye sees Thompson as an organic 
intellectual of a native radical democratic tradition, as one who ‘sought to 
position himself within and to speak from  English experience and traditions and, 
from that site, to articulate an interpretation of English history which both the Left 
and “the people” might recognize ’ (1990: 266)
Such assessments perhaps too readily equate Thompson’s aspiration for the 
abolition of the elitism and corporatism of the intellectual with the 
accomplishment of that abolition in reality However, that being said, there are 
valid grounds for a comparison between Gramsci’s and Thompson’s conceptions 
of the relation between the intellectual and the “masses”, and between intellectual 
practice and popular forms of conscious agency In each case, as we have seen, 
there is an emphasis upon grounding socialist consciousness and forms of political 
organisation in the collective experience and traditions and “commonsense 
philosophy” of the mass of the people. Thus, Thompson writes in his essay 
“Revolution”, ‘[t]he form  of a revolution may depend upon forms o f power; but, 
in the last analysis, its content depends upon the consciousness and will of the 
people’ (1960a: 8). If the revolution became distanced from people’s everyday 
lives, experiences, and aspirations (which it had done, according to Thompson) 
then it became nothing more than the imposition o f “forms of power” devoid of 
human “content” upon the people, and would, therefore, never achieve its end of 
the complete moral transformation of society.
Therefore, for Thompson, like Gramsci, the chief task of the intellectual lay in 
the “intellectual and moral reform” of the people, that is, in the hegemonic activity 
of the ‘making of socialists’ (1960a 8) amongst the people, who then would be 
able to make the revolution themselves (though, as will become clear below.
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Thompson’s conception of “revolution” differed radically from that of Gramsci). 
The conscious will of the people, expressed in customary practices and in modes 
and structures of self- organisation, as the active agent in the historical process of 
social transformation, was the key factor in ensuring the depth and permanence of 
any such transformation. It was the people that ensured that the transformation 
was carried beyond the realm of the limits of politics down into the relational and 
experiential fabric o f society itself
Central to Gramsci’s mature conception of hegemony was the idea of the need 
to wage a “war of position” against the bourgeois state, such a war concentrating 
upon the capture o f the civil social “outworks”, the institutions of the media, of 
the law and especially, for Gramsci, of education, which serve to legitimate that 
state. With the advent of Fascism in Italy, the intensification of repression had 
made direct confrontation with the state extremely difficult and hazardous, thus 
necessitating a strategy which sought to undermine it ideologically and to create a 
broad alternative “national-popular” ethico-political consensus against Fascism. In 
order to counter a monolithic, totalising state, a “bloc” rooted in society as a 
whole had to be formed The political strategy of the united front for which 
Gramsci argued during the period immediately prior to his incarceration 
represented an attempt to achieve just such a bloc
Thompson’s emphasis upon the extension of oppositional political struggle 
onto the whole broad terrain of “life” itself, encompassing areas and issues 
hitherto neglected by socialists such as the peace and nuclear disarmament 
movements, arose, as did Gramsci’s hegemonic emphasis, in the context of a 
perceived political monolithicism and imminent monopolisation o f public- 
political space by the Cold War state The Communist monolith on the one side
145
was faced by the “whale” of “Natopolis” on the other In the latter case - which, 
as a citizen of Natopolis, had to be Thompson’s primary concern - the whale 
sought not only to swallow all oppositional Jonahs but also the very notion of 
opposition, that is the very possibility of an alternative way o f doing things, itself. 
Thus, in the essay “Outside the Whale” (1960), Thompson wrote that for ‘the 
“Natopolitan” intellectual of the fifties’ ‘[t]here are no good causes left, not 
because of any lack of causes, but because with Natopolitan culture the very 
notion of a good cause is a source of embarrassment’ (1978: 9, 13). According to 
many commentators looking back from the 1950s at the heyday of intellectual 
commitment, the 1930s, that commitment had amounted to no more than political 
romanticism, a flash of colouring diffused over the works o f Auden, Spender, and 
the like, which ‘did not go at all deep’ (Amis, 1957: 4), an expression of particular 
psychic needs amongst intellectuals at that time 
Such sentiments found more methodical and coherent expression in the “End of 
Ideology” thesis propounded by Edward Shils, Daniel Bell, and the luminaries of 
the Congress for Cultural Freedom (for this latter, see Lasch, 1970: ch.3). This 
latter had had the effect, according to Thompson, resorting to Millsian 
terminology, of bringing about a ‘cultural default’ (1978: 4) among Western 
intellectuals, and had thereby extended the reach of the whale’s jaws into the 
sphere of oppositional ideology and culture The “End o f Ideology”, as Mills 
pointed out (1963 249), signified the end of I.efi-appositional ideology
specifically - and seemingly, ineluctably - because opposition became no more 
than the sign of being wedded to outdated and now inapplicable norms, it placed 
the former Left intellectual firmly inside the “belly” of Nato.
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However, if Thompson and Gramsci may be seen as having articulated 
apparently similar cultural-political strategies in the face of a totalising, all- 
powerful state which threatened to extend that power into every comer of cultural 
and social activity, it is also the case that there were vital differences between 
them with regard to the ends to which those strategies were directed. Gramsci’s 
hegemonic activity had been oriented ultimately upon the creation of a state, upon 
laying the parallel foundations upon which the “dictatorship of the proletariat” 
would be built His strategy was yet centred upon a revolutionary seizure of 
power, and, as described in the previous chapter, Gramsci’s “democratic” 
emphasis upon the creation of organic intellectuals was matched by an 
organisational imperative upon centralisation and authority necessary for 
confrontation with organised state power
For Thompson, on the other hand, for all of the fact of his continued 
employment of the discourse of revolution after the break with the Communist 
Party, the seizure of state power was not the principal aim. Thus, in “Outside the 
Whale” he wrote that ‘[t]he aim is not to create a socialist State, towering above 
man and upon which his socialist nature depends, but to create an “human society 
or socialised humanity” where (to adapt the words of More) man, and not money, 
beareth all the stroke’ (1978: 29). For Gramsci, “intellectual and moral reform” 
ultimately had to take place within the context of a specified and concrete political 
struggle against the state - that is, the struggle o f the revolutionary party. The 
achievement of hegemony within the cultural and moral spheres was first and 
foremost the achievement of dominance by one class over all others. The concept 
of hegemony thus served to denote the current relative balance of relations o f 
power between classes.
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In contrast, Thompson, in his call for socialist humanism and with his re­
conceptualisation o f the relationship between the socialist intellectual and the 
culture and experience of the people, established the grounds for an opposition 
between morality per se and the expedient, compromised, unprincipled practice of 
politics both East and West. The “reality” of contemporary Cold War politics 
required not an organisational capacity from the intellectual (1957b: 22) but rather 
a ‘capacity for utopian vision.’ (1978: 32) The intellectual now should seek to 
inspire rather than agitate, to bring ‘hope’ to the people, ‘a sense of their own 
strength and potential life.’ (1959: 55) According to Thompson, the intellectual 
should act to draw together a truly popular community, which would be made up 
of autonomous individuals constitutionally resistant to monolithic, impersonal 
political structures and their domineering political strategies.
Gramsci’s organic intellectual was an intellectual of a class (the proletariat) 
whose activity towards the victory of that class over the bourgeoisie constituted 
the totality of his or her identity as an intellectual. That activity was wholly 
directed at the elaboration of concrete class (socio-economic) interests in the 
“spiritual” spheres o f  culture, morality, and intellectual thought The socialist- 
utopian intellectual envisaged by Thompson, on the other hand, related to a 
moral community’ (Keith McClelland, cited in Soper, 1990: 218), a community 
of experience, values, and traditions reminiscent of the organic community of 
Leavis and the Scrutineers, certainly, but also an embodiment of the creative, 
loving community o f fully cultivated individuals found in William Morris’s News 
from Nowhere (1890). Such a community could exist only insofar as it fe lt itself 
to exist - that is, only “subjectively” and not simply as rooted in an “objective” 
socio-economic “base”-, could exist only in practical “lived experience”.
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Therefore, the premises of the organic relation of Gramsci’s intellectual, the 
class-political character of that relation, the elaboration of “basic” interests, do 
not apply in the case of the intellectual as imagined by Thompson. The “utopian 
vision” of that intellectual (re-)constructs the class as a community rooted in 
experiences and values; the value of just such a vision lies precisely in its offering 
the people an image of itself (through an act of imagination) as more than a 
collectivity founded upon an economic base The intellectual provides the 
possibility of self-transcendence not through the denial of the particularity of 
“private” experience but by giving suitable public expression to that experience by 
means of establishing alternative, egalitarian social and cultural practices, 
manifested in social movements and in educational and media institutions, within 
the public sphere
C.Wright Mills: ‘The Solitary Horseman’
In his characteristic emphasis upon the elaboration of a “radical humanism” and 
upon the responsibility of the intellectual in the face of the appropriation of public 
politics by élites, C.Wright Mills provides a suitable complement to 
E P Thompson in a study of the cultural politics of the 1950s radical intellectual 
The two men, indeed, were friends and intellectual colleagues. Mills was a figure 
who made the commitment to the foundation of an independent and democratic 
public sphere the central organising point of his work, and who looms large 
consequently in the history of intellectual radicalism in the United States, being 
often esteemed as a venerable precursor of the student New Left In this latter 
regard, therefore, Mills could be said to occupy a similar position to that of
149
Thompson in relation to the New Left in Britain As I have indicated, moreover, 
Mills, like Thompson, argued for the articulation o f political and moral values, 
and of the private experiences and consciousnesses o f individuals situated within 
specific social contexts and the public, impersonal practice of institutional politics. 
However, having said this, Mills departed from Thompson in the way in and the 
means by which that articulation was to be achieved. His specific practical 
involvements and intellectual affiliations led him to frame his analysis in such a 
way as, ultimately, to privilege certain “solutions” which were at variance with 
those propounded by Thompson. Furthermore, that analysis provoked a 
pessimism in Mills which would remain alien to Thompson.
In a review of The Sociological Imagination (1959) in Encounter Edward Shils 
drew an acid sketch of Mills that amounted to a personal attack. Shils caricatured 
Mills as ‘this solitary horseman, who is in part a prophet, in part a scholar, and in 
part a rough-tongued brawler’, as a ‘learned cowpuncher’ who had traversed the 
vast hinterlands of the United States astride his horse perusing ‘some novels of 
Kafka, Trotsky’s History o f  the Russian Revolution, and some essays of Max 
Weber’ along the way.’ (1960: 77-78) Shils’ personal attack upon Mills, as 
Horowitz points out, ‘became something of a cause célèbre within American 
sociological circles’ (1983: 102), representing as it did the explicit personalisation 
of an intellectual dispute.
Such a personal attack was, understandably, resented by Mills himself, who 
decided, however, not to respond, but to leave it to ‘friends in England [to] write 
letters’, and to his publisher to take out an advertisement to ‘rebalance[] the 
picture’ (Mills, cited in Horowitz, 1983: 103). However, even if his specific
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judgement and sentiments might be challenged, Shils’ critical mode was in some 
ways apt with regard to engaging with Mills. The “scholar/prophet/brawler” 
conjunction might well have been specifically intended as an unflattering criticism, 
but it also obliquely articulated Mills’ central concern that scholars should make 
more than scholarship their business, should extend their intellectual reach into 
other, public areas of concern. Such an extension, rather than invalidating the 
scholarship, as implied by Shils, was, for Mills, central to that work.
It was this concern that provided the impetus for Mills’ opening salvo against 
the “irresponsible” assimilated character of the American intellectual in an essay of 
1944 (1963: 292-304). The penetration of culture and the realms of intellect and 
morality by the demands and interests of political-economy, carried into those 
spheres by its tribunes, the mass media, had resulted, according to Mills, in the 
‘death of genuinely lively things.’ (1963: 299) Faced with the politicisation of all 
areas of lived experience, the contemporary intellectual had taken up either one of 
two options. In some cases he or she had retreated into “objectivity” or 
“scientism”, what Mills was later to call ‘the pose of the technician’ (1963: 299, 
1951: 160). Social scientists in particular had taken this route, allowing problems 
and questions to be set for them by external political and commercial interests, 
and busying themselves with providing those interests with the appropriate 
“objective” solutions and answers (see Vidich, 1993: 375). Alternatively, 
according to Mills, intellectuals had retreated into the ‘personal excuse’ of 
‘alienation’ (1963: 301), allowing themselves to be overwhelmed by their sense of 
powerlessness when confronted by the magnitude of the political-economic power 
and influence ranged against them In both cases, the annexation of life by politics
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provoked only a withdrawal on the part of intellectuals, and in the process 
deprived them of their identity as intellectuals.
Unsurprisingly, Mills argued for his fellow social scientists and all others 
involved in the vocational elaboration of intellect to face up to the challenge of 
politicisation. This was necessarily a matter not simply of augmenting the store of 
knowledge, of seeking ‘increased understanding’ (1963: 300), but of questioning 
one’s own ‘internal condition.’ (1963: 304) In order to do this, the intellectual had 
‘to unmask and to smash the stereotypes of vision and intellect with which 
modem communications swamp us’ (1963: 299); that is, he or she was required 
to “unmask” him- or herself. Achieving an oppositional efficacy against the 
politicisation by undemocratic élites of all aspects of “personal life” (thought and 
action, morality and intellect) required both the employment o f a disinterested and 
distanced “understanding” and the “subjective” elements o f will, conviction, and 
personal integrity. Thus, according to Mills, ‘[w]e must constantly shuttle 
between the understanding which is made possible by detachment and the longing 
and working for a politics of truth in a society that is responsible’ (1963: 301). 
The intellectual should uncover the truth of the political nature of the “personal”, 
its position within the dominant structures and practices o f the political-economy, 
and then through principled activity of communicating that truth to others (1963: 
301) in the face of dominant conceptions of that activity, make a truthful, moral 
politics, a public discourse which encompasses private issues of value and interest 
For Mills, this was what the public should be - that sphere in which the personal 
and the political would be brought together in a critical relationship
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However, in his 1944 essay Mills showed himself to be pessimistic about the 
prospects for the appearance of a responsible, public intellectual. The prevailing 
circumstances of war had led to a general acceptance of current realities, and even 
the discussions of the future were conducted within the parameters of post-war 
“planning” derived from the present (1963: 302). The intellectuals (or those who 
would be intellectuals) were becoming more and more assimilated, succumbing to 
the increasing power of the “cultural apparatus”; truly public communication was 
being overwhelmed by the privatising imperative of the élitist but mass institutions 
of state and commerce. But, in arriving at this conclusion, Mills was liable to be 
beset with the problem which he had himself identified (1963: 300) as the 
common cause of intellectual despair, that of facing a seemingly unbridgeable gap 
between thought and action, ideas and agency.
Hence, it was with the problem of agency in mind that Mills went on 
throughout the 1940s to identify “politically alert publics” in the United States, in 
order to assess the potential o f each of them for practising the “politics o f truth”, 
that is, to weigh the potential of each public as a social actor in the service of a 
public rational politics. In an essay of 1943 Mills had written of the labour 
movement as having just such potential for bringing about ‘genuine democracy’ 
and breaking the hold of élites on power (1963: 75-76) Moreover, Alan Wald 
writes of Mills as under the influence of the Workers’ Party during this period 
(1987: 275). However, in this same piece Mills also specified the importance of 
the part played by ‘pro-labor’ intellectuals in galvanising the dormant political 
opposition (1963: 76). It was these latter which, in Gramscian fashion, could 
articulate the narrowly economic demands of labour with the wider s<xial demand
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for democratic participation and the genuinely public accountability of those in 
power.
In The New Men o f Power (1948) Mills singled out the labour leaders as, 
potentially, at least, in a position to perform the public intellectuals’ function of 
forging the crucial links between the labour movement, as the socio-economic 
force which could challenge those in power, and those actors in society who could 
construct a new, genuinely public and rational politics. He stated that it was the 
labour leader who was ‘now the only possible link between power and the ideas 
of the politically alert of the left and liberal publics.’ (1971: 30) But, as with his 
earlier assessment of intellectuals, Mills saw the existing stratum of labour leaders 
as neither capable nor willing to capitalise upon the political potential of their 
position.
Again Mills told a familiar tale of assimilation, adaptation, and expediency: the 
leadership of the labour movement had trodden the well-worn path ‘from political 
ideas to practical politics’ (1971: 165), that is to say, echoing the Critical 
Theorist’s criticism of “optimistic” intellectuals, the labour leaders had lost their 
collective political “mind” en route to institutional power They acted ‘as if they 
were in an economic world only’, and, indeed, constituted, in many cases, ‘the last 
representatives of the economic man.’ (1971: 155, 236) This economism made 
labour leaders ‘poor bets as far as political action is concerned’, and led Mills to 
conclude in counter-Churchillian mode: ‘[n]ever has so much depended upon men 
who are so ill-prepared and so little inclined to assume the responsibility.’ (1971: 
236, 291) As before, Mills’ political sociology enabled him to identify problems 
and their solutions, whilst at the same time seemingly disclosing those problems
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(as stubbornly structural problems) in such a way as to overwhelm any agency 
that might implement those solutions
Craftsmanship and Imagination
Mills was still faced with the problem of finding a way out o f the impasse of 
structure and agency in order to avoid either falling into the despair of the wholly 
alienated or marginal intellectual, or succumbing to the enticements of an 
accommodating professionalism. He needed to find alternative social foundations 
for oppositional agency, extrapersonal (though not necessarily collective) 
structures, practices and articulations in and by which the question of the “internal 
condition” of the prospective social agent could be addressed and subjective 
limitations overcome. Increasingly, in his work o f the fifties, Mills offered the 
activity of imaginative craftsmanship as the principal foundation for the social 
(extrapersonal) elaboration of the personal will.
Initially, in White Collar (1951), craftsmanship was introduced as an ideal 
against which modem work-experience could be judged Modem work, even 
white collar work, as Mills sought to show, was alienating and bureaucratised 
The modem division of labour is characterised by routinisation, commodification 
and by purely economic motives Such conditions have led, in turn, to precisely 
that economism - a preoccupation with ‘income, power, status’ (1951: 230) - on 
the part of the working class (now including white collar workers) and also fatally 
pursued by its leaders detailed in Mills’ earlier work. A reductionist ‘short-run’ 
materialism infects every part of social and political life, such that even the
155
‘upsurge of trade unionism’ cannot be taken as signifying bright prospects for an 
imminent ‘political insurgency’, for trade unionism provides no effective ‘counter­
symbols’ to the prevailing materialism (1951: 331). The political opposition had 
no adequate counter-hegemonic resources upon which it could draw.
Craftsmanship was offered by Mills as just such a “counter-symbol”. It was 
invoked as a contrastive ‘idealized model of work gratification’ (1951: 220), as an 
‘anachronism’ which could not be achieved in ‘modem work-worlds.’ (1951: 224) 
The ideal of craftsmanship (drawn from G.D.H. Cole and, thereby, from William 
Morris) was as a unity of work and leisure, of work and culture, in and through 
which the fundamental division of livelihood and living is overcome. The craft- 
worker and his or her work exist in a symbiotic relation, as Mills made clear:
The craftsman’s work is thus a means of developing his skill, as well as a 
means of developing himself as a man. It is not that self-development is an 
ulterior goal, but that such development is the cumulative result obtained 
by devotion to and practice of his skills As he gives it the quality of his 
own mind and skill, he is also further developing his own nature, in this 
simple sense, he lives in and through his work, which confesses and 
reveals him to the world. (1951: 222)
However, if in White Collar craftsmanship remains an ethical ideal, as a mode 
of conjoining living and working, articulating the private life of the mind and the 
public revelation and elaboration of the self in and to the world, in The 
Sociological Imagination (1959) Mills sought to realise that ideal This effort 
was related directly to a re-emphasis upon the importance of social science in the
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modem world, and hence upon the potential importance of social scientists. The 
social sciences, according to Mills, were ‘becoming the common denominator of 
our cultural period ’ (1959: 13) The coincidence within the social sciences of the 
‘political and intellectual crises o f  our time’ made ‘serious work in either 
sphere...also work in the other’ (1959: 173), and thus also made the social 
scientist simultaneously a significant political figure. Social science therefore 
seemed to bear a ‘promise’ (1959: 173) of fully meaningful work, that is, work 
which attained the status and value of a craft. The conditions of the modem 
division of labour might militate against the general achievement of the 
craftsmanship ideal, but it was possible for “certain types of mind”, those 
possessed of “sociological imagination”, understood as the capacity ‘to grasp 
history and biography and the relations between the two within society’ (1959: 6), 
to bring work and life, the private and the public together within the restricted 
sphere of the “craft” of imaginative social science
The Sociological Imagination was addressed to the specific constituency of 
social scientists within the United States, and as such dealt with the procedures, 
the parameters, the very foundations (conceptual, methodological and political) of 
the discipline Mills was not concerned within that work with the traditions, the 
experiences, or the consciousness of “the people”, but with those of the 
prospective intellectuals active within the social sciences. In an appendix Mills 
addressed an appeal to the “intellectual craftsman”, the politicised social scientist 
of the future In so doing, he sought to exemplify the intellectual procedure of 
active self-creation, the intellectual craft-worker creating him- or herself as a
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distinctive subjectivity, the “scholar” and the “person” becoming inseparable 
‘Scholarship’, Mills informed his imaginary audience,
is a choice of how to live as well as a choice of career; whether he knows 
it or not, the intellectual workman forms his own self as he works toward 
the perfection of his craft, to realize his own potentialities, and any 
opportunities that come his way, he constructs a character which has at its 
core the qualities of the good workman (1959: 196)
“Objective” history - the public work of creating the world - and “subjective” 
biography - the ongoing construction of the private individual life - are part of the 
same process, the elaboration of the craft ethic.
Intellectual craftsmanship, as the ‘fusion of intellectual and personal life’ 
(1959: 201), provided, for Mills, the ground for bridging the gap, which 
threatened to grow ever wider in the modem world, between thought and action, 
work and life, “private troubles” and “public issues”. In this way, socio-political 
agency became identified with personal creativity The exercise of craftsmanship 
was equated to work which did not result in the alienation of the subject by 
making the latter a private property but which constituted the active creation of 
the subject through the concrete expression of his or her “private” experience, 
manifested in skill, specific knowledge and moral value, in public activity 
Craftsmanship entailed the biographical “ownership” of public intellectual activity. 
And, for Mills, within the Cold War context of a widespread abnegation of 
responsibility and assimilative scientism, being one’s own person was a vital 
political act, living the life of an intellectual was morally and politically crucial:
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‘[i]n a world of widely communicated nonsense, any statement of fact is of 
political and moral significance...In such a world as ours, to provide social science 
is, first of all, to practice the politics of truth’ (1959: 178) The social scientific 
intellectual had an existential and moral value; and in Mills, the “solitary 
horseman” perusing the novels of Kafka on his journey out o f the West, now 
turned ‘motor-cycle driving radical-professor-as-existentialist’ (Buhle, 1991: 
213), social science had taken on just such a significance.
Mills and Mannheim
In the same way that Thompson’s conception of the intellectual may be 
compared and contrasted with that of Gramsci, Mills’ idea of the intellectual (of 
the social scientific intellectual particularly) as a key social and political actor 
prompts comparisons with Mannheim. Mills had little faith in the working-class, 
even if constituted as “the people”, a la Thompson, and ultimately became 
dismissive of what he was to call the ‘labour metaphysic’, that is, the elevation by 
those on the Left of the revolutionary agency of labour to the level of an 
unassailable political first principle (1963: 256). As we have seen, Mills came to 
propose intellectuals as filling the historical shoes of the working-class as a 
possible ‘radical agency for change’ (1963: 256); and as an integral part of this 
political perspective he looked to the traditions of social science and the 
experience and consciousness of social scientists, rather than popular traditions 
and experience, as that in which such agency could be grounded.
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In The Sociological Imagination Mills spoke of the tradition of classic social 
science as exemplary in providing models o f  engaged and truly social science, 
wherein methods are employed for specific sets of concrete social problems and 
theories ‘are theories of some range of phenomena.’ (1959: 121) Practitioners 
within this tradition, according to Mills, were concerned not with building models 
or schema ‘from microscopic study’, nor with deducing down from grand theories 
to the level of empirical reality, but ‘try to build and to deduce at the same time.’ 
(1959: 128)
A year later Mills edited a volume of readings from the classic tradition, 
Images o f Man (1960). That tradition constituted, as John Eldridge points out, ‘a 
great cultural and intellectual resource. Its existence could not be taken for 
granted and the task of the contemporary sociologist was to ensure that it was a 
living tradition ’ (1983: 102) The contemporary social science intellectual was 
obliged to ‘[t]o reflect, keep alive and extend the social science tradition ’ (1983: 
103) Indeed, for Mills, that tradition was comparable with the literary tradition. 
Mills displayed a distinct literary consciousness, and in White Collar in particular 
sought to meld together social-scientific and literary methodologies and 
perspectives, just as Mannheim had tried to renew social science by incorporating 
concepts and categories drawn from art-historical and cultural studies.
It is possible to see in Mills’ active conception of social science not only 
respect for Mannheim as a vital contributor to a quasi-I,eavisite Great Tradition 
but also an apparent re-activation of the latter’s notion of ‘sociology as a form of 
consciousness’ (Eldridge, 1983: 103) - that is, as that which cannot be restricted 
to disciplinary boundaries or purely academic contexts, but which enables
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understanding of social life in its totality Mills’ claim that the social sciences 
constituted the “common denominator of our cultural period” directly echoed 
Mannheim’s claim that ‘the self-interpretation of man’ was now mirrored ‘in the 
perspective of his social pursuits’ (1956: 94). For both, sociology had become an 
“ethos” and an epistemological principle. For Mills, the “promise” of the social 
sciences was that which Mannheim saw in the sociology of knowledge - the 
possibility for reciprocal knowledge of the individual and the world, self- 
knowledge becoming knowledge of the world. Moreover, Mills’ conception of the 
mutual character of political and intellectual crises in modem society seemed to 
endorse precisely Mannheim’s collapsing of intellectual self-consciousness and 
socio-political action in the process of synthesising conflicting ideologies
However, having indicated these conceptual connections, it is necessary to point 
out that Mills’ “Mannheimian” commitment to intellectual agency and to the 
efficacy of the sociological consciousness should be seen in relation to other, 
critical elements in Mills’ intellectual relation to Mannheim
Thus, Mills was highly resistant to the idea of planning, which he conceived of 
as offering solutions of a technocratic order The planner, the expert, the policy 
scientist were, for Mills, all liable to be drawn into the service of power. As we 
saw in chapter one, the intellectual-as-planner, as conceived by Mannheim, 
became an agent of the existing social structure, a supposedly neutral figure 
seeking the rational adjustment of all parts - social actors and institutional 
functions - into an harmonious social whole Mannheim’s earlier historicisation 
and socialisation o f knowledge and of the intellectual had ultimately laid the 
grounds for a new objectivity beyond history, which in turn provided the
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foundations for the scientific manipulation of the “key positions” within the social 
structure.
For Mills, however, as expressed in a review of Mannheim’s Man and Society, 
and in terms similar to those of Horkheimer and Adorno in chapter two, 
Mannheim’s notion of planning exhibited myopia where the realities of power 
were concerned Mannheim appeared to carry on regardless of the fact that there 
were strata who already occupied the “key positions” in society, and that this was 
the key problem to face rather than entertaining possibilities of planning on that 
basis (1940: 968-969). Such planning would simply deliver more power, now of a 
“decontaminated” technocratic-scientific kind, into the hands of those who 
already held it.
The “intellectual craftsman” envisaged by Mills was rooted in the active unity 
of history and biography, of object and subject. The very designation “craftsman” 
signalled an attempt by Mills to give a new experiential and moral texture and 
value to scientific-scholarly activity. In this regard, Mills could be said to be more 
readily related to the earlier Mannheim, to the Mannheim rooted in the cultural 
revolt and vanguardism of the Sunday Circle, the Mannheim who articulated the 
Lebensphilosophie of Simmel and Dilthey - the “critical-moral” rather than the 
“methodological” Mannheim Or rather, perhaps one should say that whereas for 
Mannheim methodology could be detached from a specific cultural-critical and 
moral stance, and thence could become the foundation of detachment, inhering in 
the method of politico-cultural synthesis constituted as a scientific warrant against 
barbarism and cultural collapse, for Mills, as articulated in the ethic o f
162
craftsmanship, method could not be so detached from morality, from the specific 
moral progression of the individual intellectual.
The sociology of knowledge, though rooted in experience, nevertheless sought 
its synthesis, and as an essential part of the synthetic process sought to defer 
specific commitments and decisions which had to be taken within the realm of 
experience. The idea of planning that grew out of the sociology of knowledge 
ultimately turned knowledge against the supposedly irrational and chaotic sphere 
of experience: science -social science - could achieve, indeed, had to achieve, a 
position beyond the “irrational” flux of history. For his part, however, Mills’ 
imaginative crafts-worker, grafting onto the sociology of knowledge a literary and 
philosophic sensibility of which Mannheim had tried to purge it, sought to turn 
social science - as the use of specific skills and knowledges, as the elaboration and 
extension of a specific “living tradition” - back into personal-moral experience, 
into that which was a matter o f  individual feeling and creativity.
Organisation and Independence
James Miller has described how Mills influenced the founders of Students for a 
Democratic Society (SDS) in the United States in the early sixties. As he makes 
clear, this influence was conceptual and analytical, deriving especially from Mills’ 
The Power Elite (1956), which became, according to one of the SDS activists, 
‘Bible’ (Bob Ross, cited 1988: 87). Moreover, ‘[w]hen SDS published its agenda 
for the December [1961] meeting in Ann Arbor, it opened with an epigraph from 
Mills’ (1988: 79). However, Mills’ influence was also, as one might expect,
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personal - that is, it was a matter of his personal example, as one who refused to 
genuflect to power and was willing to venture beyond the cordons of 
professionalism and power-politics in practising the “politics of truth.” Thus, upon 
joining SDS, according to Miller, one had to know Mills, ‘to know not just the 
major texts and key concepts, but the personal anecdotes, the rhetorical style, the 
sweep of the man’s political vision’ (1988: 79).
In truth, the two moments of personal-moral and impersonal-intellectual 
influence were bound to be indivisible: acceptance of one involved the necessary 
acceptance of the other. Mills had insisted upon treating what formerly had been 
questions of correct professional practice as essentially moral issues, and in the 
process had attempted to re-politicise -  the political and moral being intimately 
connected -  the public life of a society which was in danger of passing into private 
hands. Mills’ practice of what has been called an ‘alternative professionalism’ 
(Eyerman and Jamison, 1994: 17) attempted to unite the exercise of a specialist, 
technical knowledge with the ends to which that knowledge was put, method and 
technique were indissociable from morality and personal aspiration
Mills’ resolute suspicion of “fraternity”, seemingly, of all collective 
organisational forms, and his insistence upon opposing them to intellectual 
independence, were seen as problematic even within SDS circles (Miller, 1988: 
90) The critical social analysis and insistence upon taking responsibility for “what 
is made of one” politically and morally in ‘the immediate context of [one’s] own 
work (1963: 232) could provide the spur for the ‘re-assertion of the personal’ 
(Tom Hayden, cited in Miller, 1988: 101) in political life, but Mills provided no 
basis or resources for forming and sustaining an organisation. Unlike Gramsci, he
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was not interested in doing so; he was not concerned with translating a 
“spasmodic” politics -  politics as existential revolt -  into politics as “permanent 
persuasion ” Rather, the main focus of his hopes, as indicated above, remained the 
intellectual -  the intellectual as a particular kind of public professional. Hence, in 
his later writings Mills called for what amounted to an “International of 
Intellectuals”, a loose aggregate of individuals in touch with one another across 
borders, who maintained, above all, their independence. (1963: 235)
In chapter six we will see that such a call has been repeated recently, by Pierre 
Bourdieu, though on the basis of an analysis which places the personal moral 
aspirations of the intellectual reflexively within an institutional history of 
intellectual practice and habitus, rather than placing them against it. Moreover, in 
that chapter I will show how Mills’ notion of an alternative, or, “partisan”, 
professionalism has been reconfigured in recent theories of the intellectual 
developed by Ron Eyerman and Andrew Jamison, and Bruce Robbins. In these, 
largely arising from the experience and context of social movements and student 
radicalism in the United States, Mills’ intellectual can be said to be adapted to 
new circumstances in which politics is seen increasingly as a matter of 
professional practice.
As far as Thompson is concerned, one can see a development that is in many 
ways different from that of Mills, consonant with his practical-institutional 
involvement Thompson’s criticism of and break with the Communist Party was 
undeniably personal and moral in character, but also he was concerned with 
identifying and developing new forms of collective self-activity and self­
organisation which could articulate a ‘language of moral revolt’ (1960a: 9)
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against the existing political culture and discourse. Hence, it was with this end in 
view that Thompson focused his attention (and his hopes) upon the burgeoning 
anti-nuclear movement in the fifties as exemplifying a new kind of ‘majority 
movement’ (Chun, 1993: 50) that would act as a counter to the organisation of 
the working-class into a passive mass. And it was for this reason that Thompson 
was cautious with regard to Mills’ apparent focus upon intellectuals as possible 
agents of social transformation, the intellectuals could end up simply perpetuating 
the domination of the people, but this time in a technocratic form.
Of course, this was precisely what Mills himself was wary of, and it was 
because of this that his earlier search for just such an agent was effectively 
abandoned in favour of elaborating a theory and a practice of moral agency, in 
which the life and work of the intellectual itself would take on, simultaneously, 
both a personal and a social significance. And one can say that even with his 
sharper organisational focus, even with his roots within native political and 
intellectual traditions and institutions, Thompson eventually followed a similar 
trajectory to Mills. For Thompson, indeed, the role of the intellectual remained 
decidedly oriented upon collective organisations -  and hence he devoted much 
energy to the revitalised anti-nuclear movement in the 1980s. But, in tandem with 
this, the intellectual was conceived as necessarily separate from all political 
organisation, as bound to jut out the ‘knees and elbows’ of his or her ‘sensibility’ 
in order to resist being ‘pressed through the grid into the universal mish-mash of 
the received assumptions of the intellectual culture’ (1978: 183) -  the intellectual 
culture of both Left and Right.
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The very formulation “socialist humanism” perhaps contained from the very 
beginning the possibility of just such a tension between collective-organisational 
and personal-moral imperatives. It was intended as that which would overcome 
this opposition, to show how the bureaucratic, reductionist, inhumane version of 
Socialism represented by Stalinism was not necessarily the last stage in its 
evolution, that a warmer, morally sensitive Socialism could be brought into being 
and sustained. However, this task and vision itself split the New Left, which could 
find, seemingly, no satisfactory organisational consensus. Within this context of 
conflict and contradiction, perhaps it is true to say that, for Thompson, it was 
most important to hold to the possibility of and the potential in the second of 
these two terms, to place ‘human’, rather than class, issues at the heart of 
intellectual practice. (1982: 28)
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Chanter Five
‘Living in truth The Intellectual as 
Existential Praxis
Introduction
The instances of the conceptualisation of the intellectual discussed in this 
chapter, Jean-Paul Sartre and Václav Havel, continue the general emphasis found 
within those of Mills and Thompson upon the intellectual as rooted in a level of 
experience that enables him or her to resist the repressive assimilation of 
institutionalised ideological politics. In the previous chapter, the intellectual was 
proposed as one whose concern it should be to articulate values and norms 
appropriate to private life and activity of specific social groups within the public 
life of society as a whole. In Mills, this work was seen, largely, as being a question 
of the reactivation of a professional or vocational ethos but within the context of 
an intellectual and creative culture thoroughly penetrated by the élite politics of 
the Cold War era. The Millsian intellectual, the professional practitioner, could 
not help but be politicised the moment he or she stepped outside the confines of a 
narrowly constrained professionalism. In Thompson, the intellectual endeavour to 
revitalise a moribund politics by making it again a matter of ethical decision and 
action was conceived as a matter of identifying and mobilising strong moral 
constituents within the politico-cultural traditions of the people It was to this 
popular cultural life that the intellectual should relate, and to which he or she was 
primarily accountable The intellectual, as such, was lodged between a 
“sophisticated” intellectual culture and the experience and traditions of the 
generality.
In the cases of Sartre and Havel the intellectual is again regarded from the 
perspective of his or her capacity for undermining a dogmatic and bureaucratic 
politics and for overcoming ideological constraints upon his or her identity.
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However, in these instances the intellectual is refracted through a predominantly 
philosophical discourse — existentialism - and is not only “explained”, or, 
analysed, thereby but through his or her identity elaborates that philosophy. The 
intellectual is that in which the philosophy is manifested and by which it is itself 
“explained”. In this respect, existentialism, as Sartre makes clear below, is a 
counterpart to Marxism (in Sartre’s view, as that which augments the latter, in 
Havel’s, as that which is opposed to it) because it provides the conceptual 
resources and context for a theory of the intellectual in which theory and practice, 
thought and action can be united.
The philosophical placement of the intellectual also draws attention to the 
relevance of specific conditions -  of tradition, of cultural resources and 
paradigms, of political institutional context -  in his or her construction. Mills and 
Thompson worked within the contexts of particular intellectual and cultural 
idioms and in relation to political and cultural institutions that made available 
particular opportunities for action and conceptualisation while excluding others. 
Sartre, for his part, stood within the tradition of the philosophes and the 
Ideologists of the lnstitut National (for this, see Kennedy, 1978), lived and was 
brought up in a culture which could be said to have been founded on eminently 
philosophical ideas. This was his “inheritance”, an intellectual culture that was 
unmistakably a state and a class culture. And it was the living presence of that 
culture within the identity and practice of the French intellectual which made 
betrayal -  of class and of state -  central to Sartre’s conception o f the intellectual 
Just as it was the presence of the influence of the French Communist Party, as 
opposed to its weakness in Britain and the United States, that made the
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relationship between the intellectual and the Party a recurring problematic in 
Sartre’s notion of the intellectual.
For Havel, similarly, the Communist Party was that with which the intellectual 
had to be preoccupied -  but in this case, of course, as the political force that 
controlled the Czechoslovak state. Havel, unlike our other examples, was active 
on the other side of the Iron Curtain. As such, therefore, his development of an 
idea o f dissidence took place within the circumstance of a state that, seemingly, 
practised Marxism, and his opposition to that state, called upon a philosophy that 
could provide a total set of values and normative moral standards upon which that 
opposition could stand firm. As we will see, in doing so, Havel drew upon 
intellectual traditions and philosophical resources that had carried particular force 
in his country, and also enacted an intellectual role which had roots specifically in 
Eastern and Central Europe. At the same time, however, both Havel and Sartre, in 
their existentialist articulations of the intellectual, necessarily made universalist 
claims for the intellectual identity that permitted the possibility of its being seen as 
non-specific and trans-national.
Sartre: The Intellectual as Monster
Sartre’s construction of the intellectual, especially as developed in his 1965 
Plea for Intellectuals, was explicitly the product of his attempt to synthesise 
Marxism and Existentialism In this regard, the intellectual becomes a category of 
agent whose real significance lies in the effort to overcome at the level of 
‘concrete events’ (1974: 251) the lived contradiction between the universal and 
the particular which the intellectual herself embodies. In this way, according to
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Sartre, the intellectual is necessarily already committed to radicalism because as 
an intellectual she constitutes nothing other than the self-recognition of society’s 
wider class contradictions. As with Havel’s existential dissident, for Sartre the 
function of the intellectual is to assume the responsibility for the recognition of the 
fundamental antagonism between the realisation of a universal humanism (truth, 
morality) and the particular, interested forms of knowledge and technique in 
which the universal is manifested and by which it is limited. The intellectual’s 
characteristic task, by this account, is to explore herself as the living embodiment 
of this fundamental contradiction, as ‘the monstrous product of a monstrous 
society.’ (1974: 247)
Marxism and Existentialsm
Unlike Havel, Sartre’s conception of the intellectual, and of his “essential” 
responsibility, was articulated in terms of Marxist master-categories of class and 
the political revolutionary transformation of society. However, through his 
elaboration of existentialism Sartre sought the revitalisation of Marxism, the 
development of which, he thought, had come to a halt under Stalin (Anderson, 
1976: 38). During that period theory and practice had become separated. 
Contemporary Marxism no longer offered the possibility of gaining practical 
knowledge of contingent historical experience, instead:
The open concepts of Marxism have closed in. They are no longer keys, 
interpretive schemata, they are posited for themselves as an already 
totalized knowledge...The totalizing investigation has given way to a 
Scholasticism of the totality The heuristic principle - “to search for the
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whole in the parts” - has become the terrorist practice of “liquidating the 
particularity”. (1963: 27-28)
Soviet Marxism could no longer actively know anything because it had ceased to 
acknowledge its lack of knowledge; its concepts had become ‘dictates' existing 
absolutely a priori. (1963: 28)
It was within this context of extreme theoreticism, in which particular 
experiential facts and events were forcibly adapted to the synthetic generalities of 
the theory, that Sartre could find a place for existentialism. The value of such a 
philosophy was that it affirmed the irreducible reality of the lived experience of 
individuals. According to Sartre, it was just this fact of ‘the irreducibility and the 
specificity of what is lived’ (1963: 10) that Kierkegaard asserted against the 
totalising philosophic system o f Hegel, which proposed the assimilation of the 
whole of reality into thought, and which regarded all the phenomena of 
inwardness as the objects of knowledge in and for Absolute Mind.
In the circumstances of idealism and absolutism prevailing within Marxism, 
therefore, ‘existentialism has been able to return and to maintain itself because it 
reaffirmed the reality of men as Kierkegaard asserted his own reality against 
Hegel.’ (1963: 28) If existentialism and Marxism can be said to ‘aim at the same 
object’ -  that is, the concrete human being - nevertheless, ‘Marxism has 
reabsorbed man into the idea’, whereas ‘existentialism seeks him everywhere 
where he is, at his work, in his home, in the street.’ (1963: 28) Existentialism 
returned because Marxism, while furnishing the concepts and categories for ‘the 
only valid interpretation o f history’ (1963:21), had frozen into a dogmatic
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idealism and no longer worked to guide practical understanding in everyday life 
and experience. For Sartre, it was existentialism which ‘remained the only 
concrete approach to reality’, which ‘addresses itself to experience in order to 
discover there concrete syntheses, and which in the circumstances of the 
bureaucratic sclerosis of Soviet Marxism took upon itself Marxism’s mantle of 
‘“philosophy-becoming-the-world” ’ (1963: 21, 30) Existentialism carried on the 
ongoing dialectical-historical process of the totalisation of experience which, as 
living experience, is ‘forever being totalised.’ (1963: 30)
A New Humanism
Sartre’s conception of the irreducible character of experience and of the 
political significance of particularity places him with Mills and Thompson as an 
advocate for a new humanism in opposition to the political totalisation of all 
forms of life in the Cold War superpower states. In The Marxists Mills included 
Sartre in his pantheon o f ‘Plain Marxists’ (1963a: 98), as a thinker who worked 
‘in Marx’s own tradition’, but who treated Marx ‘in a scholarly way’, rather than 
performing intellectual genuflections to Marxist orthodoxies. (1963a: 97) 
Thompson, on the other hand, as Kate Soper points out, often placed Sartre (as 
he also did, more famously, Althusser) in the ranks of the anti-humanists who 
denied the value of human agency in favour of obscure structural forces which 
were not accessible to ‘the conscious intentions of subjects. ’ (Thompson cited in 
Soper, 1990: 212) However, Sartre was a contributor to the first issue of The 
New Reasoner in 1957, and over against Thompson’s later charge of the former’s 
denial of agency one may cite Sartre’s endorsement of the idea of ‘man as a task' 
(1974: 250), and of the idea that each individual is fundamentally responsible for
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carrying out that task: ‘in the end one is always responsible for what is made of 
one Even if one can do nothing else besides assume this responsibility For I 
believe that a man can always make something out o f what is made of him. ’ 
(1974: 34-35)
According to Sartre, it was the false universality of bourgeois humanism, which 
unproblematically posits the universal (the universal, omniscient, self-consonant 
consciousness) as that which already exists, which should be the object of 
relentless criticism. It was this abstract universality that Marxism had adopted 
with its assumption of an all-knowing position beyond everyday contingency and 
its absorption of human consciousness and experience into an Absolute Mind. 
Like Thompson, therefore, Sartre sought a new humanism which envisaged the 
human being as that which is to be “made” through his or her own conscious 
activity. Such activity, he believed, is consequent upon the awareness of the 
absence of humanity - in the sense of a free and fully rational consciousness - in 
the particular conditions and biographical constitution of the individual 
personality, upon, that is, the consciousness of a fundamental contradiction 
between the universal, “human” ends and value of his or her conduct and the 
particular limits placed upon it by external forces which are internalised by the 
individual It is this awareness of a lived contradiction that, according to Sartre, 
actively constitutes the intellectual
The Singular Universality of the Intellectual
For Sartre, in his 1965 lectures on the constitution and function of the 
intellectual, the latter is that which arises in the conflict between universalist 
humanist ends and particularist technical means, which are legitimated with
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reference to those ends, but which in reality endanger their realisation. The 
intellectual comes into being in the consciousness of the contradiction between 
ideologically determined and delimited practical knowledge and knowledge of a 
critical-evaluative kind, knowledge which is political or moral in character insofar 
as it is, in its very particularity, informed by ‘a global and dogmatic conception 
(vague or precise: moralist or marxist) of man.’ (1974: 230) This contradiction lay 
at the heart of the common French conception of the intellectual, which appeared 
at the time of the Dreyfus Affair. According to Sartre, such an intellectual 
necessarily interferes in problems which do not concern him or her, straying into 
areas outside of his or her technical competence. Sartre employs the example of 
the nuclear scientist to illustrate his point:
I would suggest that the scientists working on the atomic fission in order 
to perfect the techniques of atomic warfare should not be called 
‘intellectuals’: they are scientists, and nothing more But if these same 
scientists, terrified by he destructive power of the devices they have helped 
to create, join forces and sign a manifesto alerting public opinion to the 
dangers of the atomic bomb, they become intellectuals (1974: 232)
The ‘technicians o f practical knowledge’ (1974: 232) for as long as they keep 
within the boundaries of their expertise cannot be called intellectuals, because they 
are not concerned with the ends to which their technical practice is put. However, 
at the same time, it is only out o f the mass of such technicians that intellectuals 
will be recruited This is because it is to the strata of technicians (‘the tertiary 
sector made up of scientists, engineers, doctors, lawyers, jurists, academics’ 
(1974 232)) that the particular social function of the examination of possibilities,
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the specialist study of means, is assigned. In their scientific concern with all 
alternative means the technicians throw open the possibility of questioning and re­
evaluating the ends to which specific means will be put. Rational scientific 
procedure requires the specialist, in the first instance, to pursue that which is 
‘useful’ in terms of its own universalising logic, and without regard to 
‘specification or limits.’ (1974: 242) Such a procedure must therefore be free to 
contest particularist perspectives and viewpoints regardless of specific political 
and social interests.
For Sartre, the significance of the Enlightenment philosophes lay in precisely 
this universalising, contestatory activity. As specialists of practical knowledge, 
“‘experts in means’” (1974: 233), drawn from the tertiary sector, they demanded 
‘the right of free enquiry’ and ‘independence for thought’ (1974: 235) to enable 
them to conduct practical research in the most effective manner. In the process, 
the philosophes, as Bauman has argued (1987: ch.2), established Reason as a 
universal criterion by which human conduct in society and in culture should be 
judged, and thereby furnished a global conception of humanity and its conduct 
which necessarily extended beyond their specific areas of competence Thus, 
according to Sartre, ‘[i]n short the philosophes did what intellectuals are criticized 
for doing today - they used their skills for another end than that towards which 
they were supposed to be working, they developed a bourgeois ideology based on 
a mechanistic and analytical scientism ’ (1974: 236) As masters of technique and 
practical knowledge, the philosophes ventured into the spheres of value and truth, 
they traversed the distance between the is of objective fact and the oughts o f  
morality and politics.
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But, if the philosophes may be considered to have been intellectuals by dint of 
the fact of their interfering in affairs which, as specialists, were not their concern, 
at the same time, they could not be said to be intellectuals in the modem sense of 
the term. The philosophes were ‘bom, educated and moulded within the 
bourgeoisie’ (1974: 236-237); their championing of the universality of rationalism 
and of the human being was at odds with the particularity and traditionalism of 
aristocratic feudalism, but it was consonant with the bourgeoisie’s thrust towards 
the universalisation o f individualism and economic liberalism. Hence, for Sartre, 
as for Gramsci, ‘the advance of scientific and practical research, and the 
progression of the rising [bourgeois] class, moved forward together.’ (1974: 236) 
The philosophes were, he writes, Gramscian organic intellectuals of the 
bourgeoisie, taking ‘upon themselves the task of expressing the objective spirit of 
[that] class.’ (1974: 236) The humanism which the philosophes advocated and 
established - the triumph of “universal man”, of the sovereignty of free rational 
individuals - was in fact bourgeois humanism, according to which ‘every man is a 
bourgeois, every bourgeois is a man ’ (1974: 236)
It was this consonance between philosophes and the class to which they 
belonged, between the universalising logic and principles of their scientific 
technique and the universalism of bourgeois ideology that, Sartre argued, 
debarred them from being considered as truly modem intellectuals in the radical 
definition he sought to give to this term The intellectual appeared at that point 
when the technicians of practical knowledge found themselves reduced to the 
status of functionaries whose work is determined by priorities expressive of 
particular interests within society, and thus distanced from the ends towards 
which their knowledge-practice tend The technicians now have their social being
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determined for them - determined, indeed, in the allocation of social roles to be 
played, jobs to be filled, even before they come into existence as the various kinds 
of specialist.
Sartre echoed the complaint voiced by ‘60s student activists that education had 
been subordinated to the demands of industry and commerce, which sought (and 
continue to seek) ‘to extend its control over the university [in order] to force it to 
abandon the old obsolete humanism and replace it with specialized disciplines, 
destined to supply firms with testers, supervisors, public relations officers, and so 
forth.’ (1974: 238) This process of selection is simultaneously a matter of 
political-economic decisions concerning the priorities of investment and the 
“efficient” structure of institutions, and also a matter of ideology. Specialists in 
practical knowledge are transformed into ‘agents of an ideological particularism’ 
(1974: 238), become in their roles as experts in their various fields transmitters of 
accepted values and ideas - of, for instance, nationalist or racist ideologies, or of 
the ideology of liberal capitalism. By these means, and by the fact that the 
technician is cut of from the working-class by the very selectivity of his or her 
education in class society, the specialist becomes a ‘middle man, a middling man, 
a middle-class man’, becomes one whose ‘social being and destiny come to him 
from without.’ (1974: 239)
Whereas the philosophes experienced a “false” harmony between the principle 
of universality inherent in their scientific activity and the universal principles which 
legitimated bourgeois hegemony, the intellectuals experience rather a conflict 
between their knowledge practice and the now revealed particularism of that 
hegemony The intellectual is caught between the inheritance of a humanist
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culture, educated as he or she has been in a tradition which is based on the 
principle o f universal equality and the disinterested character of reason, and the 
particular conditions of personal history, the whole complex of ideological 
conditions which have produced his or her own self. It is only in an abstracted 
sphere of cultural practice that technique is independent and universal; in the 
reality of class society it is pressed to serve particular ends, though its potential 
for self-determination and universality remains recognisable.
It is with the recognition of the tension between the potential and the reality of 
technical practice that the intellectual comes into being (and with its traditions of a 
disinterested humanist culture and one socially directed in character, it is less than 
surprising that the modem intellectual came to light in France). The recognition of 
contradiction is simultaneously externally and  internally directed, according to 
Sartre. For the intellectual is concerned with his or her own intériorisation of 
dominant norms and of particularist restrictions upon the development of 
universal ends.
The key point in Sartre’s elaboration of the intellectuals is that he or she is 
characterised as exemplifying a specific mode of existence or being. Intellectuals 
can not be defined according to their disposition of knowledge or the specific 
practical-occupational function they perform As a specialist in knowledge, the 
intellectual
does know certain things,.. [b]ut as an intellectual, he is searching for 
other things: the restrictions, violent or subtle, of universality by 
particularism, and the envelopment o f  tmth by myth have made him 
essentially an investigator He investigates himself first of all in order to
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transform the contradictory being assigned to him into a harmonious 
totality. (1974: 247)
That “investigation” is necessarily dialectical, however, that is, the intellectual’s 
exploration of his or her self involves, at the same time, investigation of the world 
which has produced intellectuals - ‘the self is referred to the world and the world 
is referred to the self’ (1974: 245) The “monstrous” identity of the intellectual is 
precisely that which marks the monstrousness of the world itself. He or she is not 
brought into existence by any particular decision made by any one group in 
society, rather, the intellectual represents in his or her very experience as a 
“specialist in universality” the fundamental global contradiction inherent in 
particular decisions being taken in the name of humanity as a whole.
In this way, Sartre’s intellectual, ‘characterized as having a mandate from no 
one,... receiving [a] statute from no authority’ (1974: 246-247), represents no-one 
but him- or herself. But because that self constitutes no more than the reality of 
society’s dialectical division, is situated on the fault which divides that society, the 
intellectual represents or embodies the whole of humanity. The intellectual 
constitutes a ‘singular universality.' (1974: 249) And it was Sartre himself, as a 
self-identified monstrous intellectual, who embodied the singularity of that 
universality most completely.
As noted in the opening chapter, in his conception of the intellectual Mannheim 
proposed an interdependence between consciousness and the world which meant 
that the knower and the known, and more specifically, the intellectual and the 
particular facts of his or her existence could not be separated out from one
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another. As with Sartre, self and world had to be reciprocally referred. In his 
earlier, Sunday Circle incarnation, under the influence of Simmel, Mannheim 
argued for seeing the intellectual as engaged in a necessarily doomed struggle to 
reconcile life and thought, “objective” and “subjective” cultures. However, with 
the elaboration of successive conceptions of a cultural science (the sociology of 
knowledge and interdependent thought), Mannheim laid the conceptual and 
methodological foundations for the intellectual (and later, the planner) to  achieve 
a “transcendental” synthesis of existential particularity and rational universality in 
a scientific consciousness. For Sartre, however, the intellectual could not achieve 
such a transcendence, even if hedged about by qualifications which emphasised its 
need for continual renewal. Science is not that into which experience could be 
incorporated and its distorting effects overcome, but rather, is that experience - a 
contradictory experience of particular universality, of the (self-)alienation of the 
universal ends of science - into which the intellectual is thrown and by which he or 
she is constituted. As the lived experience of the intellectual, science is 
simultaneously subjective and objective in character, that is, it is an ensemble of 
method and technique by which the intellectual gains understanding and to which, 
as a knowledge practitioner, he or she is committed, but it is also that from which 
the intellectual is consciously alienated As lived experience, science ‘is always 
simultaneously present to itself and absent from itself (1974: 42); it is that which, 
in the self-conscious intellectual, goes beyond its own particular totalisation.
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Universal and Specific Intellectuals
It is interesting that Sartre has often been described as a “universal intellectual” 
in the sense given to that term by Michel Foucault (see Jennings, 1997: 74 for a 
recent example). According to Foucault, ‘the “universal” intellectual derives from 
the jurist or notable, and finds his fullest manifestation in the writer, the bearer of 
values and significations in which all men can recognise themselves.’ (1980: 128) 
Such an intellectual stands as the ‘master of truth and justice’ (1980: 126), acting 
as the consciousness of all, and speaking for all those without a voice.
For Foucault, the history of the French intellectual from Voltaire to Zola was 
the history o f  the universal intellectual. Over against this figure, however, he 
identified an alternative tradition, appearing from the end of the nineteenth- 
century onwards, of the “specific intellectual”. This latter intellectual, he writes, 
‘derives from quite another figure, not the jurist or notable, but the savant or 
expert.’ (1980: 128) The specific intellectual does not place him- or herself 
“‘somewhat ahead and to the side” in order to express the stifled truth of the 
collectivity’ (1977: 207-208), but is situated in ‘specific sectors’ of knowledge 
practice, and through his or her ‘own conditions of life and work’, in the hospital, 
laboratory, university, and so on, is given ‘a much more immediate and concrete 
awareness of struggles ’ (1980 126) It is at the level of the situation that the 
specific intellectual operates. However, though this carries with it the dangers of 
sectoralism and the staking out and defence of areas of professional competence 
as exclusive territories of expertise, according to Foucault, the specificity of the 
intellectual’s life and work ‘can take on a general significance’ by being connected 
to the structure and function of the ‘régime of truth’ in society (1980: 132), the
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attribution  and adm inistration ith in  a system  o f
political power relations.
Rather than being strictly opposed, I would argue that Foucault offered an idea 
of the intellectual which in fact was in many ways continuous with that of Sartre, 
and which was, therefore, continuous with the French tradition. Central to 
Foucault’s critique of the universal intellectual was the problematising of 
representation, of the intellectual’s arrogation of the “right” to speak on behalf of 
others In this, he was responding to the dominance of the Left intellectual and of 
Marxism in French political culture, and to the events of May 1968. In these 
latter, Foucault stated in a 1972 conversation with Gilles Deleuze, ‘the intellectual 
discovered that the masses no longer need him to gain knowledge: they know 
perfectly well without illusion; they know far better than he and they are certainly 
capable of expressing themselves.’ (1977: 207)1 The relationship between 
intellectuals and masses was now on a new footing, whereby Marxist intellectuals 
themselves could be seen as ‘agents of [a] system of power’, through their 
promulgation of ‘the idea of their responsibility for “consciousness” and 
discourse’, who prevent the masses from expressing their knowledge (1977: 207).
However, in his delineation o f the intellectual-as-monster, Sartre’s main 
concern was with the exact nature of the representativeness o f the intellectual. 
The special character of the Sartrean intellectual consists in his or her living the 
contradiction between (ideological) particularism and (scientific) universalism, 
which leaves him or her, as an intellectual, without a “mandate” from any social 
group. Thus, such an intellectual cannot speak on behalf o f others, cannot
1 Eyerman and Jamison also make this point in their discussion of the “movement intellectual" 
(1991: 114). which I will return to below.
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arrogate the function of universal consciousness, because the universal is precisely 
that which is to be achieved (1974: 260) Commitment to the masses in the shape 
of joining or aligning oneself to their organisations does not make the intellectual 
an intellectual of the masses, and will not enable him or her to overcome the 
particularising conditions of his or her background and education. As such, the 
intellectual cannot become politically or socially representative of the masses; 
rather he or she is existentially representative, commitment being given an 
existential basis. It is a matter of being inserted into a specific social destiny, but 
then seeking to take responsibility for that destiny.
Commitment, as conceived by Sartre, is not that which is “external” to the 
intellectual, that is, it is not an “object” towards which one directs one’s energies, 
but is that which arises from the situation of the specialist in practical knowledge. 
The “conditions of life and work” of the latter, being conditions in which scientific 
truth is fettered by ideological myths, call the intellectual into being, not as a 
figure who is primarily committed to the struggles of others, but as one 
committed in his or her own reflective activity to  the liberation of her own divided 
self That activity is inseparable from the existence of the intellectual, which is, in 
turn, necessarily a committed existence.
Writer as Intellectual
It was the writer who, for Sartre, most completely embodied this existence. 
Whereas other intellectuals become so through the contradiction arising ‘between 
the universalist demands of their profession and the particularist demands of the 
dominant class’ (1974: 284), for the writer this contradiction is internal to the
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profession itself. The writer can not avoid writing of his or her experience of 
global contradictions, but insofar as this is experience, it ‘occurs in the domain of 
non-knowledge.’ (1974: 284) However, it is the task of the writer ‘to 
communicate the incommunicable’ (1974: 284) by exploiting the ambiguity of 
ordinary language -  that is, by seeking to expose its nature as both material and 
immaterial, particular and general, parole and langue It is the writer’s function 
simultaneously to thicken, to complicate, and to demonstrate and connect. The 
task of “communicating the incommunicable” is thus strictly an impossible, or, 
“utopian”, task of maintaining in and through that communication that 
incommunicability -  that is, it is a task of conveying an experience without giving 
knowledge o f it.
Hence, Sartre writes of the writer’s style:
style, in effect communicates no knowledge: it produces the singular 
universal by showing simultaneously language as a generality that 
produces and wholly conditions the writer in his facticity, and the writer as 
an adventurer, turning back on his language, and assuming its follies and 
ambiguities in order to give witness to his practical singularity and 
imprison his relationship with the world, as lived experience, in the 
material presence of words. (1974: 280)
As a specialist in ordinary language, which constitutes the conjunction between 
particular and universal, ‘the writer is not an intellectual accidentally, like others, 
but essentially.'’ (1974: 284)
Such a distinction is important, 1 think, from the point-of-view of the validation 
of writing as an activity of the intellectual It is that which most clearly delineates
185
the modem intellectual. This is endorsed by Sartre’s identification of the 
transformation of the classic bourgeois intellectual into the modem as taking place 
‘particularly from the Dreyfus affair onwards.’ (1974: 237) It is Zola, the writer, 
who is given a special place in the tradition. Zola, as a writer, as the essential 
“singular universal”, could not but “interfere” in what didn’t concern him. 
According to Sartre’s conception, the proper domain of such a figure was that 
hidden, obscure totality of “the world” which ordinary language, in its incessant 
ramblings, touches upon at every point. And as Pierre Bourdieu points out (1996: 
209ff), Sartre’s notion of the writer-intellectual -  and of himself as such an 
existent -  indicates a special, elevated place for writing -  philosophical writing -  
as a “total” activity that assimilates all other fields of expertise and modes of 
activity. Writing is validated thereby as existential praxis.
1968: The Intellectual Transformed
The events of May 1968 prompted Sartre into a re-appraisal of his conception 
of the practice of the intellectual. A prefatory note attached to the Plea for 
Intellectuals in 1972 indicated his change of perspective and his dissatisfaction 
with his pre-’68 idea of the intellectual:
Today 1 have finally understood that the intellectual cannot remain at the 
stage of unhappy consciousness (characterized by idealism and 
inefficacity): he must resolve his own problem - or, if you like, negate his 
intellectual moment in order to try and achieve a new popular statute. 
(1974: 227)
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And, in a lecture of the same year, “Justice and the State”, about his trial on libel 
charges as editor o f La Cause du Peuple, Sartre spoke of the possibility now open 
to the intellectual for “choosing the people”, which had demonstrated itself in 
1968 as capable of constituting itself as such. He spoke in Foucauldian fashion of 
this choice:
If an intellectual chooses the People, he must know that the time for 
signing manifestos, for quiet protest meetings, and for publishing articles 
in “reformist” newspapers is over. His task is not so much to speak as to 
try, by any means available to him, to let the people speak for themselves 
(1978: 179)
Whereas previously the monstrous intellectual received a statute from no 
group, now he or she was obliged to seek it out Whereas the modem intellectual 
had been exemplified in the atomic scientist who signed a petition against the 
bomb, and thus challenged the ends to which his or her knowledge practice was 
put, now the signing of petitions, of manifestos -  the “writerly” practice par 
excellence of the French intellectual -  now such activity was declared obsolete. 
The People were in a position to speak for themselves, and it now became the 
intellectuals’ chief function to ‘contest themselves as intellectuals’ (cited in 
Aronson, 1980: 316).
However, self-contestation, investigation of the particularist restrictions and 
ideological interests constraining the intellectual, had been central to the idea of 
the intellectual as presented by Sartre in 1965 Such contestation then had been 
that which constituted him or her as specific kind of existence. But, after 1968,
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one might say, for Sartre it was no longer sufficient for the intellectual to contest 
him- or herself existentially, because this self-negation was simultaneously an 
affirmation of the intellectual identity, the existence of the intellectual was 
dependent upon it, and that existence only confirmed the universality of truth and 
morality as that which was always becoming.
In the popular uprising of May 1968 Sartre identified the re-birth of an active 
politics and the opportunity for the adoption of a positive political position (“a 
new popular statute”) that seemed to offer the possibility of achieving politically 
that universalism. From this position, the intellectual -  the writer, especially the 
writer of a “non-political” biography of Flaubert -  had to be politically contested, 
his or her existential praxis was no longer to the point, and a specifically political 
activism had to take its place. But instead, what occurred was a division between 
the two: the writer-intellectual and the “anonymous” paper-seller and activist 
existed side-by-side. The ‘special contradiction’ (1978: 185) of the writer of 
bourgeois books and the anti-intellectual activist continued the contradiction 
between ideological particularism and rational universalism, only now Sartre saw 
this contradiction itself as wholly negative and took a position on one side of it, 
rather than seeing it as an existential bind which produced the intellectual that he 
was
Havel: Dissidence and Existence
The conception of dissidence elaborated in the work and life of Vaclav Havel 
(these two moments being inseparable from his point-of-view) under the 
communist régime in Czechoslovakia during the 1970s and 1980s situated the
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dissident intellectual within the sphere of social existence, rather than in politics 
primarily. As indicated at the beginning of this chapter, Havel, like Sartre, drew 
upon existentialist ideas in order to provide conceptual and ethical foundations for 
political oppositionism and for the intellectual’s reflective activity.
For Sartre, existentialism revitalised the humanist core of a mechanical, 
determinist Marxism, which now offered only absolute a priori laws 
encompassing the totality of human experience, past and present. Moreover, with 
specific regard to the intellectual, it provided a paradoxically non-political basis 
for commitment and responsibility (and hence representativeness) in existence 
itself, rather than in the intellectual’s political-theoretical alignment or sympathies. 
As Pierre Bourdieu writes, ‘Sartre converged] into an ontological structure, 
constitutive of human existence in its universality, the social experience of the 
intellectual ’ (1996: 212) The intellectual becomes so not by what he or she says, 
or in accordance with his or her profession of certain types of knowledge - though 
these latter might be regarded as the necessary conditions for intellectualism, 
instead, the intellectual becomes so through what she is in modem society, and 
most importantly, through taking responsibility for that being in actions which 
seek to overcome it. The reflective activity of the intellectual is simultaneously 
inwardly and outwardly directed, indeed, it is within such activity that the 
contradictions which cut across the relations between self and society, 
particularity and universality, are brought to the fore, and their unity or synthesis 
sought from both sides, as it were
Havel’s experience in communist Czechoslovakia led him to an extreme distrust 
of Marxism in particular and of statist politics in general His existential outlook 
was developed not as the means whereby a humanistic revolutionary or radical
189
politics could be recovered, as in Sartre and, in their emphasis upon the 
irreducibility of the ethical, as in Thompson and Mills, but as an alternative to 
“ideological” politics altogether, as that which offered an alternative basis and 
context for truth and ethical action in individual and in collective life. Over against 
political revolution, Havel offered a notion of existential revolution, a concept 
which was fundamentally anti-statist, insofar as it posited the private sphere of 
society as the locale of significant human action, and anti-historicist, insofar as it 
situated human activity within the transcendent realm of Being.
Remembrance of Things Past
As a number of authors have pointed out, Havel relates to a strong tradition of 
existentialism in Czechoslovakia. His mentor co-founder of Charter 77, Jan 
Patocka, was himself a student of Heidegger’s at Freiburg in the 1920s. In the 
cultural flowering that occurred in the newly established state in the 1920s and 
1930s, as Vladimir Tismaneanu relates, existentialist philosophy and avant-garde 
art flourished (1992a: 9) The same author then goes on to give a political and 
historical context for this flourishing:
In that part of the world, people valued memory and tried to escape a 
perpetually cunning History For them History had been a slaughterhouse, 
a stage for continuous injustice and defeats. Memory was the faculty that 
preserved the unfulfilled dreams of freedom and expectations for a 
community of true citizens. Apocalyptic sarcasm rather than metaphysical 
commitments was the hallmark of the Central F.uropean identity. (1992a: 
10)
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As an example of just such “sarcasm”, one might think of the anarchic mischief of 
Jaroslav Hasek, author of The Good Soldier Svejk, famous throughout 1910s 
Prague as an practical joker and puller of stunts, such as declaring himself to be, 
upon checking in at a Prague hotel/brothel, a Russian visitor ‘looking into the 
activities of the Austrian general staff.’ (Parrott, 1974: x) Upon arrest, Hasek 
claimed that he only ‘wanted to assure himself that the Austrian police were 
operating effectively.’ (1974: x) The figures of the “jester” and the ironist, 
moreover, have featured strongly within East and Central European dissidence 
more generally (see, for example, Kolakowski, 1971; Konrad, 1984).
According to Tismaneanu, within the Central European context intellectuals 
conceived of themselves as playing ‘a central role in articulating values and 
defending the cultural memory of nations long deprived of state existence.’ 
(1992a: 11) Ideological systems which claimed the mandate of a universal and 
transcendent History, and which demanded the subordination of the particularity 
of national traditions and experiences and modes of thought were rejected by such 
intellectuals. These latter turned instead to ways of thinking which were focussed 
upon the irreducible reality of things and events in themselves. Existential modes 
of thinking, such as phenomenology, which did not seek to explain ‘the meaning 
of things, beings, relations and events’ by means of the “external” mediation of 
‘an ideology or a scientific theory’ (Wilson, 1988: 18), bestowed a reality upon 
inwardness. Hence, such a phenomenon as memory could not be dismissed as an 
unreliable, feeble and wavering reflection of the substantial objectivity of History, 
but had to be seen as in and o f itself having a extra-personal significance and 
value
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In an interview given to Philip Roth, Milan Kundera, himself as central figure in 
the rise of dissidence in Czechoslovakia, identifies the problem of memory and 
forgetting as that which enables the political and private lives of human beings to 
be seen as united within a common “metaphysics”. The problem of forgetting, of 
the loss of self is ever present in the lives of individuals. ‘But’, according to 
Kundera, ‘forgetting is also the great problem of politics’, and of totalitarian 
politics especially.
When a big power wants to deprive a small country of its national 
consciousness it uses the method of organized forgetting . .. A nation which 
loses awareness of its past gradually loses its self. And so the political 
situation has brutally illuminated the ordinary metaphysical problem of 
forgetting that we face all the time, every day, without paying any 
attention. Politics unmasks the metaphysics of private life, private life 
unmasks the metaphysics o f politics. (1983: 235)
In such a country as Czechoslovakia, which has been burdened with the full 
weight of History (1983: 231), in the words of one of Kundera’s characters, ‘the 
struggle against power is the struggle of memory against forgetting.’ (1983: 3)
The Intelligentsia Tradition
The existential, memorial orientation which Tismaneanu identifies amongst 
Eastern and Central European intellectuals may be seen itself as relating to the 
intelligentsia tradition in Eastern Europe It is within that tradition, 1 would 
argue, that Havel may be placed. However, at the same time, one should point out
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that that tradition has been marked by fundamental divisions. The intelligentsia 
(and most markedly the Russian intelligentsia) of the nineteenth-century was split 
according to its members’ adherence to, either, a materialist-scientific notion of 
society and socio-political development, or, to metaphysical outlooks which 
emphasised irreducible identities, racial, national, or cultural. The dispute between 
the two sides thus revolved around the opposition between a religious or mystical 
transcendence, and an historical materialism.
It was in the struggle between “Westernism” and “Slavophilism” in Russia in 
the middle of the last century this dispute took on ‘an acute form’, although, as 
Richard Pipes points out, it was the Poles and the Czechs who originated a 
Slavophile theory. (1974: 265) Slavophile members of the intelligentsia reacted to 
the pronouncements of German-influenced Russian thinkers who proclaimed the 
Slavic peoples to be “unhistoric” and without a significant civilisation. Peter 
Chaadaev provoked an extreme response from the authorities when he declared in 
1856 that Russians ‘live entirely in the present in the narrowest confines, without 
a past or future, amid a dead calm’ (cited in Pipes, 1974: 266). Russia was little 
more than an historic ‘backwater’, a ‘swampland’ where the currents of history 
were stilled, and stagnated (1974: 266)
Perhaps unsurprisingly, this attack led to an intellectual response which was 
nationalistic in tone, and which centred upon the elaboration of peculiarly Russian 
virtues and traditions The charge of historical marginality was answered by the 
Slavophiles who identified the true nature of the division between West and East 
as religious and spiritual in character The dominance of rationalism and 
individualism in Western society and culture meant that life in the West was 
marked by an absence of spirituality and community. In Russia, on the other hand,
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the Orthodox Church, because it was supposedly rooted firmly in the communal 
life and traditions of the Russian people, had ensured the survival of a fulfilling 
spiritual conception of life As Pipes writes, ‘[t]hanks to Orthodoxy, Russians 
[had] managed to retain “integral” personalities in which logic and faith fused to 
produce a superior kind of knowledge which Alexis Khomiakov . ..called “living 
knowledge” (zhivoe znanie).’ (1974: 267) From the perspective provided by such 
integrated, spiritualised knowledge, the merely historical magnitude and 
significance of the Western nations was extensively diminished.2
According to the Slavophile version of history, it was the modernising reforms 
of Peter the Great which had introduced ideas and social and cultural forms into 
Russia which were alien and damaging to its native “organic spirit”. Those 
reforms, in education and in the administration of financial, economic and state 
affairs, had created a bureaucracy which interfered intolerably in the daily lives of 
the people, and brought about a breach ‘between the crown and the people.’ 
(Pipes, 1974: 267) “Traditional” Russian life, characterised, according to 
Slavophile opinion, by an unconscious integration and organicism, had been 
disrupted by a rationalising spirit which sought to make that life the object of a 
calculating, functionalist consciousness. This spirit was embodied by certain 
members of the intelligentsia who, first under the influence of Hegelian Idealism 
and then various strands of scientific materialism, sought the rationalisation of 
Russian society in accord with universalist principles.
2 Such a strategy bears comparison with that adopted by the Muscovite Tsars in their dealings 
with Western monarchies in which the latter were judged by purely native conceptions and 
standards of sovereignty, and invariably found wanting (Pipes. 1974: 76-77)
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What in fact had occurred in Russia from the time of Peter’s reforms onwards 
was the progressive separation of the state from the person of the tsar. (Pipes, 
1974: 128). Russia’s rulers had created a space for public debate and for an ethos 
of social commitment. However, at the same time, they denied the public any 
meaningful political participation. (The Enlightenment monarch Catherine the 
Great, for instance, encouraged criticism of Russian society, but then, in the 
aftermath of the French Revolution, was prepared to condemn Alexander
V
Radishchev to death for writing A Journey from  St. Petersburg to Moscow (1790) 
(Shatz, 1980: 26-27; Pipes, 1974: 256) ) The intelligentsia had been called upon 
to make a contribution to Russian society, but the were denied the possibility of 
doing so in the sphere of politics Political participation became that to which a 
large proportion o f the educated aspired, and its refusal that upon which their 
collective grievance centred.
However, this focus upon politics was, for Slavophiles and their intellectual 
descendants, damaging, insofar as it led the intelligentsia to neglect the individual 
person in favour o f the supra-individual collective, and interiority in favour of the 
merely external In the wake of the 1905 revolution in Russia, the division 
between the “materialist-political” and the “spiritual-antipolitical” wings of the 
intelligentsia was made sharply apparent. According to Marc RaefT,
The revolution of 1905 and its authoritarian aftermath created a still 
deeper rift in the ranks of Russia’s intellectual elite Those events 
confirmed the radical intelligentsia in its traditional “mystique of 
revolution” and social philosophy, while another element now distanced 
itself and focused on spiritual and professional concerns. (1994: viii)
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Vekhi
In 1909 a number of this latter “element” published a collection of essays called 
Vekhi (Landmarks) in which they sought to give an alternative vision of the value 
and function of the consciousness of the intelligent. According to Mikhail 
Gershenzon in that volume, ‘the Russian intelligent is a person who has literally 
lived outside himself since youth, recognizing as the only worthy object of his 
interest and sympathy something outside of his own society: the people, society, 
or the state. (1994: 51) The socialistic, materialist intelligentsia, which had found 
in the events of 1904 and 1905 its ‘golden age’ (Kagarlitsky, 1988: 26), had 
‘become a slave to politics.’ (Gershenzon, 1994: 60) It had “consecrated” itself to 
revolution (see Nechaev, in Payne, 1964: 26), and thus performed the rites and 
rituals appropriate to religious observance, whilst having at the same time rejected 
the spiritual-subjective content of religion. (Struve, 1994: 124)
But, the failure of the 1905 revolution to deliver to the intelligentsia heaven on 
earth opened the way for it to see that political revolution alone was insufficient 
to bring about the necessary changes for the liberation of the intelligent Before 
1905, according to Gershenzon, ‘[t]he intelligent was suffocating, or thought he 
was suffocating only because he was in bondage. A revolution really could have 
provided the people with everything they needed for a healthy life - freedom of 
self-determination and legal security But what would political freedom have 
given us, the intelligentsia?’ (1994: 65) From this perspective, the events of 1905 
and their aftermath had shaken the intelligentsia out of its automatic identification 
with the “collective good” of the social whole, and enabled it to re-focus its 
attention upon questions of the newly individualised consciousness and 
personality. ‘The intelligentsia’s disorder after the revolution’, wrote Gershenzon,
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‘was a psychological reaction of the personality, and not a transformation of 
social consciousness: the hypnotic power of civic activism which had dominated 
the intelligentsia for so many years suddenly disappeared, and the personality 
found itself at liberty.’ (1994: 66) From now on, it was the individual personality 
that would shape society, pronounced Gershenzon, unaware of the collectivist 
shape of things to come; ‘the tyranny of politics has come to an end ’ (1994: 67)
What Gershenzon and his fellow Vekhi-ists were arguing for was the 
importance of the preservation of the autonomy and distinctness of the individual 
self for the creation of a truly human society Over against collective social agency 
they asserted the individual human identity as the irreducible truth of human 
existence: ‘[a]ll that lives lives individually according to a complete plan specific 
for each being ’ (Gershenzon, 1994: 55) The attempt to claim autonomy for the 
individual’s life and work, and to cordon off a private space free from the 
priorities and interventions of the state is central in the subsequent history of 
dissidence In the case o f such figures as Kolakowski and Sakharov this bid was 
made largely in the name and for the sake of an academic or intellectual freedom 
(see Kolakowski, 1971a: 184-185; Sakharov, 1969: 25). I,ike Sartre, these 
dissidents sought the fulfilment of the universalist promise of science, and at least 
initially, saw the realisation of that promise as in accord with ‘the real interests of 
communism’ (Kolakowski, 1971a 186) Unlike Sartre, however, they did not 
view the contradiction between the universalist technique and epistemology of
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science, and the individualised consciousness of the knowing self as fundamentally 
existential in character.3
For Havel, the preservation of a private space for autonomous action is not 
conceived principally in terms of intellectual freedom and the universalist interest 
o f science but in moral and existential terms The preservation of such a space is 
important because it is there that the personality as a centre of essential moral 
responsibility may be nurtured; it is upon the foundations of such a core of 
personality that the individual can build a life “lived within the truth”, as Havel’s 
famous phrase (after Kafka) has it. Ann Mische writes of an Arendtian concern in 
Havel with the “treasure” of a ‘half-hidden, very private sphere’ as conceived as a 
“ ‘holding area” of the self, from which the self must necessarily emerge to act 
publicly ’ (1993: 245) Living in truth is characterised by its attempt to restore to 
public life the dimension of individual responsibility over against the systemic 
irresponsibility which Havel saw as sanctioned by the Soviet socio-political 
structure Through an emphasis upon living in truth, Havel ‘pave[d] the way for a 
type of civic participation in which human subjectivity is not sacrificed to politics ’ 
(Mische, 1993: 245) I,ike his intelligentsia forebears, Havel believed that a return 
to personality, to the essential “authentic” identity of the individual could 
overcome the “tyranny of politics”.4
However, though this is tnie of Kolakowski in his dissident writings of the 1950s, after 
coming to the West in the 1960s he began to write of socio-political conflict in terms of being an 
indissoluble ‘part of the human condition ’ (1971b: 45)
' In The U n bearab le  T igh tn ess o f  B eing  (1984), however, Kundcra places the phrase "living in 
truth” within a chapter entitled "Words Misunderstood” Each of the two main characters in that 
chapter has a different conception of what it means to live in truth; for one. it means perfect 
transparency in public and private life; for the other, it means the preservation of a secret space 
in one 's inner life even at the expense of lies and deceptions in the world outside For Havel, the 
two arc not incompatible, as long as the transparency striven for is of a m ora l kind, rather than 
being seen simply as social and political accou n tab ility .
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The public participation of the dissident was not, therefore, first and foremost a 
matter of politics, of gaining power to bring about what were for Havel merely 
‘external’ changes (1987a: 70) in the structure and organisation of society, but 
rather was a matter of the individual’s reclamation of responsibility for his or her 
own self The “function” of the intellectual, if such a thing could be attributed to 
him or her, is not to offer new self-sustaining systemic conceptions of the world 
based upon “universal” science or reason, is not to devise plans or conceptual 
structures which can be superimposed upon living reality, for Havel, 
consciousness should not seek to synthesise or transcend, a la Mannheim, 
diversified existence by accounting for itself in social or political terms Rather, 
reflective practice should be seen as that which returns the existent to itself, is that 
which is ontologically constituted, and thus should seek to recover the lost 
integrity of being of which it itself is the “cause” and the “effect”
In one of his Letters to Olga (1988), Havel spelt out this conception of 
reflective practice:
What in fact are mind, reflection, consciousness?,..[W]e are both 
“somewhat” rooted in Being and “somewhat” outside it, and our mind is 
in fact a kind of bridge that attempts to span that “gap” by substituting, re­
constructing, re-creating what we are not, or what we don’t have, what is 
on the far shore of that “gap”. So though we are only “half’ in Being, yet 
in a sense we are so doubly, wherein through this second “half-being” we 
attempt to replace the loss of the first: perceiving, knowing, appearance, 
understanding, grasping, becoming aware - all o f these are degrees or 
modes of how our “half-Being” strives towards its missing second half, 
strives to re-create it (1988: 328-329)
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In this account, thought and apprehension are transformed from being actively 
creative to being re-creative, re-collective in character. Consciousness becomes 
synonymous with the exercise of conscience, wherein thought is characterised by 
the recognition of responsibility and obligation towards transcendent Being.
Reflecting Being
Havel’s notion of reflection is Kierkegaardian in its identification of a 
transcendent, untotalisable referent for consciousness, and in its anti-Hegelianism 
It is, therefore, worthwhile reviewing briefly Kierkegaard’s conception of a 
reflective practice which was allotted a primary role in reclaiming a transcendent 
ontological and theological foundation for human existence
Reflection, for Kierkegaard, was that which should make that existence more 
inwardly directed Thus, Sartre’s assessment of Kierkegaard’s opposition to 
Hegelian historicism emphasised his objection to the latter’s externalisation or 
objectification of lived experience Sartre writes: ‘[wjhat Kierkegaard opposes in 
Hegel is the fact that for Hegel the tragedy of a particular life is always surpassed 
The lived fades away into knowledge.’ (1963: 9fn) Hegelianism neglected ‘the 
unsurpassable opaqueness of the lived experience’, and though it might have been 
‘aware of the unity of life and consciousness’, these are at the same time 
recognised as ‘incomplete from the point o f view o f the totality.’ (1963: 9fn)
The “present age” was characterised by Kierkegaard as lacking in inwardness 
The Hegelian notion of history as the progressive self-recognition of the Idea in 
reality, of Absolute Mind’s becoming transparent to itself through the historical 
consciousness of individuals in the aggregate, found for Kierkegaard its
200
expression in the “absurd” affirmation of the modem subject as absolute. Such a 
subject acts as Shakespeare’s Coriolanus, ‘As if a man were author of himself’ 
(5.3.36); he takes upon himself responsibility for his own actions, seeking an 
ethical autonomy in and by which those actions may only be judged on terms he 
himself provides This principle of self-authorship, according to which subjects 
encounter only themselves in others, for Kierkegaard is extended into modem 
political organisation, wherein the principles of association and accountability 
dominate. In the public sphere o f institutionally organised opinion and association 
(the press, political parties and social movements, and the like), the individual in 
actuality is reduced to an aggregated abstraction Caught up in the process of 
elaborating the Idea in and through the historical development of public 
institutions, the subject is reflected nut o f itself \ becoming little more than a ‘third 
party’ (1940: 17) to its own life
Thus, the supposed emphasis upon the personal responsibility of the individual 
in the present age for Kierkegaard had led in the contrary direction, that is, to the 
abnegation o f responsibility Publicity, accountability, and the advance of a 
scientific rationality which proclaimed the possibility of making all natural and 
social phenomena transparent to human understanding resulted in the loss of 
unique particularity, the “unsurpassable”, irreducible individuality of the living 
subject. No longer embedded in the unreflected ‘substantial categories’ (1944: 
141) of nationhood, family and religion, cut off from the sphere of essential 
relationship, the modem individual became merely an abstract category, an object 
of knowledge without substantial identity. Such an identity, according to 
Kierkegaard, arises only within a private space, a space ‘inaccessible to every 
living being’ (1944: 155), but accessible to the transcendent truths of God For
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Kierkegaard, to see the end of history as self-revelation, as the revelation of an 
absolute publicity, with all things being known, was patently absurd. For the sake 
of the preservation of an inner life, there needed to be things that could not be 
known to human understanding, which, like God, transcended the possibility of 
knowledge, and which constituted the unreflected pre-existent (ontological) 
foundation of human existence and identity.
In opposition to philosophical idealism’s reduction of life to moments within a 
process of (self-) extemalisation towards an absent totality, Kierkegaard proposed 
a conception of reflective practice as that which reflects the subject back into 
itself. Reflection was not “bad” in itself, but should be employed to other ends 
than those of publicity and scientific enlightenment Hence, Kierkegaard wrote in 
The Present Age. ‘reflection is not of itself something harmful, on the contrary, it 
is necessary to work through it in order that one’s actions should be more 
intensive.’ (1940: 39) Reflection could enable the reclamation of private space by 
the modem subject, but only by becoming reflection upon humanity’s essential 
relationship with a supreme and infinite God. Such religious reflection allowed the 
individual to preserve the “unsurpassable opaqueness” of lived experience, 
because that experience thereby could be known as unknowable, and each 
particular lived moment could be recognised as opening upon a prospect of 
eternity which had yet to be experienced anew in every moment. Reflection, for 
Kierkegaard, should lead always to that which was outside itself - that is, to the 
obscure reality of the inwardness of the subject, to that which is, as Havel put it, 
“on the far shore” of our Being
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The Responsibility of the Intellectual
The idea of the dissident-intellectual as asserted by Havel was one which 
centred upon responsibility - such an intellectual, indeed, for Havel was 
responsible by definition. But this responsibility was seen as at odds with the 
conception which prevailed under totalitarianism. In Communist society 
responsibility was a purely state-political affair, was a matter of responsibility fo r  
the collective welfare as embodied and articulated in official state institutions and 
an official ideology Responsibility had become rigidified in just the kind of 
institutionally organised public sphere which Kierkegaard had rejected as effacing 
the individual subject in favour of an abstract idea of it. The individual had had the 
sense of «'//'-responsibility, of responsibility to something above and beyond the 
self, an inner identity and being, taken away from him or her, and in its stead had 
been given a set of impersonal truths and identifications (those of Class, State or 
Party)
In the Communist Bloc, according to Havel, the responsibility of many 
intellectuals had been of this impersonal, “external” kind Such intellectuals 
identified themselves with an ideology which sought the imposition of universal 
solutions in the name of the people, but which in fact led them to betray the 
people (1995 37) They sought the “utopian” realisation of ideals which, for 
Havel, should remain transcendent:
One must distinguish between, on the one hand, a state of openness 
towards mysteriously changing and always rather elusive and never quite 
attainable ideals such as truth and morality, and, on the other hand, an
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unequivocal identification with a detailed plan for implementing those 
ideals which in the end becomes self-justifying. (1987b: 82)
The utopianism o f such intellectuals resided in their attempt to take responsibility 
for the practical realisation of those areas of human concern which are necessarily 
unrealisable. It is the activities of these intellectuals which have resulted in the 
widespread belief that ‘the intellectual is a biological species dangerous to 
humankind’, and which leads Havel himself to conclude that ‘[w]e should treat 
“utopian intellectuals” with caution’, though at the same time listening to ‘the 
humble, responsible, moral intellectual.’ (1995: 37)
As we will see in the next chapter, such an appeal to humility has become a 
familiar refrain in contemporary discussion of the intellectual, though in many 
cases it has not arisen from the sort of absolute ontology espoused by Havel
Ideology vs. Being
Havel’s criticism of the utopian universalist ideology which, with the co­
operation of intellectuals, spread its ‘tentacles’ into ‘all aspects of life’ in 
Communist society (Tismaneanu, 1992b: 617) stands squarely in the intelligenlsia 
tradition of complaint against systemic explanations of and resolutions for 
characteristically human behaviour and problems In the ‘post-totalitarian system’ 
(1987a: 40) of Communist Czechoslovakia, according to Havel, ideology was all 
embracing, and as such did away with the need for large-scale overt coercion on 
the part of the state. The official Communist ideology provided its citizens with 
the means to live a meaningful life of sorts:
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Ideology is a specious way of relating to the world. It offers human beings 
the illusion of an identity, of dignity, and o f morality, while making it 
easier for them to part with them...It is an excuse that everyone can 
use...the primary excusatory function of ideology , is to provide people, 
both as victims and pillars of the community, with the illusion that the 
system is in harmony with the human order and the order of the universe. 
(1987a: 42-43)
Havel’s conception of ideology as a comprehensive system of ideas and beliefs 
which offers individuals the possibility of finding a meaningful place for 
themselves in the world seems to be very much in accord with a number of other 
important conceptions of the nature and function of ideology. Amongst these, one 
can include Gramsci’s notion of hegemony, as discussed in chapter three, 
Althusser’s structuralist conception, which posits ideology as the concrete means 
in and by which individuals and groups reproduce the totality of social relations 
and identities, and Barthes’ “mythological” conception, according to which 
ideology functions in a discursive or rhetorical manner, as a ‘meta-language’ 
(1973: 115) or mode of representation. In each of these cases, ideology is viewed 
as that which gives specific form and meaning to experience, is seen as a process 
of the social and political formation of necessarily collective identities. Ideology is 
in this sense productive, insofar as it is the ongoing production of a set of social 
narratives in and by which a society seeks to live.
From these points-of-view the ideological, as embodied and articulated within 
social and cultural institutions and practices, is a problem which may be addressed 
in political terms That is to say, it is a matter o f  a political struggle over
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consciousness which is concerned with the identification o f ideological formations 
and meanings, and their displacement by formations and meanings of a universal 
(“scientific-objective”) class character. In short, the particularist “truths” of the 
bourgeoisie are displaced by the universal “truths” o f the working-class. For 
Havel, however, ideology is seen strictly in moral terms; it is dismissed not 
because it normalises or naturalises the oppression and exploitation of one class 
by another but because it debases all human beings, by providing them with a 
false and illusory conception of themselves. Ideology’s crime is against human 
nature or being per se, in that it enables individuals to excuse themselves and shirk 
their fundamental responsibility to themselves and each other
Such a moral and ontological shortfall cannot be addressed politically through 
the development of a consciousness which represents the transformation of 
politics into a science - whether revolutionary or otherwise - but requires the 
recovery of personal conscience 5 Paradoxically it is conscience which opens out 
the individual to a higher, more comprehensive totality, because in and through 
conscience he or she is brought into relationship with the ‘absolute horizon of his 
relations’ (1987a: 142), that is, becomes aware of his or her absolute obligations 
and responsibilities as a human being However, such a relationship, according to 
Havel, is dependent upon the rehabilitation o f ‘the personal experience of the 
human being as the initial measure of things’ (1987a: 149), it is only by “taking
The issue of conscience was central to the criticism  voiced by intellectuals of the Czechoslovak 
regime in the period before the Prague Spring In an address given at the Forth Congress of the 
Czech Writers’ Union in June 1967. Karel Krisik spoke of the indivisibility of reason and 
conscience. Using the fifteenth-century Czech reformer Jan Hus as his example. Kôsik declared 
that if the unity of reason and conscience is lost, 'reason loses substantiality and conscience 
reality Reason without conscience becomes the utilitarian and mechanical reason of 
computation and calculation. Conscience divorced from reason sinks to an impotent inner 
voice, or the variety of good intentions.’ (1973: 28) The idea of conscience as requiring public 
and rational expression was also central to H avel's dissidence
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things personally”, one might say, that it is possible for the individual to oppose to 
the “guiltless” impersonality (1987a: 156) of the post-totalitarian system the 
moral universalism inherent in the assumption of responsibility in living in truth. 
Hence, Havel writes: ‘[w]hat is most dangerous to [the] evil [of impersonal 
power] are not the rockets aimed at this or that state but the fundamental 
negation of this evil in the very structure of contemporary humanity.’ (1987a: 
154) The greatest threat to the powerful lies in those who have transformed their 
existence by placing the ultimate value upon the integrity of their own being and 
personal experience.
The Significance of Sacrifice
Havel’s validation of the personal conscience as that which constitutes the 
foundation of the individual’s interventions in the public sphere of civil society 
may be related to Sartre’s conception of the intellectual as one who “meddles” in 
the affairs of others on the basis of minding his or her own business. Like Sartre, 
for Havel the intellectual’s activity takes on universal significance when the 
intellectual achieves a unity of the personality, that is, unites the self that knows 
with the self that acts, and is thereby enabled to burst the constraints of a 
particularist conditioning. The intellectual’s transcendence of particularity is 
predicated on that particularity itself, it is the consequence of the individual’s 
return into, and reclamation of, the universal foundations within his or her 
particular existence Just as in Sartre the process of research, of scientific 
investigation necessarily involved an existential dimension - the “traversal” of that 
investigation through the self of the researcher - so in Havel the practice of
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knowledge becomes an existential praxis - the elaboration of a life lived in truth. 
Through living his or her life according to the dictates of conscience, the 
individual gains access to a universally valid knowledge and thus provides the 
foundations for a universal identity
The emphasis upon personal responsibility and the agency of conscience within 
Havel’s dissident thought led him to see sacrifice as a key element in the activity 
and identity of the intellectual-dissident.6 Sacrifice was the public affirmation o f 
conscience, it constituted the means by which the transcendent truths of existence, 
the ‘something in the order of being which exceeds all our competence’ (1987a: 
153), could be made the object of a kind of knowledge - that is, by becoming the 
subject-object of a living knowledge. Through the act of sacrifice the individual is 
able ‘personally to guarantee something that transcends him’, and thus “his” life is 
made ‘meaningful ’ (1987a: 152) However, that meaning, indeed, the fact that life 
has meaning, is not confined to the individual alone, for the true significance of 
sacrifice is that it guarantees meaning fo r  all, insofar as the meaning of a sacrifice, 
as affirming transcendent truth and value, must be universal or otherwise be 
meaning/ev.v Conceived in this way, sacrifice becomes almost a form of public 
discourse or mode of communication that provides the existential-epistemological 
grounds upon which a theologically rooted community may be founded.
Of course, sacrifice - the sacrifice of self and of others, the two being 
inseparable - is a strongly influential factor in the constitution of many of the 
“utopian” rationalist intellectuals which Havel identified as a threat to the public
Jan Patocka described the movement around Charter 77 as the ‘solidarity of the shaken and
sacrificed.’ (Tucker, 1993/4: 292)
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weal. The “revolutionary career” written o f by Horkheimer was one of endurance 
of privation, of imprisonment, exile and relentless persecution by the authorities, 
not only for the marked revolutionary or oppositionist but usually for his or her 
family and associates. For the sake of political commitment, the individual was 
prepared to subordinate his or her fate to that of the majority. Thus, in his 
“Revolutionary Catechism” Sergei Nechaev wrote of the revolutionary as just so 
much ‘capital’ to be spent in the service o f the revolution (in Payne, 1964: 26), 
and himself died in one of the Tsar’s prisons in 1882. Trotsky was first imprisoned 
at the age of seventeen and spent much o f the rest of his life in exile or on the 
move. In a speech upon the founding of the Fourth International he declared: 
‘[o]ur party demands each of us, totally and completely. Let the philistines hunt 
their own individuality in empty space For a revolutionary to give himself entirely 
to the party signifies finding himself.’ (1974: 86) At the end of his life, shortened 
after ten years in prison and detention, Gramsci wrote of how he had ‘always 
thought that my individual fate was a subordinate matter’ (1994a: 362), and 
displayed consistently throughout his term o f imprisonment a sense of the public, 
impersonal character and significance of his personal predicament. Hence, in a 
letter written to his wife in 1931 he wrote o f the seeming absence of passion and 
intimacy in his letters: ‘my letters are “public,” not restricted to the two of us, and 
the awareness of this inevitably forces me to curb the explosion of my feelings 
insofar as they are expressed by the words written in these letters ’ (1994a: 111)7
In her book R esista n ce  L itera tu re  (1987) Barbara Harlow writes of the collective character of 
the prison-writings of political detainees, seeing them as a type of collective (auto-)biography. as 
collective documents’ in which the fate of the individual is given a representative significance. 
(1987: 120-121)
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One may point to many other examples of the “revolutionary career”, but the 
intention here is to emphasise the sense of the necessity of sacrificing themselves 
to “something higher” that has prevailed amongst revolutionary intellectuals. 
Trotsky’s language in the above citation parallels that of Havel, in that he sees 
that it is in the giving of oneself to something beyond oneself that it is possible to 
“find” that same self. The revolutionary’s sacrifice, like that of Havel’s dissident, 
acts as a guarantee of a level of truth and value raised above the practical 
everyday. It is the realisation of the idea (the Ideal) in experiential substance, in 
the ethical life of the individual, as sought by Gramsci, as described in chapter 
three.
However, the difference between the dissident and the revolutionary as 
conceived by Havel revolves around the fact that the latter’s sacrifice, the 
consecration of him- or herself to higher ends, is carried out in the name of 
history, and thus represents a “utopian” attempt to realise the universal - the 
inherently unrealisable universal dimension of truth and morality - in concrete 
collective and institutional forms in the ‘human “here and now”.’ (1987a: 99) As 
such, the revolutionary for Havel, as the bourgeois for Sartre, attempts to bring 
that into being which is always becoming For Havel, being cannot be identified in 
any specific concrete entity, unlike history, being has no agent, it cannot be 
‘represented by a maquette of itself..., by an entity among entity, a thing among 
things ’ (1988 363) The act of sacrifice performed in the name o f being is 
therefore not a moment of agency, an act which is intended in the first instance to 
bring about particular historical effects, changes in the social or political order 
Rather, such an act is primarily self-referential, it carries its own “ends” within 
itself - that is, it is an act addressed to the reclamation of a pre-existent universal
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integral identity which is performed in the full knowledge of its ultimate 
inefficacy.
Dissident become President
If the activity o f  the dissident was existential in character, according to Havel, it 
did have political consequences in the circumstances of the post-totalitarian 
system. Thus, in “The Power of the Powerless” he wrote that under such a system 
‘living within the truth has more than a mere existential dimension (returning 
humanity to its inherent nature), or a noetic dimension (revealing reality as it is), 
or a moral dimension (setting an example for others). It also has an unambiguous 
political dimension.’ (1987a: 56-57) Living in truth represented a political 
challenge precisely because it was anft'-political in operation, that is to say, it 
sought the re-foundation of social life on moral and ontological grounds In a 
society totalised under the sign of ideological politics the attempt ‘to put politics 
in its place’ (Konrad, 1984: 92), to substitute moral for political ends, inevitably 
leads to political conflict and opposition. In these circumstances, the intellectual- 
dissident, the antipolitician, in his or her effort to reclaim the fundamental ends of 
intellectual and cultural activity, is seen as interfering in affairs which are not his 
or her concern - in the case of Communist Czechoslovakia, all of the life of state 
and society.
The particular cast of Havel’s dissidence - its grounding in existentialist 
conceptions - made it possible, even necessary, for him to participate in the 
political reconstruction of his country in the aftermath of the 1989 events The
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decision to become president, according to Havel, was much less a matter of cool 
political calculation than of being “pulled forward by Being.” (1992: xvi) It is 
possible for Havel to see the pursuit of a ‘“non-political politics’” as not 
inconsistent with the exercise of power in office (1991: 219) precisely because for 
him the politics of power may be in a very real sense domesticated. Faced with the 
question of how he can reconcile the idea of living in truth and the dictates of 
conscience with his now high office, Havel declares his current political practice 
to be in fact the exercise of civility, with the long-term aim of establishing a 
‘moral and intellectual state ’ (1992: 20) Hence, he writes: ‘[f]rom my political 
ideals, it should be clear enough that what I would like to accentuate in every 
possible way in my practice of politics is culture.’ (1992: 12) Politics in this way 
becomes part of ‘the culture of everyday life’ (1992: 12), is freed from the 
damaging conflicts and moral corruption of parties and partiality; it is no longer 
rooted in the dialectic of history but in the immediacy and essential unity of Being 
Rather than being occupied with collective confrontations over the distribution of 
resources or the priorities of production and consumption, the conduct of politics 
is centred on the nurture and cultivation of the individual human being Politics 
becomes civility by other means, an ongoing cultural process toward self- 
realisation.
Havel’s decision to accept the presidency was consistent with his philosophical 
position because that decision was made by him into an essential moral -  or, life -  
choice. As such, it was not the practical application of a theory or doctrine, a 
specific enactment of an overarching ideological system. For Havel, indeed, the 
practical political effects and significance of dissident antipolitics were specific to 
the Czech situation and should not be worked up into a general ‘doctrine ’
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(1987b: 82) Thus, the purpose of elaborating an existential philosophy of 
dissidence was not to develop an encompassing system of thought adequate to all 
contingent situations but to enable the individual to recognise his or her moral 
responsibility in a given set of circumstances; to enable the individual to make the 
right choice of that (the integrity of Being) which has been already “chosen” for 
him or her.
As represented by the dissident practice of Havel, intellectual reflection -  and in 
what is often regarded as its highest form, philosophy -  is no longer concerned 
with the construction of theories and the manufacture of conceptual and 
methodological tools that permit the intellectual to get beyond particularity and 
the limitations of local truths and values. But this is not simply a matter of the 
displacement of an adherence to universalist perspectives and methods by an 
affiliation to particularity amongst intellectuals. Rather, the conception of 
reflection as enabling a deepening of particularity and the return of the subject 
back into itself must be seen as itself shaped by universalist forces and pressures. 
The intellectual resistance to totalitarianism mounted by Havel was undertaken on 
the basis of a deeper, more extensive totality, that of Being, which exercises a 
moral pull stronger that the merely provisional ideological influence of the 
Communist state. Such a totality is unknowable, in the same way as Sartre’s lived 
experience, but is all the more “real” for that, because thereby it becomes that 
which is brought to life only in acts of faith or belief, rather than requiring rational 
demonstrative proof, which necessarily presupposes its opposite, disproof, and 
hence is always in danger of slipping into partiality, if not outright falsehood
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It is not my contention that Havel’s metaphysical conception of intellectual 
reflection typifies specifically the contemporary intellectual. However, 1 do 
contend that in his emphasis upon the priority of moral-existential over political 
choices and decisions, and upon the acknowledgement of the obligation of the 
intellectual towards the specificity o f the situation as a universal obligation Havel 
may be regarded as representative. The contemporary intellectual is now humble 
in the face of the plurality of identities and worldviews visible in the everyday life 
of society.
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Chapter Six
Symbolic Exchanges? The Intellectual in
Everyday Life
‘[W]e shouldn’t attack the system negatively any more or critically take it to 
task fo r not giving us the cards to play with, because that seems to me entirely 
nostalgic and pessimistic-nihilistic...We have to transform it. fTJhis kind o f 
operation isn ’t exceptional; it isn 7 the preserve o f theorists: you can try and do 
it in thought, but in my opinion people in their Uves do it every day. It's the game 
o f life. ’ (Jean Raudrillard, 1995; 92)
‘Converse or Perish’
In Legislators and Interpreters (1987) Zygmunt Bauman identifies a change 
having taken place in the (self-)conception of the intellectual in the conditions of 
“postmodemity” This latter is characterised, in general terms, as referring to ‘a 
distinct quality of intellectual climate, to a distinctly new meta-cultural stance, to a 
distinct self-awareness o f the era.’ (1987: 119) Central to the postmodern sense is 
a consciousness of the ending of what Bauman elsewhere calls ‘the audacious 
dream of modernity’ (1992: 179) - that is, a sense of the historically and culturally 
specific nature of the modernist “project” of imposing a universal order upon a 
spontaneous, chaotic Nature, and upon other societies and cultures, which in 
relation to the forces o f modernity become part of Nature, as primitive and 
mdimentary in character For Bauman, the modem(ist) state (the state being itself 
an essential constituent o f  modernity) was one modelled upon horticultural, 
therapeutic and architectural paradigms, seeking to manage Nature and natural 
spaces and phenomena in accord with universal principles of use, health and 
proportion (1992: 178-179, 1987: ch.2) Postmodemity, on the other hand, 
constitutes, if not the “return” of Nature, at least an acknowledgement that 
modernity’s confident elevation of itself above that which it sought to control and 
to dominate was largely illusory; that the self of modernity could not be easily 
separated out from the life o f the other which was its object.
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Modernity, as essentially managerial and interventionist, and as universalist in 
orientation, was, according to Bauman, predicated upon the unequal relationship- 
paradigm of tutor and tutee, leader and led More particularly, with regard to the 
practice and status of intellectuals, it called upon the latter to assume a legislative 
social function, to deploy their accumulated knowledge and culture in such a way 
as to establish universal rules and criteria for the judgement of truth and beauty, in 
the process laying the grounds for their own authority and for the authority of 
those who can demonstrate their reflexive mastery of such rules and procedures 
Thus, Bauman writes:
The typically modem strategy of intellectual work is one best 
characterised by the metaphor of the ‘legislator’ role It consists of making 
authoritative statements which arbitrate in controversies of opinions and 
which select those opinions which, having been selected, become correct 
and binding The authority to arbitrate is in this sense legitimized by 
superior (objective) knowledge to which intellectuals have a better access 
than the non-intellectual part of society Access to such knowledge is 
better thanks to procedural rules which assure the attainment of truth, the 
arrival at valid moral judgement, and the selection of proper artistic taste 
(1987: 4-5)
The legislative intellectuals’ role was to legitimate the universalist modem 
order not by becoming ideologists - that is, purveyors of specific points-of-view, 
social or political orthodoxies which explicitly endorse the rule of the dominant 
class - but by securing the sovereignty of objective procedures and criteria, which 
enabled “correct and binding” choices to be made from amongst the various
216
versions of the truth Such intellectuals, through their elaboration of universal 
Reason, provided the basis for the unification of politics, morality and culture. In 
each sphere, the rational, universalisable character of an action or phenomenon 
became the measure of its value.
The transition to postmodemity, however, and thus to the predominance of a 
new self-awareness on the part of societies and cultures - an awareness, indeed, of 
the plurality of forms of social and cultural life -  has, according to Bauman, 
brought a new type of intellectual, a new intellectual function into being - the 
interpreter For Bauman,
The typically post-modem strategy of intellectual work is one best 
characterized by the metaphor of the ‘interpreter’ role. It consists of 
translating statements, made within one communally based tradition, so 
that they can be understood within the system o f knowledge based on 
another tradition. Instead of being orientated towards selecting the best 
social order, this strategy is aimed at facilitating communication between 
autonomous (sovereign) participants (1987: 5)
In the interpretive role the intellectual is concerned above all with the act of 
communication, rather than tuition, with facilitation, rather than selection. In 
postmodern philosophical and social thought community is the ‘central concept.’ 
(1987: 145), according to such thought, there is no longer a singular “way things 
are”, or a social order towards which all should aspire and for which they should 
work, but rather, a plurality of communities and traditions, a differentiated set of 
social and cultural belongings and identities Community ‘has come to replace
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reason and universal truth, and the one method leading to both’ (1987: 145) as 
that in which contemporary society seeks its meanings, and upon which 
intellectuals hope to find a foundation for their role The new world, as 
represented in postmodern thought, ‘is cut to human size, homely, cosy, 
comfortable like a family home Like Marx’s moths, we are attracted by the light 
of the candle on the family table one the universal sun fades ’ (1987: 145)
This resurgence of domesticity within social and cultural thought finds its 
embodiment in the characteristic activity of interpretive intellectuals as outlined by 
Bauman The task of such intellectuals is to deploy their specialist ‘discursive 
skills’ in order to enter into ‘civilized conversation’ with their counterparts rooted 
in other ‘cultural traditions.’ (1987: 143) It is up to these intellectuals now to 
apply themselves to the problems of translation across the divides of pluralism and 
socio-cultural specificity Grouped together around their respective family tables, 
the intellectuals are called upon ‘[t]o talk to people rather than fight them’, to 
draw upon the experiences and traditions of others, rather than shutting off the 
flow o f ideas (1987: 143) For ‘the art of civilized conversation is something the 
pluralist world needs badly It may neglect such art only at its peril Converse or 
perish’ (1987: 143)
It is the intellectuals’ own tradition, their specialisation in the ways and means 
of discursive exchange, which prepares them for such a task But this recognition 
prompts a further recognition on the part of Bauman of a potential source of 
tension or conflict in the exercise of one or the other intellectual role. For 
intellectuals are members and participants both within their own community - that 
is, that of the intellectuals, professional practitioners of knowledge, per se - and 
within wider communities grouped around specific ethnic, cultural, sexual
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identities, and the like According to Bauman, in order to retain effectiveness 
acting as a member of these latter communities as an interpretive intellectual, it is 
the intellectuals’ ‘right’, even their ‘duty’ (1987: 145) to maintain the legislative 
function with regard to their own tradition ‘While the postmodern strategy entails 
the abandonment of the universalistic ambitions of the intellectuals’ own tradition, 
it does not abandon the universalistic ambitions of the intellectuals towards their 
own tradition ’ (1987: 5) In the latter instance, intellectuals are obliged to secure 
‘the dominion of reason’ and ‘the survival of certainty’ (1987: 145) on the basis 
of the demonstrative force of their work, which carries within it a universalising 
impetus Outside of that work, however, outside of the fields of expertise, the 
disciplines, the professional community, the intellectuals act to foster a non­
totalising discourse, do not seek to impose their ideas upon others, but act as 
modest citizens.
There is, therefore, a distinction to be made within the intellectuals’ activity, 
between ‘the intrinsic (intra-communal) and extrinsic (inter-communal) role of the 
intellectuals.’ (1987: 146) The problem is, though, as Bauman acknowledges, 
where does one community begin and another end? How does one determine 
communal boundaries and thus determine the intellectual mode (legislative or 
interpretive) appropriate in any particular situation? Without the possibility of 
appealing to an independent authority with the powers of socio-cultural 
arbitration, such boundaries would seem only to be determinable through such 
legislative action as, so Bauman tells us, is appropriate in an ri/rra-communal 
context But in fixing limits the intellectual are also acting /w/er-communally,
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because in so doing they are fixing limits for others not of the community. 
Intellectuals are thereby pre-empting judgement.
Thus, the distinction drawn between intrinsic and extrinsic activity, between the 
two roles of the intellectual as authority and citizen may in actuality be impossible 
to sustain, because the two faces o f  the intellectual - one turned inwards, towards 
the characteristic problems and procedures of his or her work, the other turned 
outwards, towards the world at large - are not in fact distinguishable. This is 
tacitly acknowledged within Bauman’s argument, in that there the community 
which the intellectual may be said to  be inside of (and thus in which he or she may 
fulfil a legislative function) seems to  slip between the homogeneous community or 
tradition of the professional intellectuals, and an heterogeneous community of 
shared meanings and identity - a national, class or ethnic community, for instance
As Bauman says, the boundaries o f a community are difficult to locate, and this 
difficulty seems to extend into his own argument This may be, one might say, 
because the specific cultural identity of the intellectual - his or her membership of 
a particular social group - is simultaneously the source or foundation for his or her 
identity as an intellectual, but is also that which he or she attempts to overcome in 
intellectual practice. The individual who works within a particular field, and the 
individual who lives in the outside world with others are inseparable.
A World of Difference
Such a statement, however, finds little agreement in the thought of Richard 
Rorty, to whose work 1 want now to turn. I choose to look at Rorty because he 
has made the question of the public status and social function (or the lack of both)
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of the philosopher central to his thought, and in so doing, he continues the debate, 
in different terms, about the nature of the most appropriate mode of activity for 
the contemporary intellectual
For Rorty, the function of the contemporary philosopher is most decidedly not 
public or social in character In an essay on Foucault, he devises an answer for the 
latter to the questions ‘“Where do you stand? What are your values?’” :
“I stand with you as a fellow-citizen, but as a philosopher, I stand off by 
myself, pursuing projects of self-invention which are none of your 
concern I am not about to offer philosophical grounds for being on your 
side in public affairs, for my philosophical project is a private one which 
provides neither motive nor justification for my political actions.” (1991: 
198)
The trouble with Foucault, Rorty tells us, is that he succumbed to the temptation 
‘to find a public, political counterpart’ (1991: 196) for his private search for 
autonomy Instead, he should have attempted to separate one from the other, 
avoiding the effort to provide a universal political foundation for his private 
“projects of self-invention”
This emphasis upon separation, this rejection of a foundational role for 
philosophers echoes Bauman’s distinction between citizen and professional 
Moreover, in his assertion that ‘we stop assuming the function of the intellectual 
is radical criticism of existing institutions’ (1992: 5), Rorty endorses the 
declaration made by Baudrillard cited at the head o f this chapter Such a radical 
critique, according to Rorty, constitutes ‘an unfortunate residue of the scientistic 
conception of philosophy’ (1991: 25), wherein philosophy is seen ‘as penetrating 
to a reality behind contemporary appearances’ (1991 25) Intellectuals - and
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especially intellectuals of the Left - have thus viewed philosophy as being 
essentially social and political in character, because its proper function is to yield 
certain knowledge of the functioning of society at its roots
Over against this conception, Rorty situates the intellectual within the details of 
everyday life, within the private sphere of ‘the different sorts of little things 
around which individuals or communities center their fantasies and their lives.’ 
(1989: 93) Again, this insertion of the intellectual into the community takes up 
Bauman’s emphasis upon the “civil” interpretive role of the intellectual But 
Rorty’s version has a more explicit existential or experiential emphasis than that 
of Bauman. The intellectual retains no legislative professional authority upon 
which his or her interpretive function can be built Rather, the intellectual as 
envisaged by Rorty engages, in accord with Baudrillard, in “the game of life”. His 
or her characteristic activity is strangely reminiscent of that of Sartre and Havel 
described in the last chapter; it is concerned not with illuminating a pre-existent 
reality but with deepening and widening the experience o f the individual. The 
intellectual does not seek to uncover the existence of ‘one general common 
reality’ (1989: 94), which can provide the basis for a universal human identity, but 
seeks to describe, hath in his nr her life and work, a plurality of realities
The Liberal Ironist
The scientistic philosophy of the liberal-humanist culture o f modernity is seen 
by Rorty as “metaphysical”, insofar as it is predicated on the idea that there is a 
reality “out there” which exists independently of our attempts to describe it, and 
about which we seek to find the “truth” In his conception of a “post-philosophy”, 
however, Rorty argues that science should give way to literature as that upon
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which the philosophical enterprise should centre. Whereas the ‘liberal 
metaphysician’ of modernity looks to explain human behaviour by referring to a 
universal level of ‘moral motivation - rationality, or the love of God, or the love 
of truth’, the ‘liberal ironist’ is possessed only of a ‘skill at imaginative 
identification’, which enables him or her to describe and re-describe the plurality 
and variety of “little things” which give meaning to individual and communal lives 
(1989: 93) The ironist is a thoroughgoing textualist because he or she thinks of 
words as referring to nothing beyond themselves, and thus as infinitely open to 
rearrangement. Whereas the metaphysical thinkers of modernity try to make their 
scientistic philosophical vocabularies stand as the foundations for social 
arrangements and political systems, the liberal ironist seeks to sensitise his or her 
own vocabulary to a plurality of other vocabularies in such a way as to enable him 
or her to notice suffering when it occurs, and to be aware and tolerant of 
differences (1989: 93)
Like Bauman, in the figure of the liberal ironist Rorty offers a modest, scaled- 
down conception of the intellectual’s role. The ironist does not seek to perform a 
public function, legislating a rational social order into being, but instead, equipped 
with an ironic self-awareness of the contemporary intellectual’s limitations, the 
fact that he or she has no access to a privileged “final vocabulary”, enters into 
multiplicitous private conversations with other cultures and traditions. The 
philosopher has metamorphosed into the “literate” interpreter of often 
incommensurate private vocabularies; his or her task is not to make the world 
transparent to one and all but to complicate, to complexify our experience of that 
world by exposing it to a whole variety of different experiences. ‘Within a liberal 
metaphysical culture’, Rorty writes,
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the disciplines which were charged with penetrating behind the many 
private appearances to the one general common reality - theology, science, 
philosophy - were the ones which were expected to bind human beings 
together, and thus to eliminate cruelty Within an ironist culture, by 
contrast, it is the disciplines which specialize in thick description of the 
private and idiosyncratic which are assigned the job. In particular, novels 
and ethnographies which sensitize one to the pain of those who do not 
speak our language must do the job which demonstrations of a common 
human nature were supposed to do (1989: 94)
In place of a penetrative scientistic theory, which “liquidates the particularity” of 
its objects, Rorty elevates a multifarious cultural practice which respects the 
integrity of its objects, which allows them to retain their differentiated, irreducible 
character, and which thus erases the boundaries between self and other, subject 
and object The narratives of an “ironist culture” are multi-layered and multi­
dimensional, replete with a diversity of experience, as such, they are acts of 
collective self-creation
However, in describing such a practice of self-creation, Rorty makes clear that 
he is talking of an ideal liberal society, and points out that this might only be 
achieved on the back of minimum social, political and economic conditions Such 
a society would he held together by a ‘social glue’ which consisted in ‘little more 
than a consensus that the point of social organization is to let everybody have a 
chance at self-creation to the best of his or her abilities, and that that goal 
requires, beside peace and wealth, the standard “bourgeois freedoms”.’ (1989: 84)
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Within the ideal liberal society would prevail the belief not in a metaphysical, 
transcendent guarantee for current social arrangements but a more modest, 
pragmatic and contingent awareness of their efficacy. Such a belief would be 
based on ‘nothing more profound’ than the evidence of history that ‘something 
like the institutions of bourgeois liberal society’ provide the most favourable 
context for people to go about their private business of self-creation (1989: 84- 
85) People do not need intellectuals to perform a “public service” of criticism and 
justification, they do not need them to create grandiose conceptual or ideological 
systems which are able to explain all social phenomena Bourgeois liberal society, 
for Rorty, has already developed institutional instruments and structures sufficient 
to the tasks of public life, understood as balancing competing requirements for 
economic and civil opportunities. What are needed in this respect are only 
suggestions for practical, concrete schemes and programmes towards which those 
institutional resources should be put. Innovative and creative activity, the 
questioning, ironic activity o f the autonomous intellectual, in the ideal liberal 
society is re-located within the private sphere, but at the same time, paradoxically, 
becomes that which is a source of ‘social hope’, rather than providing the 
consolations o f ‘private perfection ’ (1989 94) In this ideal society, the public, as 
the sphere of social and political legitimation, is no longer required, and it is the 
private which provides collective, communal meanings
Intellectuals and Sentiment
Rorty’s identification of the social significance of private acts in one respect is 
consonant with Havel’s notion of dissident activity Indeed, in his article “The 
Intellectuals at the F.nd of Socialism” (1992), Rorty writes very approvingly of
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Havel’s example in being prepared ‘to go all the way in substituting groundless 
hope for theoretical insight’, in ‘emphasizing] his lack of interest in underlying 
forces and historical trends.’ (11) However, as in the case of Foucault, Rorty is 
perturbed by Havel’s adherence to a quasi-Heideggerian ontological 
foundationalism, by his notion of existential revolution and his need for an 
unimaginable other (1992: 15) In holding to these, Havel persists in the activity 
of radical critique, only substituting ‘Heideggerian vacuity for Marxist vacuity’ 
(1992: 15), and thus persists in interfering in what, as an intellectual, shouldn’t 
concern him.
In considering the charge levelled at Havel of pursuing the metaphysical fallacy, 
however, one may raise the question of how he could have managed to act as he 
did without a foundation in a level of reality at least some way “above” the purely 
contingent Furthermore, one may then go on to ask how sufficient continuing the 
“conversation of humankind” itself might be for providing a basis for even the sort 
of contingent, pragmatic action required to bring a more equitable, more decent 
liberal society into being
These are questions which Rorty puts to himself, responding to objections that 
the “social glue” binding a society together necessarily needs a metaphysical 
“thickening agent” in order to provide itself with “moral motivation”. (1989: 85) 
He answers these objections by pointing to the general irrelevance of systematic 
philosophical beliefs to the practical, everyday conduct of societies, as evinced in 
the decline of religion and religious viewpoints in the nineteenth-century For 
Rorty, ‘[t]he idea that liberal societies are bound together by philosophical beliefs 
seems to me ludicrous What binds societies together are common vocabularies 
and common hopes The vocabularies are, typically, parasitic on the hopes.’
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(1989: 86) Hence, what Rorty argues for is an idea o f sentiment as central to the 
organisation and functioning of society. People do not need grand theoretical 
schemes to give them a reason to hope, or to care about the future of the society 
in which they live, such hope, according to Rorty, is the very substance of what it 
means to live and to give a meaning to living, as an individual and as a member of 
a particular community, within society Hope does not need to be grounded 
because it itself constitutes the ground for the stories we create for ourselves 
about our lives
The difficulties in privileging sentiment in such a way are manifest. Chief 
among these, and crucial with regard to this discussion, is, as Norman Geras 
points out, that sentiment is an unreliable variety of social cement, that its 
‘objects can be very particular’, and that exposure to the fact of the communality 
of sentiments (that different peoples, though they should be recognised as 
different, share the same hopes for their children, are liable to suffer humiliation, 
just as we are, when their differences aren’t recognised) provides an insubstantial 
basis for positive ‘moral and practical commitment ’ (1995' 98) It may be possible 
that feeling may supply us with the necessary basis for identifying with others - 
feeling ourselves attached to a particular community or tradition in and by which 
our individual lives are given greater experiential depth - and it may be the case 
that through specialising in “imaginative identification” intellectuals could become 
the purveyors of “social hope”, making available the cultural resources for as wide 
a solidarity as humanly possible, though stopping short o f  humanity as a whole 
(see Geras, 1995: 76-77), However, it seems likely that in order to act against a 
dominant - an exclusively dominant - tradition - a tradition which represents itself 
as the inevitable product of history - it would be necessary for an individual to
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step beyond the contingency of sentiment and to find a reason to act Or better, it 
would be necessary for such an individual to become convinced, in the face 
usually of moral, legal and physical opposition, that they must act as they do. As 
with Gramsci and with Havel, contingent feeling is united in such instances with a 
universalist component sustained in reflection.
Rorty’s avowed concern is with the functioning and potential of liberal societies 
specifically, and with the place of the intellectual in such societies. Moreover, 
insofar as he attempts to practise just the sort of pluralist interpretive intellectual 
activity that is so often recommended in his work, it may seem unfair to tax him 
with not trying to provide general moral or political formulations which are valid 
across a whole range of incommensurable traditions. For Rorty, after all, this 
should not be the affair of the liberal intellectual; like Havel, he believes that the 
trouble with intellectuals lies precisely in their attempt to prescribe universal 
solutions to concrete problems Intellectuals should give up on their pretensions 
to curing social and political ills by means of scientistic elixirs
However, as I argued in the last chapter, Havel’s attack on rationalist 
universalism was carried out on the basis of a higher, more comprehensive 
universalism, one ontological and religious in character For Havel, like Rorty, the 
primary focus of the intellectual’s activity should not be the public sphere, but for 
the former the intellectual’s task was to provide an alternative foundation for civil 
life in a society in which the official public sphere reached down into all aspects of 
everyday life For Rorty, on the other hand, the rejection of a foundational role for 
the intellectual in public life signifies the rejection of any foundational role. The 
public is not that which needs to be resisted but should simply be left to itself,
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there is no need to provide alternatives because in its basic structure the liberal 
public sphere provides the institutional and conceptual wherewithal for an 
equitable society
The universal character of liberal society is revealed in the fact that it no longer 
has a viable alternative to itself in toto. The “superiority” of liberalism for Rorty 
resides not in its offering positive solutions to social and political problems but in 
its potential for providing a conceptual and institutional framework within which a 
plurality of alternative ways of life and of conceiving the world may be chosen 
and lived. This “fact” of liberalism’s universalism is taken for granted by Rorty, 
and constitutes the foundation of his anti-foundationalism. The liberal 
intellectual’s role need no longer be one of working in public to gain universal 
legitimacy for particular social or political arrangements because that “game” has 
already been played out, and won, in liberal democracies To seek to find a 
justification for the activity of the intellectual in terms of a game all the moves in 
which have already been made is no more than mere nostalgia and repetition The 
issue for Rorty is thus not so much about doing without the foundations for a just 
society, but rather recognising that we already have grounds sufficient to our 
social and political purposes The task, then, becomes for him one of persuading 
intellectuals to give up their grand justificatory projects in order to focus upon the 
details of everyday private life
Life Politics and Reflexivitv
In the political sociology and social theory of Anthony Giddens and Alberto 
Melucci there has been an effort to identify a politics specific to complex
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contemporary liberal societies, which focuses upon the centrality of a reflexive 
politics o f life in such societies The vocabulary, the specific cluster of meaningful 
terms, is different to that employed by Rorty, or by Bauman, but there is a 
commensurate concern with the specific place and function of reflexive 
consciousness in societies characterised by pluralism and a high degree of 
institutionalised reflexivity The reference in the work of these theorists is not to a 
multiplicity of communities or traditions but to a plurality of internally referential 
systems (institutional and experiential in make-up) which compose individual and 
social life - moments of the simultaneously personal and social-structural 
elaboration of (and between) the self and society
Giddens writes of the development within “late modernity” of the seifs 
becoming a ‘reflexive project’ (1991: 215); the life of the individual is seen from 
this perspective, as it is by Rorty, as a narrative to be constructed, a story to be 
told by the individual in and through the socially available identifications he or she 
chooses The extension of “abstract systems”, systems of socially structured 
and/or institutionally organised knowledge, into areas o f life formerly beyond such 
systems has made them now subject to social control and intervention The 
external “facts” of Nature - the natural environment, animal and human biology, 
human psychology - have been incorporated into internally referential systems. 
The managerial interventionism which Bauman considers characteristic of the 
modernist reflexive or intellectual mode, adverted to above, for Giddens has been 
extended to all areas of what becomes only nominally “personal” life Such life 
can no longer be unequivocally regarded as ours alone, the repository of an 
authentic self The boundaries between personality and impersonality, between 
social and individual action have dissolved. Or rather, these boundaries are npw
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seen as fluid and as fixed by self-reflexive (and hence also socially reflexive) 
decisions.
Like critics of mass society such as those of the Frankfurt School, Giddens 
identifies the dangers of increased anomie and of an increasingly centralised 
control over all aspects of individual lives as consequent upon the extension of 
internally referential systems. (1991: 224) There is the potential within late 
modernity for the hyper-socialisation of the individual self, whereby that self 
becomes little more than the reflex of forces beyond itself, and in the process of 
self-identity in fact perpetuates self-domination However, the expansion of 
institutional-systemic structures and centralising forces across the whole terrain of 
personal and social life is seen as a two-way process, opening the way for new 
opportunities for action on the part of individuals Thus, for Melucci, mass 
education and the wholesale introduction of civil and political rights, rather than 
simply leading to the incorporation of individuals into the dominant culture, or 
securing the unchallengeable domination of elite politics and ideologies, have led 
to new possibilities for social and political action (1989 113) Giddens writes of 
the ‘globalising influences [which] intrude deeply into the reflexive project of the 
self (1991: 214) as thereby connecting the person and the planet - events which 
take place, and conditions which inhere, at one level have an effect upon, and a 
significance for, events and conditions at the other Power, a la Foucault, is seen 
by Giddens to be generative, not merely the exercise of domination o f  masses by 
an elite group but the very means by which all groups, all members o f a society 
create meanings for themselves
In the contemporary reflexive order, in which the production and reproduction 
of the social order is dependent upon reflexive activity, self and society are
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interdependent, and both become subject to choice. One can choose the sort of 
life one leads according to the sort of person one judges oneself to be from 
amongst the repertoire of socially available identities, or, in Rortean terms, one 
can sort amongst the multiplicity of vocabularies current within society in order to 
increase one’s imaginative capacity, and thus to create one’s individuality
However, this scenario of choice is also dependent upon the establishment of 
boundaries or limits between the self and the social world. If we are now capable 
of choosing, o f  actualising ourselves, we are also in danger of being swamped by 
rapidly changing conditions and experiences. It is, therefore, necessary to ensure a 
continuity of identity, of life-narrative Melucci writes of ‘[t]he fragile hinge 
between inner and outer’, the individual’s reflexive capacity, which acts as ‘the 
meeting point between the internal and external signals that the individual must 
decode in order to situate him- or herself in relation to changes within that 
individual and in his or her interactions with the world ’ (1989: 117) It is the 
individual who sets his or her own boundary between inner and outer experience, 
who acts as his or her own “gatekeeper”, in order to ensure the continuity and 
coherence of ‘[t]he narrative of self-identity’ in ‘rapidly changing circumstances 
on a local and global scale ’ (Giddens, 1991 215)
The fixing and reflexive sustenance of boundaries and divisions between 
different sectors of experience constitutes an intrinsic part of what Giddens terms 
“life politics” The politics of life is concerned with the conditions that enable us 
to make choices within our everyday lives However, for both Giddens and 
Melucci, the sphere of life-choices which such a politics seeks to expand and 
enable is moral-existential in character Giddens speaks of the era of life politics
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as that which sees the ‘return of the institutionally repressed’, and as marked by 
the ‘remoralising of social life ’ (1991: 224) Melucci writes of the limits of 
conventional institutional politics and identifies an essentially existential space in 
which are present ‘structures and interests which precede, delimit and condition 
politics ’ (1989: 167) It is within this space that the “rights of everyday life”, 
rights to autonomy ‘relating to space, time, birth and death’ (1989: 173), can be 
identified, and the freedom to be and the right to difference (1989: 177-178) 
reflexively guaranteed. It is thus this space which is the sphere o f life-political 
action: action which enables individuals to guarantee an autonomous space within 
their selves and lives which is free from external necessities and pressures, and 
which, in turn, situates the preservation of such freedom at the heart of social life.
Social Movements and the Intellectual
In their re-introduction of a moral-existential dimension into politics and 
society, their general conception of reflexive practice as existentially- and morally- 
directed, Giddens and Melucci articulate in sociological terms a concern with the 
sphere of “fundamental ends” and “core values” which has been articulated in the 
discourse of the intellectual This connection is made more explicit, in terms of the 
intellectual in relation to so-called “new social movements”, in the work of Ron 
F.yerman and Andrew Jamison I will come to some of this work below, but first 1 
want to consider social movements from the perspective of their knowledge 
practice
The new social movements - the green and women’s movements, those centred 
upon issues o f race and sexuality - are often characterised as being concerned with
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“making the personal political”, that is, in less sloganeering fashion, with 
elaborating a politics of everyday life. They articulate “qualitative”, “post- 
material”, rather than simply “quantitative” concerns, and are typically gathered 
around issues of identity and choice, and the creation of an alternative life-politics. 
They incorporate ‘everyday cultural and personal as well as material concerns’ 
(Boggs, 1986: 47) within their political purview Insofar as they try to articulate 
the personal and impersonal aspects of social life, the new movements are centred 
upon the moral-existential implications and ends of politics, and upon the 
relationship between experience and knowledge.
As examples of this latter emphasis, one may look to the focus within the green 
and women’s movements upon questions o f knowledge, of consciousness, and 
upon producing kinds of knowledge based upon experiences hitherto ignored or 
not valued For its part, the green movement has often affirmed intuitive, even 
mystical modes of understanding as either a necessary supplement to, if not a 
replacement for, a too rule-bound, instrumentalist scientific rationality. And 
feminists have taken the latter to task for its pretension to a fundamentally 
patriarchal omniscience, its representation of itself as wholly disengaged and thus 
as originating nowhere, rather than somewhere, as unlocalisable, rather than 
situated, as disembodied, rather than embodied in a specific community’s 
experience and understanding of the world (see Haraway, 1988)
For Hilary Wainwright, the epistemological innovation which has taken place 
within such social movements constitutes a large part of their significance, and 
provides the basis for, and necessitates further elaboration of, a politics o f 
knowledge She writes ‘social movement activists, in much of their more 
innovative practice, have pioneered an approach to knowledge which, like Hayek,
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appreciates its practical and tacit aspects but, unlike Hayek, treats these and its 
theoretical aspects as social products ’ (1994: 13) These tacit and practical 
aspects of knowledge, those elements of knowledge attached to ‘the particular 
circumstance of time and place’ (Hayek, 1949: 80), the ‘personal’ dimensions of 
knowledge (Polanyi, 1967: 20), for Hayek demonstrated the limitations of a 
scientific objectivity which arrogated to itself the capacity to explain and to make 
clear all social, and especially economic, phenomena Within the sphere of the 
economy, individuals showed themselves as able to act, and to act correctly, with 
only the partial and practical knowledge peculiar to the specific circumstances of 
time and place (1949: 86) To act effectively, one did not need to aspire to a total 
knowledge of society and its functioning but only exploit one’s practical 
knowledge of one’s situation
Within social movements, according to Wainwright, there has been an emphasis 
upon the experiential, necessarily situated character of knowledge which is similar 
to that of Hayek “Informal” and affective modes of understanding, such as 
intuition and kinds o f awareness issuing from a felt sense of identity, previously 
relegated to the realm of the merely “subjective”, for Wainwright are recognised 
and valued as legitimate sources of knowledge within social movement practice 
However, unlike Hayek, rather than seeing this recognition of the situatedness of 
knowledge as invalidating a knowledge o f society, knowledge practice within 
social movements preserves the possibility of an experiential, “subjective” 
knowledge which is simultaneously theoretical and “objective” The challenge for 
a politics of knowledge based upon the experience of social movements is not to 
sink into an extreme individualism which entails calling off the search for a social 
account of social phenomena but to develop a pluralistic, differentiated and
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practical, but still fundamentally collectivist, theory of society and its functioning 
If, for Wainwright, ‘the existence of different forms of being requires different 
kinds of knowing’ (1994: 104), that pluralistic state of affairs does not negate the 
objective validity of each of the latter, for each is objective in relation to the 
various forms of the former.
Wainwright’s conception of a politics of knowledge deriving from social 
movement knowledge practice in many respects continues the concerns and the 
theoretical-methodological aspirations of Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge 
As seen in the opening chapter, Mannheim attempted to articulate a sociology - a 
cultural sociology - that incorporated the particularity and partiality of experiential 
modes of understanding into a synthetic-structural mode of thought For 
Mannheim, experience was already theoretical, and thus at least potentially 
generalisable Informal knowledge - incomplete knowledge - could provide the 
basis for a new kind of synthetic objectivity which was objective to the degree 
that it acknowledged its relational character and reflected partiality back into 
itself
However, though Mannheim (and Scheler) acknowledged the legitimacy, the 
productive character of “non-rational”, practical, situated modes of thought 
(Weltanschauungen, ideologies) as that upon which a sociology could be built, he 
still treated them as that which had to be overcome. The intellectual-as-social- 
scientist, as dynamic synthesist, was the figure assigned to this task But 
ultimately this resulted in the splitting off of theory, or, the level of theory (that is, 
social science) from the level of practice It was Mannheim’s intention to get 
beyond the Marxist idea of politics as “preparation for insurrection”, as
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necessarily activist, but in the process he ended up presenting a synthetic and 
distanced political science as the only legitimate form of political practice.
In contrast to Mannheim sociology, Wainwright’s politics of knowledge is not 
intended as a synthesis within a scientific consciousness of experiential and 
situated knowledges but is seen as elaborated within the collective political 
practice of specific social activists Moreover, Wainwright does not make the 
intellectual per se - that is, as a distinct social identity - central to her conception 
of knowledge politics. But, in her discussion of the women’s movement she does 
situate feminist activists within the context of the tradition of the intellectual: 
‘[t]he women’s movement, especially in the West, is in an historically rare 
position: the majority of its activists combine the position of being part of the 
intelligentsia, with the tools and confidence for public critical reasoning, and being 
themselves part of an oppressed group.’ (1994: 138)
One of the strengths of the women’s movement, according to this account, is 
that in it there is no longer a “gap” of representation between the individual who 
suffers and the individual who protests; the individual who experiences and the 
individual who thinks are one and the same. Thus, the intellectual fulfils the 
criteria expressed in the Foucauldian conception discussed in the previous 
chapter, she (most definitely a “she”) is specifically situated as a member of an 
identifiable social group with a very real experience of social struggle, and has 
found a voice for herself which enables her to speak from and about that 
experience Unlike the peasants of Marx’s Eighteenth Brumaire, the women who 
participate in the women’s movement no longer have to be represented but 
represent themselves theoretically and organisationally Their modes of life and 
thought are identical
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C o g n i t i v e  P r a x i s
In their work on social movements, largely concerned with the green 
movement, Eyerman and Jamison, like Wainwright, also place movement activists 
within the context of the tradition of the intellectual. They are, however, more 
directly concerned with re-inventing the intellectual identity as a type of key social 
actor. They make the creation of intellectuals a core activity o f the new social 
movements, drawing upon Melucci’s and Giddens’ ideas about the reflexive 
formation of social identities, and Habermas’ conception of knowledge interests.
Eyerman and Jamison originate the concept of “cognitive praxis” to describe 
the reflexive activity carried on within social movements. Like Wainwright’s 
politics of knowledge, this is seen as a process whereby activists produce 
knowledges, ideas and ideals, and forms of consciousness through their 
participation in movements For Eyerman and Jamison, this process constitutes 
the key significance of social movements: ‘it is our claim that a social movement 
is its cognitive praxis, that is what distinguishes one movement from another, but 
also, and more importantly, what gives a social movement its significance for 
broader social processes (1991: 54) The social movements, as ‘temporary public 
spaces’ (1991: 4), are places where new norms and new identities arising from 
particular collective experiences (primarily experiences of oppression) can be tried 
out and contested over.
Such an idea of the social movement is in accord with a Habermasian 
conception of the public sphere as an institutional and quasi-institutional space 
where specific knowledge interests are articulated for the purpose of achieving 
legitimacy One may also compare F.yerman’s and Jamison’s idea of the social
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movement as a ‘cognitive territory’ (1991: 55) with Bauman’s notion of the 
intellectual as a ‘spot’ on the social terrain (1987: 19) where an identity is located, 
for dominion over which a variety of individuals and groups compete. The social 
movement is important as a public space where ‘everyday’ and ‘professional’ 
knowledges (1991: 52) are brought together, through cognitive praxis, in 
dialectical relation It is the intellectuals who, ‘as historical actors,...make visible’ 
that praxis (1991: 44) That is to say, it is the intellectuals who work within the 
spaces opened up for them by movements, by exploiting the opportunities which 
become available for new roles and identities, thereby giving existential (personal- 
biographical) substance and force to the “deep-structural” (1991: 44) extra- 
personal cognitive currents - or, in Habermasian terms, knowledge interests 
(1991 54, 68-69) - active within a movement
In this conception of the intellectual’s role in the social movement Eyerman and 
Jamison relate closely to Mills’ vision of the sociological intellectual as formulated 
in The Sociological Imagination, which, as we saw in chapter four, depicted the 
intellectual as self-consciously connecting macro- and micro-levels of sociological 
analysis, as uniting the psychological and the social in his or her work Indeed, 
F.yerman and Jamison refer to the Millsian task of turning private troubles into 
public issues as a central function of social movement intellectuals (1991: 56) 
Furthermore, in making reference to the origins of their own political and 
intellectual motivations in the ‘60s student movement, they write of their desire to 
play the part of ‘partisan theorists’, public intellectuals in the Millsian mould 
(1991 8), and make such personal experience and desire a key determinant in 
their configuration of the social movement intellectual For the social movement 
does not come spontaneously into existence, the two authors tell us, but is
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dependent upon the wills, expressed in commitment and motivation, to bring it 
into being, (1991: 56)
In a later work, Eyerman writes o f the three-dimensional constitution of the 
intellectual as the self-referential element of subjective reflection mediating 
between deep-structuring and surface processes realised in cognitive and 
institutional forms and practices (1994: 20) The intellectual becomes in this 
account one who articulates the two levels by realising and re-inventing his or her 
identity as simultaneously private and public, individual and collective In this 
respect, the movement intellectual is the contemporary (re-)enactment of this 
concurrently psychological and social process. Hence, for Eyerman and Jamison, 
such intellectuals ‘are movement intellectuals because they create their individual 
role at the same time as they create the movement, as new individual identities and 
a new collective identity take form in the same interactive process.’ (1991: 98)'
The Organic Intellectual Re-visited
The intermediary character of the activist movement intellectual refers us back 
to Gramsci’s organic intellectual, who, as shown in chapter three, was conceived 
as articulating the masses and an élite, specific experiences and practices and 
deeper historical trends, as conjoining spontaneous and revolutionary
1 In D isarm in g  P a tr ia rch y  (1995). Sasha Roseneil has taken the concept o f cognitive praxis, as 
the reflexive process of the formation of identities within social movements, and applied it to the 
experience of women at the Grecnham Common peace camp. According to Roseneil. the camp 
provided an alternative public space in which ‘new forms of consciousness and new identities' 
(2) could surface and flourish. From examining women’s experiences of a life of protest at the 
camp. Roseneil identifies those new forms of consciousness and identity as ‘both the medium 
and the outcome of feminist politics.’ (136) In this way. the personal (one’s identity) becomes 
the public end of one’s activity as the elaboration of the individual identity itself becomes a 
public collective-political process
It is worth pointing out that Roseneil also quotes approvingly from Mills’ The S o c io lo g ica l 
Im agination  at the beginning o f her work, and stresses the central methodological importance of 
personal experience to sociological work.
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consciousnesses. The organic intellectual - or, rather, the creation of the organic 
intellectual - performs the articulating function objectively and subjectively - that 
is, such an intellectual makes the link through his or her organisational and 
agitational activity, and is that articulation, in his or her social existence and 
identity. From this perspective, therefore, the organic intellectual may be seen as a 
precursor to the type of movement intellectual as described by Eyerman and 
Jamison - the creation of his or her individual identity is simultaneously, as part of 
the same “interactive process”, work towards the origination of a broader, 
collective identity. The organic intellectual’s individual knowledge practice, 
reverting to the term employed by Wainwright, is necessarily a politics of 
knowledge, because it is constituted by, and constituent of, collective knowledge 
interests.
The distinction made between “old” social movements, specifically the workers’ 
movement, concerned with the material issues of production and the redistribution 
of wealth, and the new movements fixed upon qualitative, post-material concerns 
for Eyerman and Jamison necessitates drawing an additional distinction, between 
types of movement intellectual This latter distinction revolves around the 
relationship between intellectuals and masses The labour movement spawned and 
was the preserve of the ‘partisan intellectual [who] as ideologist and teacher often 
played the role of gatekeeper, deciding what was relevant for discussion and who 
was competent to participate.’ (1991: 113) Such an intellectual, according to 
Eyerman and Jamison, took on a leaderly function, seeing it as his or her task, 
upon the basis of privileged insight gained from a grounding in high culture, to 
enlighten and lead ‘“blind” social forces ’ (1991: 113) As such, he or she was a 
type of “universal” intellectual, as described by Foucault.
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Gramsci’s significance, from this point-of-view, in originating the organic 
intellectual, lay in detaching critical thinking from its association with particular 
groups and, in theory, at least, making it ‘open to all.’ (1991: 111) The organic 
intellectual was - or, would be - both the product of this process, and the process 
itself Eyerman and Jamison, in their conception of the cognitive praxis of the 
movement intellectual, take this process of opening up critical thought further 
They seek ‘to “translate” [Gramsci’s] terms into the more general language of 
sociology’ (1991: 95), thereby going beyond the specifically class genesis, context 
and identity of the organic intellectual, and detaching critical cognitive praxis from 
a purely Marxist conception of its functioning. New movement intellectuals are 
formed on a different basis to the partisan intellectuals o f  the labour movement - 
they come into being on a certain “cognitive territory”, rather than the terrain of 
class struggle, and articulate structural knowledge interests, rather than being the 
representatives of collective material interests in the cultural and ideological 
spheres In this way, Eyerman and Jamison may be seen as situated within the 
tradition of Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge (and more obliquely that of 
Critical Theory) which attempted to preserve Marxism’s emphasis upon the 
materiality of ideas and cultural formations such as identities without retaining 
what was considered to be the reductive logic of class analysis
There is no longer the intention of securing the universal hegemony of the 
working-class in the creation of the intellectuals of the new social movements; 
these new organic intellectuals are more modest and (self-)limited in their 
competence and the scope of their aspirations These intellectuals elaborate 
certain specific meanings (in Rortean parlance, speak certain vocabularies) for 
particular groups or communities Their role is specialised and often provisional,
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coming into being for a while to occupy the social space opened up for - and by - 
them. (1991: 113, 98) It is the movement, according to Fyerman and Jamison, 
which as a newly accessible terrain of identities and meanings ‘lead[s] and 
direct[s] intellectuals’ (1991: 99), rather than the other way round. Echoing 
Melucci’s assertion concerning the levelling and empowering effects of the spread 
of education, Eyerman and Jamison claim that the ‘gap between the educated 
leaders and the “masses” has been significantly diminished, and the claim to 
privileged insight on the basis of a higher cultural understanding is, justifiably, 
regarded with skepticism if not totally discredited as “ideology”.’ (1991: 114) 
Contemporary social movements may in fact be regarded as ‘largely 
movements of intellectuals’, though, paraphrasing Gramsci, the authors also 
proclaim that while all activists may be regarded as intellectuals, they do not all 
have ‘the function of intellectuals in social movements.’ (1991: 114, 94) 
Following Gramsci, therefore, the intellectual is regarded by Eyerman and 
Jamison as a situated social practice, that is, as a fundamental human capacity 
manifested and enacted in a specific social identity existing in a systems of 
relations with other such identities However, the conception of the society and its 
system of relations in which the intellectual is situated has now altered; that 
society is now considered to be fundamentally pluralistic in character, and 
constitutionally resistant to - or perhaps, intolerant of - universalisation 
Contemporary society is thus seen as consisting of a multiplicity of co-existing 
communities and groups, each with its own traditions and interests, for which 
intellectuals, as spokespersons, organisers, publicists, perform tasks of 
interpretation and facilitation of respective meanings and identities It is a society
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which, as in Rorty and in Bauman (and for that matter, as in Mannheim), is 
essentially liberal in nature.
The Corporatism of the Universal
The examples taken so far of contemporary configurations of the intellectual 
exhibit a dual movement: i) the dissolution of the boundary between specific 
social and moral experience and the domain of reflection, and ii) the fixing of 
limits upon the range and capacity of intellectual action These two dimensions are 
intimately connected: being of a specific “community of meaning”, enacting and 
enunciating particular meanings, uniting the cognitive with the affective, such 
intellectuals are grounded in specificity and can no longer entertain notions of 
universalism, or ‘Tantasies” of representing all of society, enabling its total self­
apprehension. The interpretive intellectual (the ironic intellectual) enables 
communities and traditions to understand something of one another, to be able to 
live together in a state of mutual tolerance without seeking to subsume one 
another under one dominant set of meanings, or socio-political paradigm
However, Pierre Bourdieu offers an in many ways different version of the 
contemporary intellectual His is a sociological - or, ‘realist’ (Karabel, 1996: 206) 
- account, but one which has retained a significant normative dimension. Bourdieu 
makes use of a ‘conceptual toolbox’ (Ross, 1990: 206) o f theoretical and 
analytical categories and concepts derived from Marxism, but the economic 
character of the latter is translated into more specifically cultural terms (Eagleton, 
1992 120-121) Thus, the key term in Bourdieu’s analysis of the intellectual is 
cultural capital, conceived as comprising the means and mode of cultural
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production which constitutes the basis and context for intellectual activity. For 
Bourdieu, therefore, cultural activity - production and consumption - shares the 
class character of economic activity, with capital in the cultural sphere disposed in 
order to yield “symbolic profits” for those who control it Fxonomic production 
and cultural reproduction are moments within the same historical-materialist 
movement.
On the strength of this class analysis of culture, George Ross draws a 
comparison between Bourdieu’s perspective and that of the Frankfurt School 
(1990: 224, fn.30). For Ross, in Bourdieu there is the same ‘pessimism’, the same 
‘etemalization of domination’ (1990: 224, fn.30) as found in the Critical 
Theorists. He writes: ‘Bourdieu’s class analytical model is one of deep pessimism 
about change What characterizes “reproduction” over time, to Bourdieu, is that 
the upper classes always win.’ (1990: 225, fn.46) Like the Frankfurt School, 
Bourdieu’s cultural materialism is redolent o f  Marxism, but without supplying the 
possibility for agency, the motor for change. Hence, Bourdieu is in the train of 
Western Marxism - characterised by pessimism, exhibiting the “hallmark of 
defeat”, as identified by Perry Anderson. By transplanting the economic into the 
cultural, class domination in the one is transported, is extended and magnified into 
the other. Creativity, the possibilities for a choice of life-narratives, the opening 
up of possibilities for new identities, for alternative public spaces - all such moves, 
according to this account, merely confirm existing domination
Bourdieu’s work Distinction, published in France in 1979, appears to confirm 
the above account of his position. According to Ross, it is in this text that 
Bourdieu’s ‘affinity’ with the Critical Theorists ‘is most obvious ’ (1990: 224, 
fn 30) Thus, there he writes of the counter-cultural lifestyles of the young and of
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the predominant “fun ethic” of the petite bourgeoisie as ‘a practical utopianism 
which was. [once] the privilege of intellectuals, and as ‘a sort of dream of social 
flying, a desperate effort to defy the gravity of the social field.’ (1984: 370) This 
is lifestylism in the most pejorative sense. The ‘new intellectuals’ of the petite 
bourgeoisie is seen as indulging itself in a cod bohemianism, ‘inventing an art of 
living which provides them with the gratifications and prestige of the intellectual 
at the least cost.’ (1984: 370) In effect, they adopt poses, postures, superficial 
forms of what was once an integral intellectual identity and practice - ‘the 
distinctive poses, the distinctive games and other external signs of inner riches 
previously reserved for the intellectuals ’ (1984: 371) The adoption of the fun 
ethic, defined as the refusal of the ‘finite, definite, final’ (1984: 370) (as in Rorty) 
and as the rejection of the ready-made and the predetermined in favour of the 
“liberatory” circulation of values and meanings, results in the perfection of 
consumption, and hence the reproduction of the economic order
For Bourdieu, lifestylism breaks down experiential boundaries and structures 
built up collectively (such structures as were the concern of Gramsci and 
Thompson) as the foundations of political and ethical identities, and leaves behind 
isolated consumers ‘free (or forced) to confront in extended order the separate 
markets ’ (1984: 371) The “new intellectuals’” rejection of hierarchical 
classificatory systems (of knowledge, particularly) (1984: 370) dissolves the 
boundary between everyday life and intellectual activity (public reflection upon 
core values, modes of life, dominant systems of ideas and beliefs) and opens the 
way to the complete penetration of both by commercial forces
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Bruce Robbins sees in this analysis of lifestylism and consumer culture a 
hostility to and rejection of the pluralisation and démocratisation of culture 
Robbins argues in Secular Vocations (1993) for the public-political relevance of 
the discipline of cultural studies as rooted in the value of popular culture and 
forms of experience. The pessimistic scenario offered by Bourdieu, according to 
Robbins, is founded upon universal, homogenising cultural capital, which reduces 
all moves in the social-cultural “game” to being determined by interest - an 
interest in increasing the stock of such capital. For Robbins, however,
The threat to cultural capital posed by cultural studies is clear For 
Bourdieu, culture is necessarily empty of any popular or democratic input 
Its contents are arbitrary, fixed in advance by the state, and ruled only by 
the dominant class to win at the “main social games” and thus maintain its 
privileges (1993: 208)
Because cultural studies credits cultural producers (especially popular cultural 
producers) with the competence - the agency - to engage in “symbolic exchanges” 
and thereby create “surplus value” (of meaning, of legitimacy, of symbolic power) 
(Baudrillard, 1995: 82) which they can themselves appropriate, it undermines the 
notion of an all-encompassing, “eternalising” domination on the part of the state 
However, precisely because Bourdieu’s analysis is statist, according to Robbins, it 
seeks to subvert the credibility of cultural studies as expressive of cultural- 
political radicalism. Cultural studies becomes ‘a form of populism’ (Fagleton, 
1992: 119), which is seen by Bourdieu as ‘inverted ethnocentrism’ (1984: 374), 
that is, no more than a conservative mystificatory strategy which elevates the 
particular and local to the status of the universal and global
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According to Robbins, Bourdieu dismisses the legitimation of intellectual 
practice on the basis of “the people” as the utilisation of so much cultural capital 
at the same time as himself drawing upon ‘the limitless credit of the state’ (1993: 
208) and thereby trumping one authority with another. Bourdieu’s pessimistic 
view of contemporary cultural radicalism involves raising the state to the status of 
‘a superhuman power’ (1993: 209) and in the process legitimates in perpetuity his 
own project of intellectual opposition to it Bourdieu’s pessimistic universalisation 
confirms itself and the loss of that agency and efficacy which the contemporary 
intellectual, as cultural activist, claims for cultural producers
However, recent work - and activity - by Bourdieu adds more to the narrative 
of outright pessimism offered by Ross and Robbins. That work also shows 
Bourdieu attempting to re-formulate the statist, universalist conception of the 
intellectual as identified by Robbins, affirming as he does a dialectic operating in 
intellectual practice between “modesty” and “ambition”, the particular and the 
universal. Whereas the dissolution of the boundary between the public and the 
profession (‘There can be no clear border between speaking to ourselves and 
speaking to others’ (1993: 88-89)) for Robbins leads to a self-limited conception 
of the intellectual - the professional (“secular”) practitioner adhering to the public 
value of his or her practice -, the maintenance of the separation between the 
autonomous field of the intellectual and the heteronomous forces pressing upon it 
(1996: 346-348) for Bourdieu provides the foundation for action outside of that 
field It is the autonomy of the cultural producer in his or her own field that lays 
the basis for efficacy in other fields
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In his analysis of contemporary intellectual practice, Robbins constructs a 
paradigm of universal corporatism according to which contemporary 
professionalism offers the possibility of superseding the established oppositions 
between interest and disinterest, private and public, inside and outside in the 
various fields of knowledge practice. It is no longer possible to see a stark 
opposition between the universal state and corporate professions: ‘[b]oth state 
and profession are sedimented composites of past social forces, democratic and 
anti-democratic, which the same forces continue to shape and reshape ’ (1993: 
218) Specific fields of knowledge seek to articulate private and public interest in 
much the same way as does the state
For his part, Bourdieu offers up the possibility of a corporatism o f the 
universal This is understood as residing in the intellectuals’ aspiration for 
autonomy to defend their own interests, to resist the heteronomous forces of 
commerce, becoming a defence of the universal interest For Bourdieu, the 
‘antinomy’ ‘between autonomy and commitment, between pure culture and 
politics’ (1996: 340) is precisely that which the intellectual tries to overcome, is 
that which makes the intellectual He proposes that the appearance of the 
possibility of ‘a politics o f purity' (1996: 342) was coterminous with the 
appearance of the intellectuals themselves That is to say, at that point (identified 
by Bourdieu with Zola’s intervention in the Dreyfus Affair (1996: 342) there 
appeared the possibility of making political interventions on the basis of the 
“pure” cultural field which conferred upon the intellectual an authority purified of 
all external interests
After C.Wright Mills and William James, Bourdieu talks of the potential 
available at the present time for the formation of an ‘Internationale o f
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intellectuals' (1996: 344) which would constitute a collective mobilisation of 
intellectuals to take control of the means of cultural production. Thus, he writes in 
conclusion:
Cultural producers will not find again a place of their own in the social 
world unless.. they agree to work collectively for the defence of their own 
interests. This should lead them to assert themselves as an international 
power of criticism and watchfulness, or even of proposals, in the face of 
the technocrats, or - with an ambition both more lofty and more realistic, 
and hence limited to their own sphere - to get involved in rational action 
to defend the economic and social conditions of the autonomy of these 
socially privileged universes in which the material and intellectual 
instruments of what we call Reason are produced and reproduced. (1996: 
348)
Again, it is the limits and boundaries of intellectual action which provide the 
grounds for action beyond them (“an ambition both more lofty and more 
realistic”) To the raison d’etat is counterposed the ‘Realpolitik o f reason' (1996: 
348) After the philosophes, as conceived by Gramsci, after Zola, and most 
importantly, after Sartre, the universalising, autonomous, pure character of 
rational practice supplies the foundation for impure activities To mind one’s own 
rational business - as specialist, as expert, as cultural producer - is to mind 
everyone else’s business
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Professionals and Intellectuals
The distinction between the notions of cultural production proposed by 
Robbins and Bourdieu may be seen to be less analytical and methodological in 
nature, and more a matter of attitude and tradition, those areas in which the 
intellectual principally is constituted. Each rejects an absolute opposition between 
purity and impurity, engagement and detachment, closeness and distance. Thus, 
for Robbins, disembodied theory in actuality embodies the eye of the public 
already placed within a discipline (1993: 107), and for Bourdieu, the purity of 
culture constitutes its very material, very impure embodiment However, there is a 
difference between these two in the that Robbins and Bourdieu offer “alternative 
historical narratives” of the intellectual — narratives which give present form to 
specific traditions of a national, political and conceptual character, and which 
provide the contextual foundations for certain kinds of identity and practice
The key division between these alternative narratives revolves around the 
respective attitudes taken towards the place of the state in Left political culture, 
and towards the relationship between the state and the professions As such, the 
division between Bourdieu and Robbins with regard to the contemporary identity 
and practice of the intellectual exemplifies ‘the current debates between 
modernists and postmodernists’ written of by Nicholas Gamham (1995: 365), 
which are concerned not only with determining just which particular paradigm of 
the intellectual should be subscribed to in present circumstances but whether the 
intellectual as a category o f cultural-political actor is any longer of any relevance 
at all
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In making a comparison between Left culture in the United States and in 
Britain, Robbins refers to ‘the lack of an American counterpart to that positive 
faith in the State [found in] the British ’ (1993: 213) This faith, one may say, 
may also be found in French Left culture. According to Robbins, in the United 
States professionalism became relatively more important and gained a firmer hold 
because there the state (the administrative apparatus) developed relatively late, 
thus allowing corporate groups to seize the opportunities to organise production 
and take control of the economic sphere (1993: 214) (One may draw an 
interesting contrast here with the development of the Russian intelligentsia, as 
described in the previous chapter, which sought to clear a space for itself free 
from state regulation and intrusion )
One can think here again of C Wright Mills Mills persistently argued for the 
assumption of responsibility by members of the social-science professions As 
seen in chapter four, The Sociological Imagination centred on the task of turning 
academic-professional practice into craftsmanship, construed as a labour of 
personal or biographical investment in one’s work, and thus giving it, 
paradoxically, public relevance and value Mills sought the integration of the 
public person - that is, the person who participates in the everyday life of the polis 
and society - and the member of the corporate or professional body.
I have already written of F.yerman’s and Jamison’s attempt, in the form of a 
partisan professionalism, to perform the task identified by Mills, and one can 
count them among the ‘60s legatees of Mills’ ‘alternative professionalism.’ 
(F.yerman and Jamison, 1994: 17) In his account of a publicly relevant 
professionalism, Robbins also places the struggle of American student radicals in 
this Millsian frame, claiming that ‘the institutional and ideological structure of the
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professions was not simply and ironically what the radicals of the 1960s were 
fighting against, but also a major influence in defining what they were fighting 
fo r .’ (1993: 53) Rather than being a ‘Tall” from disinterested political 
commitment into compromised institutionalisation, Robbins sees the story of 
professionalism as a more complicated tale o f the repeated attempt to synthesise 
the two.
Robbins points to the example of the development of feminist literary studies 
as just such a case in point: that development has not been a history of 
transformation from “pure” commitment to an “impure” institutional placement 
but rather, in the words of Jane Gallop, ‘an ongoing history of divided loyalties’ 
(cited 1993: 53). And elsewhere Gallop elaborates on this point: ‘Again and again 
[from the earliest days of feminist criticism] the academic feminist critic strive[s] 
for a synthesis of feminism and intrinsic literary study, trying to resolve a conflict 
between her feminist identity and her institutional identity, between valuing 
women and valuing literature ’ (1992: 88) One may find in this an echo of Hilary 
Wainwright’s earlier quoted comment that feminists are simultaneously an 
oppressed group and its intellectuals, suggesting that in the identity of the feminist 
activist experience and reflection, thought and action come together -  that, in 
fact, that identity is itself the dialectical elaboration of the unity of theory and 
practice
However, in her conception of feminism and of the women’s movement as a 
social and political movement Wainwright presupposes the existence of a “classic” 
modem public realm of political discourses and institutional bodies and practices 
which exists independent of the specific instances out of which it is composed 
Her purpose is the transformation of “govemmentality” by bringing the public
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sphere o f governmental politics closer to the experience of situated social groups 
and ‘the institutions of everyday life.’ (1994: 273) Gallop’s concern, on the other 
hand, is with the nature of professionalism as embodied in academic feminism, as 
that in which the conventional distinction or opposition between the inside of the 
profession and the outside of the public is inappropriate. The feminist literary 
professional, according to this view, has a ‘double view-point’ as an academic and 
as a feminist, has a ‘contradictory identity’ in which the other of the professional 
is itself. (1992: 90) But whereas in Sartre such self-division signified the 
recognition of the limits of the professional identity which simultaneously called 
for its (self-)transcendence, here it signifies the confirmation of the limits of the 
professional as that beyond which one can not venture. The professional now 
includes the non-professional within itself and thus constitutes the limit of both.
It is such a conception of a contradictory professionalism that has underpinned 
more broadly the academic activist strategy of “political correctness”, which grew 
up on American campuses particularly during the 1980s, and which may be 
thought of as a strategy of the partisan professional Though it is difficult to place 
it under one heading or paradigm (something, moreover, I would be reluctant to 
do, in view of the fact that hostile commentators often resort to reductionist 
representations for their own purposes) political correctness in general represents 
an attempt to bring issues of race, gender and sexuality (and to a lesser extent, 
class) into the classroom by way of curricular and pedagogical reform, and policy 
proposals which address issues o f social exclusion on campuses more generally 
As such, it can be seen as anti-Weberian in its tendency to politicise the classroom 
and to tip the scales of debate (and tuition) in favour of the most disadvantaged 
social groups The dissolution of boundaries between the plurality of social
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subjectivities -  “subject positions” -  and objectivity, between the practical 
situated consciousness of a member of a specific “experiential community” and 
generalising theoretical consciousness has led to the validation of a professional 
practice as having a public, extra-professional significance and efficacy. At the 
same time, however, academic activism, to the extent that it seeks to incorporate 
substantive social and political issues into its institutional discourses and practices, 
provides the possibility of those discourses and practices being legitimated as the 
sole context in which those issues can be adequately articulated and addressed 
The aspiration to dissolve the boundary between the classroom and the wider 
society, to transform academic practice into a form of political practice carries 
with it the danger of its becoming the privileged form of that practice, if the 
profession is not located within the context of a broader public sphere.
The representation of professionalism offered by Robbins and Gallop is one 
where the world “outside” is brought into academic practice; like the Critical 
Theorists of chapter two, they may be said to present theory itself as a kind of 
practice, though here without the prevailing mood of pessimism, the sense of loss 
of potency that characterised the former In Bourdieu, however, there is a 
movement in a counter direction: the professional practitioner seeks to purify his 
or her practice in order to make it effective in the world beyond it
As we have seen, Robbins equates state and profession as those locations 
where the private and the public, the personal and the impersonal come into 
relation, are shaped by, and themselves shape social life. However, even if we may 
agree broadly with this claim, it is necessary to point out that that relationship 
takes on a different, and opposed, form in each case If in the profession the
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boundary between private and public may be said to have been broken down, so 
that the inside of the profession can no longer be separated from the outside of the 
world which is supposed to constitute its referent, this has the effect only of 
confirming the profession’s legitimacy within the state. That is to say, the 
outcome of this reflexive operation is the mutual confirmation of the positions of 
both: the state is confirmed in its legitimacy by allowing such an “impure” and 
encompassing profession within its borders, a profession that includes within the 
compass of its competence the whole range of political, moral and existential 
problems and issues proper to the lives o f its heterogeneous and divided citizenry. 
The profession, meanwhile, is confirmed in its particularity precisely because in 
its scope it is a whole world unto itself. The competence of such a professional is 
a worldly competence, and therefore there is no need for him or her to aspire to 
get beyond it
In the state, on the other hand, the relationship between private and public is 
inclusive of both professional and non-professional practices and bodies, 
encompasses institutional and quasi- or non-institutional forces These exist within 
the state as distinct, bounded phenomena, which, as such, seek to overcome each 
other and in identifying themselves with the state get beyond their own limits The 
state becomes thereby the location for the expression of an aspiration to go 
beyond the limits of the particular, while at the same time holding those 
boundaries in place Or, one may say, the state both produces that aspiration, 
offering the possibility of universal transformation, and thus of its own negation, 
and in its very impurity, the fact that it is the site of a plurality of self-confirming 
aspirant entities, negates it
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This analysis allows one to develop a more complex and positive view of 
Bourdieu’s “statist” intellectual, as that which represents a contemporary 
manifestation of that tradition, than that offered by Robbins From this point-of- 
view, the statism of the intellectual does not simply consist in the fact that he or 
she draws upon the universalist symbolic credit of the state in order to legitimate 
and support his or her corporate intellectual identity and interest. Rather, the state 
provides the intellectual with a foundation for an aspiration or ambition to go 
beyond his or her competence which is at the same time integral to that 
competence. This, however, does not add up to the confirmation of the 
professional specialism as that which has overcome in itself the opposition 
between theory and experience, public and private. For, the very existence o f an 
aspiration to transcend the limits placed upon the autonomy of the intellectual, the 
ambition to escape the forces that transform the intellectual into one corporate 
interest amongst others, signifies an absence within the profession that can only be 
addressed by transforming the extra-professional conditions in which it exists.
The intellectual’s orientation upon the state as that which is both the expression 
of concrete class interests and forces, and the context in, and the means by, which 
those interests might be transcended provides the basis for the identity and role of 
the intellectual as a certain kind of professional and the transcendence of that 
identity and role. From this perspective, the characteristic activity of the “statist” 
intellectual -  the institution of independent public bodies, campaigns and 
committees, the formation of political and cultural movements (for Bourdieu’s 
recent participation in this sort of activity, see Jennings, 1997: 79-80) -  is not only 
dependent upon the extra-professional in concrete terms (as a membership, 
signatory, audience) but also in the sense of constituting an ideal which the
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intellectual, as intellectual, attempts to realise, but, simultaneously, recognises as 
beyond his or her competence.
The contemporary emphasis upon the necessary limits o f intellectual practice 
based upon the recognition of the specificity of a plurality of knowledges to 
certain communities of experience is seen as exemplifying the postmodern 
moment in politics and culture. Bauman’s interpreter, Rorty’s ironist, the reflexive 
individual of Giddens and Melucci, the fluid and provisional intellectuals of the 
social movements described by Eyerman, Jamison and Wainwright, the academic 
activist of Robbins and Gallop -  all are seen as coming into existence in a milieu 
in which the supposed “givens” of social and political life have been called into 
question and found wanting. The “fixed” boundaries between subjective and 
objective modes of life and thought, between a singular “way things are” and a 
plurality of partial approximations to that truth are thought to  have broken down, 
probably irretrievably
As part of this general dissolution, the intellectual can no longer claim a special 
subjectivity that allows him or her to legislate authoritatively between competing 
versions of the truth, or offer universalist “solutions” to social and political 
problems Indeed, as just this sort of social subject the intellectual is now regarded 
in many quarters as inextricably bound to the fate of modernity, being deemed to 
having been a central protagonist in that particular narrative of state-formation 
and social and cultural centralisation The rejection of one, therefore, necessarily 
entails the rejection of the other
Naturally enough, according to this logic, the recognition of the continuing 
validity of the category of the intellectual as elaborated by Bourdieu above is also 
a recognition of the continuing relevance of the modem To endorse a “statist”
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universalising role for the intellectual in a pluralist society that is becoming 
apparently increasingly fragmented and heterogeneous, a globalised society in 
which the state seems to be of less and less relevance, would appear to be no 
more than “nostalgic”, as Baudrillard would have it. As such, it would amount to 
making a demand upon contemporary society which it could no longer deliver, 
seeking to play a “game” the rules of which no longer apply
However, in answer to this, one can say that the intellectual has always been 
divided against itself, that it has been characterised by contradiction and a 
dialectic of the universal and the particular It is, therefore, difficult, if not 
incorrect, wholly to identify the “universal” intellectual with an overweening 
repressive modernity (that which is to be rejected) and the “specific” intellectual 
or situated knowledge practitioner with a fluid, democratic postmodemity (that 
which is to be accepted) For the intellectual, as I have tried to show, is that which 
has arisen out of the conflict between a specialist professional competence and the 
transcendent aspirations attendant upon that competence, is that which has sought 
to articulate and to overcome the tension between an “impure” situated identity 
and the “pure” practice of that identity. The intellectual is not only that which is 
“told” in “alternative historical narratives” but is also that diverse process of 
telling itself As long as we acknowledge this dialectic of identity and practice, 
“form” and “content” as reflexively operative in the constitution of social subjects 
the intellectual may remain a valid category
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